目　录

中文目录

英文目录

企鹅口袋书系列·伟大的思想

看不见的手

（英汉双语）

［英］亚当·斯密　著

马睿　译

中国出版集团

中国对外翻译出版公司

1

论劳动分工

人类劳动生产力最显著的提高，以及人们在进行劳动、应用劳动时所体现出来的绝大部分技能、熟练性和决断力，似乎都是劳动分工的结果。

要了解劳动分工在社会的一般事务中的作用，比较容易的方法是考察在某些具体的制造业中是如何进行劳动分工的。人们普遍认为，在某些微不足道的制造业中，劳动分工是最细的；或许并不是这些微不足道的制造业真的要比那些更为重要的制造业分工更细，而是在那些只须满足少数人的少量需求的微小制造业中，工人的总数必然很少，整个工作过程中各个不同部门雇用的人员往往可以聚集在同一个车间，我们可以一下子就看见他们。相反，在那些满足大多数人的大量需求的大型制造业中，工作过程中每一个不同的工作部门都会雇用很多人，所以不可能将他们集中在一个车间干活。除了在同一个部门干活的人之外，我们很少能一次看见很多人。因此，尽管和那些微小的制造业相比，这类制造业中的劳动实际上划分要细致得多，分成很多部门，但其分工并不是特别明显，因而不太会被人注意。

故试举一个非常微小的制造业，在该制造业中人们往往能够注意到劳动分工的例子，比如别针制造业。一个没有受过任何职业培训（劳动分工使之成为一种专门的职业），也不熟悉该职业所使用的机械如何应用（同样，这类机械的发明很可能是劳动分工的结果）的人或许无论怎样吃苦耐劳，勤勤恳恳，也不一定能一天做出一枚别针，更不能做20枚了。但是该行业发展到今天，不仅整个工作已成为专门的职业，而且这种职业又分成了许多部门，其中大部分部门又逐渐成为专门的职业。一个人抽出铁丝，另一个人将其拉直，第三个人将其切断，第四个人将其一端削尖，第五个人将另一端打磨好以便装上圆头；制作圆头则另需要三种不同的操作；装圆头、把针涂白，以及把针装到纸盒里都已经是专门的职业。这样，别针制造这样一个重要的职业就被分成大约18种不同的工序。在有些工厂中，这18种不同的工序分别由18个人操作，而在其他工厂，有时会有一个人担任两三种不同的操作。我见过一间这种类型的小工厂，只雇用了10个人，其中有几个人从事两三种不同的操作。尽管他们很穷而根本不考虑购买必要的机械设备，但他们如果勤勉努力，仍然能够每天制造12磅重的别针。中等大小的别针，1磅最多可达4000枚。以此计算，这10个人一天最多可以生产48000枚别针，每个人的生产量为这一总数的1/10，这样我们可以大致推断出，每人每天可以制造4800枚别针。但是如果所有这些人分开独立工作，且其中没有人受过该行业的专门培训的话，则每人每天制造的别针数量不会达到20枚，甚至有可能1枚也制造不出来；那样一来，他们每天的工作量或许不及现今工作量的1/240，甚至不及现今工作量的1/4800，相比之下，如今的高效正是合理分工和不同工种之间协同合作的结果。

别针制造虽然是微不足道的行业，但就劳动分工的效果来说，其他各种工艺和制造业与其没有什么差别，尽管许多行业中的劳动分工没有这么细，也不可能简化成如此简单的操作。然而一旦可以进行劳动分工，则必然可以在每一种工艺中相应地提高劳动生产力。各个行业之所以各自分立，雇用不同的员工，似乎也是因为劳动分工能够带来这样的裨益。那些工业水平和劳动生产力水平极高的国家，其行业分工的程度也很高；在较为原始的社会中由一个人完成的工作，在较为现代的国家则一般需要好几个人协作完成。在每一个进步的社会中，农民一般只是单纯的农民，而制造业者也只是单纯的制造业者。而且任何一件完整的制造业产品也几乎总是必须由许多人共同完成。以制麻业和毛织业为例，从亚麻和羊毛的生产到麻布的漂白和烫平，再到麻布的染色和浆纱，各部门使用了许多不同的技艺。和制造业相比，农业的性质的确不容许有这么多精细的劳动分工，各种工作彼此也不像制造业那样完全独立分开。我们不可能将养畜人和谷物种植者的工作截然分立，但是木匠和铁匠所从事的工艺则完全不同。纺纱和织布几乎是完全不同的两个行当，而犁耕、耙掘、播种和收割经常可以由同一个人进行。农业对这些不同种类劳动的需要是随着一年中季节的变化而变换的，因此不可能雇用一个人经常性地来从事其中任何一种劳动。或许正因为不能雇用完全不同的人来从事不同类型的农业劳动，农业生产力的提高总是不能够与工业同步。的确，一般来说最富有的国家在农业和制造业方面都要优于邻国，然而相对于农业而言，这些国家在制造业方面的优越性通常更为明显和突出。在这些富有的国家，土地的耕种情况更好，所投入的劳动力和资本也更多，在土地面积和肥沃程度相同的情况下，也能有更多的产出。因而其农产品产量上的优越程度很少能与劳动力和资本投入上的优越程度成正比。在农业方面，富国和穷国劳动力的生产力水平差异并不一定很大；或至少不会像制造业的生产力水平差异那么大。因此，如果质量相同的话，富国生产的谷物价格不一定会比穷国低廉。在质量相同的情况下，波兰生产的谷物价格可能会和法国一样，尽管后者的富裕和社会进步程度要优于前者。在法国那些生产谷物的省份，谷物的质量和英国的谷物完全没有差别，在大多数年份中其价格也与英国谷物持平，尽管法国的富裕和社会进步程度或许要逊于英国。然而就田地的耕种水平来说，英国要高于法国，据说法国的耕种水平也大大高于波兰。不过尽管在耕种水平较为低下的穷国，谷物的价格和质量可以在一定程度上与富国媲美，但在制造业方面则根本不能妄想；至少在富国的土壤、气候和天然条件适合这些制造业的时候，情况是这样。法国的丝绸比英国的更物美价廉，因为至少在当前生丝进口关税如此之高的情况下，法国的气候比英国更适宜丝绸生产。然而英国的五金器具和生羊毛无论从哪一方面来说都远胜于法国，在质量相同的前提下，其价格也比法国便宜。据说波兰除了少数几种家庭用品制造业外几乎没有什么制造业，这少数几种还都是些较为原始的，任何国家都不可或缺的制造业。

有了劳动分工，单位数量的人在单位时间内可以从事的工作比过去多得多，主要有三个原因：首先，每一个工人的劳动熟练程度提高了；其次，由一个工种转到另一个工种通常要损失很多时间，现在这些时间省下了；最后，大量提高劳动效率、精简劳动强度的机器的发明，使得如今一个人可以做过去许多人做的工作。

先看第一个原因。工人劳动熟练程度的提高必然会增加他可以从事的劳动的数量；劳动分工将每一个人的业务简化为某一种简单的操作，这又使这一操作成为此人一生所从事的唯一职业，由此必然会大大提高工人的劳动熟练程度。一个惯于使用铁锤却从不曾练习如何制作铆钉的铁匠，一旦遭遇某种特殊情况必须试着制作铆钉，我坚信他每天可能最多制作两三枚，且铆钉的质量还低劣不堪。即便是经常制作铆钉的铁匠，如果铆钉制作不是他唯一或主要的工作，即使他竭尽全力，也很难在一天之内制作出800或1000枚铆钉。我见过几个不到20岁的青年，他们除了制作铆钉外没有练习过其他技艺，这些人如果竭尽全力，则每人每天最多可以制作2300枚铆钉。然而制作铆钉绝不是最为简单的操作。同一个人要拉风箱，要在必要时调整火力，要将铁烧热，锤打铆钉的每一部分；在锻造钉头时他还不得不换工具。如果将制作一枚别针或一个金属钮扣的整个工序细分成不同的操作，所有的操作就要简单得多，如果一个人以其中的某一种操作作为一生的职业的话，其劳动的熟练程度就要高得多。制造业中某些工序的完成速度极其快，在那些从未亲眼见过的人看来，人类的双手根本不可能可以达到这样的速度。

第二，由一个工种转换到另一个工种通常要损失很多时间，而节省这段时间所带来的好处也绝不是我们一开始就能够想到的。人们不可能从一个工种很快转换到另一个位于不同地点且需要完全不同的工具进行操作的工种。一个乡间的织工同时耕种一小片耕地，离开织机走到田间就需要一段时间，从田间回到织机还需要一段时间。诚然，如果可以在同一个车间进行两种业务操作，所花费的时间无疑会减少很多，但即使是这样，浪费仍然是巨大的。人们从一个工作转到另一个工作，一般都会休息或闲逛一会儿，很难在刚开始一项新工作时就精力集中地全情投入；这时他们总是难免心不在焉，因此有一段时间与其说他们在工作，不如说他们在虚晃时间。每一个农村劳动者因为每半个小时就要更换工作和工具，一生中几乎每天都要做20种不同的工作，自然而且一定会养成这种闲逛和懒散的习惯，这常常会导致农村劳动者总是懒惰散漫，即使时间紧迫，他们也不能够全身心地投入工作。这样看来，先不说他是否技艺娴熟，单此一个原因，就大大降低了他的工作效率。

第三，也是最后一个原因。每个人都知道应用适当的机械设备能够在某种程度上提高劳动效率、简化劳动工序，再举例论证难免多余。因此我在这里只需讨论一下，所有那些提高效率、简化工序的机器之所以被发明问世，起因也都是劳动分工。只有人们不再在各种工序和工具的转换中浪费时间，而是全身心地投入到一个目标上时，才更有可能发现更加简单和快速地达到该目标的方法。而分工的结果，正是每个人都自然而然地把全部注意力投注在某一种很单一的目标上。因此只要工作的性质还有改良的余地，在每一个具体劳动部门从事具体劳动的人自然会很快发现新的方法，使其自身的工作更加简单，完成起来也更容易。在劳动分工最细的制造业中使用的大多数机器，最初都是由普通工人发明的，他们受雇从事某些很简单的操作，自然会考虑如何找到更加简单和快速的方法来执行这些操作。那些常去这类制造业参观的人一定会经常看到这类设计相当巧妙的机器，它们就是这类工人为了改进和提高各自特定工作的效率而发明的。在最早的蒸汽机中，本来需要雇用一个男孩根据活塞的升降不断转换开关，连接和断开锅炉和汽缸之间的通路。其中一个男孩因为贪玩，发现在开关该通路的阀门把手处系上一根绳子，阀门即可自行开关，这样他就能跑去和玩伴们游戏了。这是自蒸汽机发明以来人们对其做出的最大改进之一，而这一改进正是一个希望节省劳动的小男孩发现的。

然而，绝不是所有机械设备的改进都是有机会使用这些机器的人发明的。许多改进是出于机械制造师的聪明才智，而所谓的机械制造师，正是在机械制造成为一个专门行业之后形成的；有些则是所谓的哲学家或思想者的智慧结晶，他们并非每日身体力行地做事，而是以观察万物为业；因此，这些人往往能够将一些完全不同且毫不相干的事物的力量结合起来加以利用。和其他各个行业一样，随着社会的逐渐进步，哲学或思考也成为某一类公民主要或唯一的职业。同样，和其他各个行业一样，哲学也被细分为大量不同的分支，每一个分支又为一群或一类哲学家提供专门职业；哲学行业的分工，也和所有其他行业的细致分工一样，提高了人们的技艺熟练程度，节约了时间。每个人更加专精于自己所从事的那份工作。这样一来，从总体而言，就能做更多的工作，从而大大提高了这门学问的整体质量。

在一个治理得很好的社会中，正是劳动分工使得所有不同行业的生产力水平大为提高，为整个社会带来了普遍财富，最底层的人也能够享受到这种普遍财富带来的利益。每个工人在自己的工作中所创造的产品大大超出了他自己的需要；所有其他人的情况也完全一样，能用大量自己的产品换得大量他人生产的产品或等价物品。他大量提供给他人所需要的产品，后者也同样大量满足他个人的需要；整个社会的所有阶层就普遍富裕起来。

考察一下一个文明和繁荣国家中最普通的工匠或临时工的生活用品，你就会知道，为了使他们能享用到这些生活用品，那些行业中的人必须提供自己生产的一部分，但这样的人却多得难以计数。以临时工身上穿的羊毛外衣为例，无论看起来多么粗制滥造，也是许许多多工人共同劳动的成果。牧羊人、选毛人、梳毛人、染工、梳理工、纺工、织工、漂洗工、裁缝工，等等，必须将这些人的工作结合起来，才能够完成如此简单朴素的一件产品。加之这些劳动者的住处往往相隔很远，在彼此之间运送材料，又需要多少商人和运输工人啊！染工所使用的染料往往来自世界另一端某个遥远的角落，要将各种不同的染料汇集在一起，又需要多少商人、运输工，加上船工、水手、帆布和绳索制造者的辛勤工作！还有，这些工人手中拿的哪怕是最简单的工具，又需要多少不同的劳动工种相互协作！水手的船只、漂洗工的作坊，甚至织工的织机这类复杂的机械姑且不论，单说那无比简单的器具，牧羊人修剪羊毛的剪刀，都需要许多种不同的劳动才能制成。为了生产这样一把简单的剪刀，就需要把采矿工、熔炉制造工、伐木工、熔矿炉所用焦炭的烧炭工、制砖工、泥瓦匠、锅炉工、作坊建造者、锻工、铁匠等所有人各自不同的技艺全部结合起来才行。如果我们以同样的方式再考察一下他身上穿的所有衣服或家里的所有家具，他贴身穿的粗麻衬衫、脚上穿的鞋子、家里睡的床，乃至这张床的不同部件、他在厨房做饭用的炉子、他做饭所用的煤炭（那可是从地下深处挖掘出来，或许经过很远的水路和陆路运输才到达他这里），乃至厨房里的其他各种用具、桌子上的所有用具、刀叉、盛放和分发食物用的陶瓷盘子和锡盘子，为他制作面包和啤酒要用到多少工种、雇用多少工人，他房间里保温、采光、遮风挡雨用的玻璃窗——那华美而令人愉快的发明中凝聚着多少知识和艺术，没有玻璃，整个北半球大概没有一处适宜人们舒适地居住——再想一想，为生产所有这些生活用品所雇用的人手中又要拿着多少种不同的工具；总之，如果我们考察一下所有这些物品，想一想其中每一件物品要雇用多少劳动力才能制成，就能够理解，在文明社会中，如果没有成千上万人的协助和合作，普通工人就不可能得到他通常所能得到的那些按照我们的理解，平常而又简单的生活用品。诚然，和大人物豪华奢侈的生活相比，普通工人的生活用品看上去当然无比简单；不过，这可是真的，欧洲某国王子的生活用品并非总是远超一个勤劳节俭的农民的生活用品，而后者的生活用品却超过了许多非洲君主的生活用品，要知道这些大人物可是成千上万赤裸草民生命和自由的绝对主宰啊！

2

劳动分工的原理

尽管人类智慧地预见到劳动分工能够带来普遍富裕，并希望利用它来实现这一目的，劳动分工，乃至其产生的诸多裨益，却不是人类智慧的结晶。它是人性中某种倾向的必然结果——尽管产生这种结果需要经历一个缓慢而渐进的过程，而其本身也未曾期待有如此广泛的效用——那就是物物交换、以物易物和互相交易的倾向。

这种倾向到底是人性中最原始又无法进一步解释说明的原则之一，还是听起来更接近于事实，是人类理性和言语能力的必然结果，并不是我们当前探究的话题。这种倾向人人皆有，亦为人所特有，其他动物不会拥有，其他动物似乎不懂得订立任何形式的契约——包括这种交换在内。两只猎犬在追逐同一只野兔时，有时会出现某种意义上的协同行为：将猎物驱往对方的方向，或者在猎物被逐至己方时努力拦截。然而猎犬之间的彼此“配合”并非因为它们受到某种契约的约束，而是因为恰巧在那个特定时刻，它们对同一个目标产生了共同的渴望。我们从未见过两只狗公平谨慎地交换彼此的骨头，也从未见过有任何动物通过自己的肢体动作和叫声向同类示意这是我的，那是你的；我想用我的这根骨头来换你的那根。如果动物想从人或者其他动物那里得到什么，除了博取对方欢心之外，没有其他的说服手段。小狗若要吃奶，就得奉承讨好母狗；家犬若要得到食物，就得在主人就餐之时做出种种娇态引起注意。人类对其同伴有时也会采用同样的手段。当有求于他人又没有其他办法达到目的时，他会卑躬屈膝、阿谀奉承来博得他人的好感。然而一个人并不总是如此幸运。在文明社会，人们随时会需要他人的各种合作和帮助，虽倾其一生也难以结交到几个知己好友。在其他动物中，每个个体一旦发育成熟便完全独立，在自然状态下，并不需要其他动物的帮助。但是人却时常需要同伴的帮助，而单单指望对方的善心是徒劳无益的。如果能够影响他们，利用其利己之心，使其明白此时提供帮助完全符合其自身的利益，那么达到目的可能性就要大一些。任何一个希望和他人进行交易的人都会这样提议。这种提议的要义在于：给我我想要的，你就能得到你想要的。正是通过这种方式，彼此得到了自己所需要的绝大部分服务。我们的一日三餐并非来自屠夫、酿酒师或面包烘焙师的恩惠，而是来源于他们对自身利益的考虑。我们不是向他们乞求仁慈，而是诉诸他们的利己之心；我们不谈论我们的需要，而只谈对他们的好处。除了乞丐，不会有人选择把大部分希望寄托于他人的恩惠，即使乞丐也并不全依赖于此。乐善好施之人的施舍的确为乞丐提供了全部生存必需品。由此，尽管乞丐通过这种方法最终获得了他的全部生活所需，但他没有，也不可能在每当有需要的时候得到自己想要的东西。和其他人一样，他也要通过协定、交换和购买来满足自己平时绝大多数的需求。他用某人施舍的钱买来了食物；用另一个人赠予的旧衣物换来适合自己尺寸的旧衣物，或栖身之所，或一餐食物，或者他把旧衣卖掉，用得来的钱随时购买自己需要的食物、衣服或住所。

正如人们通过协定、交换和买卖等方式彼此获得了自己需要的绝大部分服务，也正是这种相互交易的倾向最初引发了劳动分工。例如在以狩猎或游牧为生的部落，有人擅于打造弓弩，其技艺之娴熟超过其他族人。他便经常用自己制作的弓弩和族人交易，换得家禽和兽肉。并且他后来发现，通过交换得来的家禽和兽肉要比自己亲自去狩猎得到的更多。因此，出于个人利益之考虑，弓弩制作逐渐成为他的主要营生，如此他就成了最初意义上的弓弩制作师。另有人擅于制作棚屋或活动房的屋架和屋顶。他已习惯用自己的这门手艺，给族人制作屋架和屋顶来交换家禽和兽肉，直到后来他发现全力以赴于这门手艺符合他自身的利益，因此他也就成了最初的木匠。就这样，有人以同样的方式成为铁匠或铜匠，还有人成为毛皮或皮革（这是原始人类主要的衣料）硝皮人或鞣革人。因此，当人们确定能够用自己的劳动产品中自己消费不掉的所有剩余部分去交换自己需要的他人劳动产品的剩余部分时，便得到了鼓励，开始从事各自擅长的某一专门职业，并不断改进和完善自己为了从事这些专门职业的资质或才能。

事实上，不同的人在天赋才能上的差异比我们想象的要小得多，而且，促使人们最终从事不同职业的天赋差异，在其发展成熟之时，多半并非劳动分工的原因，而是分工的结果。两个特性全然不同的人，比如一个哲学家和一个普通的街头搬运工，与其说是天分有差异，倒不如说是后天的习惯、风俗和教育起到了很大的作用。在他们刚来到这个世界上前六年或者八年，两者几乎没有什么不同，无论是各自的父母还是玩伴都察觉不到两者之间有任何明显差异。也就在那个年纪，或者紧接着的几年里，他们开始了截然不同的活动。此后他们才能的差异才得以凸显并逐渐扩大，直到最后，哲学家的虚荣心使他不愿承认自己与搬运工之间存在任何相同之处。但是如果没有物物交换、以物易物和互相交易的倾向，每一个人都必须自己设法获得需要的生活必要品和便利品。所有的人都必须行使同样的职责，干同样的工作，那么，就没有什么职业上的差别，产生巨大才能差异的唯一根源也就不复存在了。

交换的倾向造就了才能的不同——不同职业者在才能上的差异看来极其显著——也正是这种倾向使得这种差异能够为人所用。要知道许多被认为属于同一族的动物在自然界中生存所产生的天资差异，要远远大于人类在未受习俗熏陶和教育影响时的天赋差异。就其本性而言，一个哲学家与一个街头搬运工在天资和性情上的差异，一点也不会比大獒犬与灰毛犬，或者灰毛犬与长毛犬，或者长毛犬与牧羊犬之间的差别更大。不过那些不同种类的动物，尽管都属于同一族，却很少能够对彼此有用。大獒犬以力大取胜，绝不会从灰毛犬的敏捷、长毛犬的聪明或牧羊犬的温顺中得到助益和激励。动物的这些天资与才能的差异，因为缺少易物或交换的能力和倾向，无法被摆放在同一个平台上加以利用，因而也就无法对改进生存条件和生存实利产生任何裨益。动物依然必须依靠个体的力量单枪匹马地存活和防卫，丝毫没有受益于自然界所赋予它们的个体差异。而人类则相反，即使是天分差别最大的人也会对彼此有用，可以说，人类利用各自才能生产的不同产品，通过交易，易物和交换这种普遍倾向，被摆放在同一个平台上。每个人在这里，可以根据自己的需要购买到他人利用其聪明才智生产的任何产品。

3

商业体系的原理

通常认为，政治经济学是经济学的一个分支，是政治家或立法者的经济学，它提出了两个明确的目标：其一，为该国征缴足量的税收或维持国民生存的钱款，更确切地讲，国民要能够为该国缴纳足量的税收或维持自身生存的钱款。其二，要为整个国家或全体国民提供足够的收入，使公共服务得以维系。简单地说，政治经济学的目标就是国富民强。

谈到国民的富足，各国在不同时期所经历的迈向富强之路各不相同，由此产生了两种迥异的政治经济体系：其一可谓商业体系，其二则是农业体系。

［……］

一个普遍的概念是，财富的多少是用货币或金银这两种贵金属的数量来衡量的，这源于货币的双重职能——既是交易工具又是价值尺度。鉴于货币的第一重性质，我们无需借助其他商品便可随时以货币换得自己需要的物品。人们总是觉得挣钱乃是大事，只要有钱，想买什么都轻而易举。而鉴于货币的第二重性质，我们一般会根据交换所用的货币数量来估量商品的价值。正因为如此，我们称富人价值千金，说穷人不名一文。我们说节俭吝啬或迫切渴望变富的人喜爱钱财，认为那些大大咧咧、出手大方，或生活富足的人不那么贪恋钱财。富有即是钱多，简单来讲，财富和货币在一般人的语言中没有丝毫差别。

正如富人腰缠万贯，富足之国理应储存大量的货币；无论哪个国家，走向富强的最便捷的途径莫过于积累大量金银。在发现美洲之后的一段时间里，西班牙人每登陆一个陌生的海岸，首先要做的，就是查看能否在附近找到金银。然后再根据搜集得来的相关信息判断该地是否值得定居，抑或该国是否值得征服。修道士普拉诺·卡尔比诺受法国教廷派遣前去拜见一代天骄成吉思汗的后人时就曾谈到，鞑靼人过去经常会问他法兰西王国是否牛羊遍野。鞑靼人的询问和西班牙人的实地调查有着同样的目的——都希望了解该国富裕的程度，从而判断是否值得征服。和任何其他游牧国家一样，鞑靼人通常并不清楚货币有何功用，取而代之成为交换媒介和价值尺度的是牛羊。因此，正如西班牙人认为金银的数量决定财富的多少，鞑靼人认为牛群的数量是衡量财富的决定因素。就这两种不同的观念而言，或许鞑靼人的想法更加接近事实。

洛克
【1】

先生曾评论过货币与其他动产的不同之处。他说，所有其他动产在本质上都容易消耗，因此其内含的价值并不十分可靠。一个国家可能在某一年对某种动产的拥有量十分充足，但即使没有任何出口，这种动产也很有可能仅仅因为国人的浪费或消耗而在下一年成为紧缺物品。与之相反，货币则十分稳定。在流通过程中，货币可能流经多方，但只要不流失到国外，它便不大可能被浪费或消耗。因此，按照洛克先生的说法，一个国家的可流通财富中最为可靠和真实的莫过于金银，那么根据这一点，增加国家对这两种金属的储备在他看来便是一国政治经济学的重要目标。

也有人认为，如果一个国家可以独立于全世界，那么该国国内流通的货币多少也就无关紧要了。使用该货币进行流通只不过是用一种消费品换得数量或多或少的另一种消费品，而在这些人看来，这个国家是真正富有还是贫穷将全然取决于那些可消费物品的多寡。但是另一方面，他们认为，如果一国要与他国建立联系、被迫与他国作战，或者必须维持远在他乡的军舰和军队开销，情况就完全不同了。这时只能向国外大量运送货币，而其前提就是该国国内拥有足量的货币储备。因此，所有这类国家都应该在和平年代竭力积累黄金白银，这样一旦战争爆发，它才能有强大的财力后盾。

由于深受这些通行观念的影响，欧洲各国都曾仔细研究如何通过各种途径在本国最大数量地储备金银，尽管这类研究几乎没有什么实际的收获。欧洲绝大部分金银矿藏位于西班牙和葡萄牙，向全欧输送金银的也主要是这两个国家。但两国或明令禁止金银输出，违者严惩，或课以高额关税。欧洲其他各国自古以来也都将类似禁令视为国策的一部分，甚至最出乎我们意料的，是古代苏格兰的某些议会法案也严厉禁止携带黄金白银出境，违者重罚。古时英法两国也都颁发过类似的法令。

然而，当那些国家成为商业国时，此禁令就会在许多情况下给商人带来诸多不便。无论是买进别国商品还是将本国商品出口到其他国家，金银在交易中都要比其他商品占据极大的优势。于是商人以不利于本国贸易为由，抵制这项禁令。

首先，他们声称以购买外国商品为目的输出金银不一定会减少本国的金银储量，恰恰相反，此举倒有可能增加金银储量。因为如果本国对该商品的消费不因进口而增加，则可以通过将其转售给其他国家获得更多利润，由此所得的金银收益或许要大大高于起初购买这些进口商品的支出。托马斯·孟
【2】

先生将国际贸易的这一运作方式比作农业中的播种和收割。他说：“如果我们只看到播种时农夫大把大把地将好玉米扔到地里，我们会认为他是个疯子。但是考虑到在他一年忙碌结束后的丰收，我们就会发现他当初的劳作不但应当应分，还能够产生更多的价值。”

商人们抵制该禁令的理由之二，是该禁令根本无法限制金银的输出，与其蕴含的巨大价值相比，金银的体积并不大，偷运到他国实为易事。用这些商人的话说，要想防止偷运走私成风，唯一的做法是适度地关注商人们所谓的“贸易差额”。如果一国的出口额大于进口额，则其他国家需要向其支付一部分贸易差额，这部分差额必然以金银的形式支付，因而该国的金银储量就会相应增加。而当该国贸易进口大于出口时，它就需要向其他国家支付国际贸易差额，因为同样需用金银支付，该国的金银储备就会相应减少。在这种情况下，禁止金银输出不仅不能达到预期效果，反而会因运输的风险增加而导致金银的价格高涨。他们还说，这样一来，整个贸易对于那些应支付贸易差额的国家更加不利；商人在他国交易需要从发行货币的银行那里购买汇票，不但要承担往那里运送货币本身的风险、麻烦和费用，还要承担该禁令带来的额外风险。而贸易越是对一国不利，这部分贸易差额对于应收取该差额的国家而言价值就越小。举英国和荷兰两国的贸易为例，如果英国的进口比出口多了5％，就需要用英国的105盎司白银在荷兰购买相当于100盎司白银的汇票：因而英国的这105盎司白银在荷兰将贬值到100盎司，只能购买价值100盎司的荷兰商品；而荷兰的100盎司白银在英国却升值到105盎司，且能购买价值105盎司的英国商品。英国商品在荷兰出售的价格相对便宜，荷兰商品在英国出售的价格相对昂贵，二者与正常价格的差距正是两国的贸易差额。相应的，英国货物所换回的荷兰货币量相对减少，荷兰货物所换回的英国货币相对增多，其减少和增多的幅度也相当于两国的贸易差额。因此，这种贸易差额必然会对英国造成相应程度的不利，必须将更多的金银运往荷兰，以弥补差额。

以上争论在某种程度上不无道理，在某种程度上也多少有些强词夺理。说其不无道理是，因为他们断言贸易中金银的输出可能往往对国家裨益颇多。同时也是因为，当个体国民发现输出金银能为他们带来好处时，任何禁令都将是一纸空文。谓之强词夺理是因为他们认为，保有或增加金银的数量，相对于保有或增加任何其他有用商品的数量而言，更需要政府关注；因为自由贸易完全能够确保其他商品的适量供应，无需政府给予过多的关心。谓之强词夺理还在于他们断言，兑换中的高价格必然会扩大所谓的贸易逆差，造成更多的金银出口。兑换中的高价格对用本国货币在他国支付的商人来说实为不利，商人们为购买本国银行在那些国家发行的汇票所支付的价格更高，高出的部分正是兑换差价。但是尽管禁令引发的风险可能会为银行引发额外费用，却未必需要将更多的货币输往该国。一般而言，这笔费用是在走私货币时在国内支付的，除了所汇出的实际金额外，私运者不会多输出一文钱。高汇率也自然会使商人努力平衡其出口和进口，以便尽可能少地以高汇率付款。此外，兑换中的高价格必定会起到类似课税的作用，因为它提高了他国商品的价格，减少了这些商品的消费。因此，兑换中的高价格不但不会增加这些商人所谓的贸易逆差，反而会使之缩小，并最终减少了金银的输出。

尽管如此，此番言论却使听者深信不疑。深谙商道的商人提出这些言论说服国家议会、亲王参事和贵族乡绅，暗喜后者对此一无所知。和商人们一样，乡绅贵族仅凭经验即可得知对外贸易可以富国，却对其如何富国的具体原理所知甚少。商人非常清楚对外贸易让他们自身致富的原理，这是他们的本分，至于如何富国却并绝非其分内之事。除了在他们有机会要求国家对有关对外贸易的法律进行一些调整之时，这个问题从来不在他们的考虑范围之内。只有在那时，他们才有必要谈及对外贸易的裨益，以及现行法律如何对这些裨益构成了障碍。在就此事做出决策的法官们听来这可真是再恰当不过的陈述：如对外贸易如何能够源源不断地为本国带来货币收入，而当前讨论的法律形成了障碍；如果没有该法律，对外贸易带来的收入将会更高，等等。论证最终达到了预期效果。在法国和英国，本国的铸币严禁输出，他国铸币和金条银块则可以自由出口。在荷兰和其他的一些地方，甚至本国的铸币也可以自由输出。政府关注的焦点不再是防范金银输出，而是转而关注贸易差额，以此作为可能引发国内金银增加或减少的唯一原因。对于前者的关注本是徒劳，而新的关注焦点看似更为错综复杂，却同样无济于事。《英国得自对外贸易的财富》，托马斯·孟先生这部著作的标题不仅成为英国政治经济学遵循的基本准则，也适用于任何其他商业国家。最重要的是，内陆贸易或国内贸易——在这种贸易中，同样数量的资本可以产生最大的收入，同时也为本国人民创造了最多的就业机会——却沦为国际贸易的附属品。人们认为，国内贸易既不能把货币带入国内，也不能把货币带到国外，国家也不可能因为国内贸易而变得更加富强或贫穷，除非国内贸易的兴旺与否会间接影响到国际贸易的形势。

好比没有葡萄园的人若要饮酒就只能与人交易，没有金银矿藏的国家无疑只能和他国交易获得金银。然而，对于国内和国际贸易，政府也似乎没有必要偏重两者之中的任何一种。一个人只要有购买葡萄酒的钱就能够随时买到葡萄酒，一个国家只要有购买金银的货币也就永远不会缺金少银。金银和其他商品一样，也有自己的价格；既然金银可以用来购买任何商品，任何商品也都可以用来购买金银。我们可以确信，即使没有政府的关注，贸易的自由总能在我们亟需好酒时及时供应好酒；同样我们也要深信，贸易的自由总能为我们提供用于商品流通或其他用途中用于购买或使用的全部金银。

在任何国家，人类劳动所能购买或生产的每一种商品的数量，都可以根据实际需求自我调节，这种需求也可以理解为那些愿意支付生产和出售该商品所需支付的全部地租、劳动力和利润的人的需求。但是没有哪一种商品能像金银这样根据实际需求容易做出准确的自我调节，这是因为金银这两种贵金属有限的体积蕴含了巨大的价值，比其他任何商品都更容易地周转于异地之间——从价格较低的地方周转至价格较高的地方，从金银供给充盈的地方周转至金银不足的地方。例如，如果英国需要一批额外数量的黄金，一艘邮船即可从里斯本或任何供应黄金的地方运来50吨黄金，可铸成500多万几尼
【3】

。但是如果需要同样价值的谷物，按1吨谷物价值5几尼计算，总共需要运送100万吨，假设每艘邮船的承载量为1000吨，则需要1000艘邮船。如此这般，英国海军全部用来运输都是不够的。

当一国进口金银的数量超出实际需求时，无论政府如何警惕小心，金银的出口都无法避免。西班牙和葡萄牙所有严苛残暴的法律都未能保住其国内的金银储量。西葡两国陆续从秘鲁和巴西进口的金银超出了两国的实际需求，导致两国金银价格低于周边国家。相反，如果任何国家的金银储量不能满足实际需求，从而使其价格高于邻国，政府就无需费心进口金银。即使政府想要费心去禁止进口金银，亦决不会奏效。当斯巴达人有足够的能力购买金银时，无论莱克格斯
【4】

制定怎样的法典设置障碍都无济于事，自有大量黄金白银源源不断地流入拉塞德蒙
【5】

。再严苛的关税法都挡不住从荷兰和戈登堡东印度公司进口茶叶，因为这些公司的茶叶比英国公司的便宜。不过另一方面，1磅茶叶的市价通常以白银计算，即使按最高价格，即16先令，这1磅茶叶的体积也相当于这16先令白银体积的100倍；如果用黄金，则相当于等价值的黄金体积的2000倍。走私茶叶的难度相对于走私金银，自然也须按此比例增加。

在某种程度上，正是由于金银比较容易从充足的市场转运到短缺的市场，这两种贵金属的价格不像其他大部分商品的价格那样不断上下波动，许多商品因为体积太大，很难在市场存货过多或过少时做出灵活反应。固然，金银的价格也并非完全稳定，但其可能发生的变动一般来说都是缓慢、渐进、统一的。举例来说，欧洲有些人认为——或许这样想并没有太多根据——在本世纪和上一个世纪，由于人们不断从西属西印度群岛进口金银，这两种贵金属一直在不断贬值，尽管贬值的过程是渐进的。然而要想使金银的价格发生突然变化，从而使得所有其他商品的货币价格立即发生合理而巨大的涨落，则需要像发现美洲所带来的那样的商业革命。

尽管如此，一个有财力购买金银的国家如果在什么时候短缺金银，补足这两种贵金属的供应几乎要比补足其他任何商品都更加方便。如果制造业的原料不足，工业必陷于停顿；如果食物供给不足，人们就要为饥饿所苦；但如果货币不足，易货贸易就可以代替用货币交换商品，只不过可能会有诸多不便。另一种方法是赊账买卖，交易各方每月或每年结算一次，互相补偿赊欠，这种方法就比易货贸易方便一些。如果能够利用一种调控得当的纸币，则不但没有任何不便，在某些情况下还能带来一些裨益。所以无论从哪个方面来说，任何国家的政府都绝对没有必要花费心思去关注货币数量的保有或增加问题。

然而，“货币稀缺”始终是我们最常听到的抱怨。货币和葡萄酒一样，对那些既无财力购买又没有信用赊购的人，永远是紧缺之物，而只要拥有财力或信用二者之一，就很少会在需要的时候感到匮乏。不过对货币稀缺的抱怨并不仅限于没有远虑的挥霍之人，有时整个商业城镇及附近地区会普遍感到货币短缺，过度贸易是造成这一现象的常见原因。即使足够稳重冷静的人，如果不按照当前的资金情况制定营运计划，也可能会像入不敷出的挥霍之人一样，既没有购买货币的资力，也缺乏借贷的信用。在计划完成之前，他们的财力就已经耗光，信用也跟着没有了，这时他们只有四处借贷，而人人都会说没钱借给他们。即使我们到处听到人们说货币短缺，也并不一定就证明国内流动的金银数量比通常减少了，而只表明许多人想要得到金银却无力支付罢了。贸易利润高于通常情况时，无论大小商人都会犯过度贸易的通病。此时他们输往国外的货币不一定比平常多，而是在国内外赊账购买非常大量的商品，并将其运往遥远的市场，期望在付款期限之内收到货款。一旦不能在付款期限之内收到货款，他们会既没有财力购买货币，也没有可靠的借贷担保。如此看来，对货币稀缺的普遍抱怨，根本不是由于金银的稀缺，而是在于债务人难于借贷，债权人又难于收回借款所致。

如果我们在此一针见血地论证财富并不在于金钱或金银的多少，而取决于可以用手中的金钱购买多少商品——也就是说，金钱只有在购买时才有价值，未免过于简单。货币无疑是国家资本的一个组成部分，但我们已经证明，它只是国家资本的一小部分，甚至始终是最无利可图的那一小部分。

商人之所以觉得用货币购买商品要比用商品购买货币更加划算，不是因为货币是财富更为重要的组成部分，而是因为众所周知，货币是已知并确立的交易工具，容易与一切货物交换，而要得到能交换一切货物的货币却未必那么容易。此外，大多数商品要比货币更容易损坏，因此保存这些商品可能经常需要承担大得多的损失。而且，当商人有商品在手上时，他更有可能需要钱进行周转，毕竟什么都不如把已经获得的回报锁在自己的保险箱里来得安全，而最重要的是，卖比买利润来得更直接。因为所有这些原因，商人一般总是更急于出售商品换得货币，而不是用货币来交换商品。不过尽管一个商人在仓库中存有大量存货时，会因为无法及时出售这些存货而最终破产，而一个国家却不大可能有这样的遭遇。商人的全部资本中有易破损的商品和预计用于换取货币的商品，而国家的土地和劳动产品的年产量却只有很少一部分用于和邻国交换获取金银，绝大部分都是在国内流通和消费的；即使在运往国外的剩余产品中，绝大多数通常也是用于交换和购买外国的其他商品。因此，国家即使不能用预计用于购买金银的商品换得足够的金银，也不至于濒临破产。诚然，国家的确会面临一些损失和不便，且可能不得不采取一些必要的权宜之计来替代货币供应，然而其土地和劳动产品的年产量与往常相比没有变化，或者几乎没有变化，因为可以花费同样多或几乎同样多的消费资本来维系这一产量。尽管用商品交换货币没有用货币交换商品那样容易，从长远来看，前者却比后者更加必要。商品除了用于交换货币之外还有许多其他用途，而货币除用于购买商品外别无它用。因此，货币必然要追求商品，而商品却并不一定要追求货币或者根本没有这个必要，购买的人并不一定要转手出售，而常常是为了使用或消费，而出售的人却永远都是为了换取货币再次买入。前者在买入之后往往就完成了整个过程，而后者在卖出货物之后，最多只完成了整个过程的一半。人们渴望货币并不是为了它本身，而是为了可以用货币买来的一切。

有人说可消费品很快会被损坏，而金银的耐久性更强一些，因此如果不是要持续出口，金银可以积累很长时间，这样国家的真正财富就会有极大的增加。所以，一般人就会认为，对一个国家最不利的，就是其主要贸易行为是用耐久性较强的商品去换取比较容易损毁的商品。然而，我们不能想当然地认为，用英国的五金器具去换取法国的葡萄酒就是对英国贸易不利；尽管五金器具是耐久性很强的商品，如果不是因为持续出口，可以在国内积累很长时间，到时整个英国的铁锅就会多得惊人了。不过一般来说，无论在哪个国家，这类五金器具的数量必然受到其需求的限制；如果一个国家所拥有的铁锅数量大于其烹制食物所需，未免有点超乎情理了；如果食物的总量增加了，则铁锅的数量也很容易随之增加，所增加的食物总量中有一部分是用来购买铁锅的，或者说是为多出来的那部分生产铁锅的工人维持生计所需的。同样我们也很容易理解，任何国家的金银数量也应受其需要所限；这些贵金属的用途包括铸成硬币当作流通的货物，以及制成器皿当作家具；每个国家的铸币数量应受到在国内流动的商品价值的调节：一旦该价值增加，就立即会有一部分被输往国外有金银铸币的国家，换得国内流通所需的更多铸币：而金银器皿的数量则要受到国内喜好奢华的家庭数目和财富的支配，这类家庭的财富增加了，很有可能其中一部分要用于向有剩余金银器皿的国家购买：任何国家，为了增加财富就输入或在国内保留超过需求量的金银都是荒谬的，就像家庭也不能依靠购入不必要的厨具来增加其佳肴美酒，这是因为出资购买不必要的厨具不但不会增加，反而会减少家庭必需品的数量和质量；同样，任何国家出资购买不必要的金银，也必定会减少维持国民衣食住行所需的财富。切要牢记：金银，无论其形状是铸币还是盘盏，无非只是用具而已，在这一点上，它们和厨房用具没有区别。如果增加金银的用途，增加靠金银来流通、支配和制造的消费品，自然可以增加金银的数量；但是如果希望通过非常方法增加金银数量，必将减少金银的用途，甚至会减少金银的数量，因为这两种贵金属的数量必然会受到其用途的限制。一旦金银的积累超出了需求，就很容易被转运，而由于闲置不用会造成极大损失，所以任何法律也无法阻止它们被立即输往境外。

一个国家要进行对外战争，维持远在海外的海军和陆军所需，并不一定要积累金银。维持海军和陆军依靠的不是金银，而是可消费商品。因此，只要一国的国内工业年产量，也就是土地、劳动和消费品存量所产生的年收入使它有能力在远离边境的国外购买足够的消费品，它就能够维持在那里打战。

一个国家可以通过三种不同的方式向远在国外的军队运送粮饷和物资：一是若干其所积累的不同的金银；二是若干其制造业年产物；三是若干其农产品年产物。

我们可以合理地认为，任何国家积累或存储的金银都可以分成三部分：一是用于流通的货币；二是家用的金银器皿；最后则是经过多年节俭积累，存在国库中的货币。

国内用于流通的货币很少能够节省下来，因为这方面不可能有太多的盈余。在任何国家，一年之内买卖的商品的价值需要一定数量的货币进行流通并将其分配给不同的消费者，因此货币的使用不能过量。流通渠道必定会吸引来充足的货币量，但不能容纳更多的货币。然而在国家进行对外战争时，一般会从该渠道抽取一定数量的货币。由于大量人口远在境外，在国内维持生计的人口数量相对减少；在国内流通的商品数量减少了，也就不需要那么多货币进行流通了。这时国家通常会大量发行各种纸币，诸如英国的财政部证券、海军债券和银行票据，以此替代流通的金银，以便将更大数量的金银输往境外。不过，对外战争花费浩大，且旷日持久，以上这些财政来源是远不够维持的。

无论在何种情况下，熔化私家金银器皿都于事无补，法国在上一次战争开始使用过这种办法，不过收获并不大，还不够补偿铸造带来的损失，结果得不偿失。

过去，王室积累的财宝曾提供大得多并持续更久的资源；而在今时，除了普鲁士国王之外，积累财宝似乎不再是欧洲王室的政策了。

本世纪各国用于维持对外战争的资金——或许已经创造了人类有史以来战争花费的最高记录——似乎已经很少再依赖流通货币或输出家用金银器皿，抑或国库积累的财物了。在上一次对法战争中，英国的花费超过了9000万英镑，其中不仅包括7500万英镑新募的国债，还包括为每英镑土地税征收的两个先令的附加税，以及每年从还债基金中借用的款项。这笔巨额费用中有2/3花费在遥远的境外国度：德国、葡萄牙、美国、地中海各港口、东印度和西印度群岛。英国的各位国王没有积累财宝，我们未曾听说有超量金银器皿被熔化铸币这样的事情，当时人们认为，国内流通的金银不会超过1800万英镑，然而自最后一次金币改革以来，人们开始觉得他们过低估计了国内的金银流通量。所以，让我们姑且根据我亲眼所见抑或听说过的最夸大的算法，假设当时国内流通的金银共值3000万英镑，假如战争全部用的是英国自己的货币，那么即使根据这样夸张的算法，在六七年的时间内，英国的全部货币必然会全部运出并运回至少两次。如果这种假设成立的话，那么它所能证明的最具决定性意义的观点就是，政府根本没有必要监管货币的保存，因为根据这个假定，国内的所有货币必然要在这么短的时间内在国境内外来回往返两回，且整个过程无人察觉，可见对任何人都没有什么影响。然而事实是，在这段时期内，流通渠道似乎根本没有显得比平时更空虚，那些有财力换取货币的人几乎没有感到货币匮乏。在整个战争期间，尤其是在战争将要结束时，对外贸易的利润比以往更大了，这种情况当然导致了全英国各个地区普遍的过度贸易；而过度扩张营运的结果，和惯常一样，是人们又开始抱怨货币短缺。许多需要货币的人既没有办法购买货币又没有信用借贷；而一旦借贷者感觉到很难借贷，对于放贷者来说，收回欠款也变得困难了。不过拥有能换取金银价值的人，基本上都能够按金银的价值换取金银。

所以，用来支付上一场战争巨额支出的，一定不是国内输出的金银，而是英国出口的这样那样的商品。当政府或代表政府行事的人士与某一个商人签约汇款到国外时，该商人会向与其来往的国外联系人寄送一张期票，而他也一定会尽力以商品而不是金银来支付该期票。如果英国的商品不是该国所需，他将设法将其运往其他国家，购买一张期票，来支付所欠国家的款项。只要是市场所需，商品的运输总是能够产生可观的利润，而金银的运输就很难产生什么利润了。为了购买国外商品而将金银运往国外，商人获取的利润并非来自购买商品，而是来自销售运回国后的商品；但是如果仅仅为了支付债务而将其运往国外，就不会有任何商品运回，商人自然也就得不到任何利润，因此，他自然会绞尽脑汁，用出口商品而非出口金银的办法来偿还国外债务。于是《英国现状》一书的作者指出，在上一次战争期间，英国出口了大量商品，却没有任何商品被运回国内。

除了上述三种金银之外，在所有商业大国中还有大量金条银块交替地输入输出，为对外贸易提供方便。这些金条银块在不同商业国家之间的流通与每一个国家内部的硬币流通方式一样，因而可以被看作是一个由不同国家组成的大商业共和国的货币。国内硬币的流通及其方向受到每个国家境内流通商品的支配：该商业共和国的货币则要受到不同国家之间流通商品的支配。无论在单独一个国家还是这个大型商业共和国，使用货币都是为了促进交换，前者是一个国家内部不同个人之间的交换，后者是不同国家之间的交换。该大型商业共和国的一部分货币可能已经，或者说很可能的确被用于上一次战争的支出了。在全面发生战争时期，人们自然会认为货币的流通及其流通方向因为受到战争的影响而与和平时期不同；认为在战事发生地点附近的流通量应该更大，交战国军队所需的饷给和物资都需要在那里及邻近国家购买。但是就这一大商业共和国的货币来说，无论英国每年需要以这种方式使用多少，它每年都必须用英国商品或其他可用于交换该货币的东西购得；所以归根结底，进行战争所需要的资源仍然是商品，是国内每年的土地和劳动产品。的确，人们很容易联想到，这样巨大的年支出一定需要极大的年产量才能够支付。例如，1761年的支出高达1900多万，任何金银的积累都无法支持每年这样巨大的费用，即便是金银本身，年产量也达不到这样的程度。根据最可靠的统计，每年输往西班牙和葡萄牙的金银总量一般不超过600万英镑，在上一次战争的某些年份，这个数目都不够支付四个月的费用。

最适合运往遥远的境外，在当地购买军队所需的粮饷和物资，或用于购买大商业共和国的一部分货币，进而购买这些粮饷和物资的商品，似乎应该是制造得更加精巧的工业品，如体积小价值高，能以最小的费用输出到千里之外的制造品。因此，如果一个国家每年生产的此类工业品有大量剩余，并将其出口到国外，它就能够将非常昂贵的对外战争持续多年，此时它不需要输出任何可观数量的金银，甚至也没有这样大量的金银可以输出。诚然，每年剩余的制造品中有很大一部分必须在这种情况下输出，而它虽给商人带回利润，却不会给国家带来任何回报，因为政府向商人购买外国期票，以便在外国购买军队所需的饷给和物资。不过，总有一部分剩余制造品的输出是可以产生利润的。在战争期间，对制造业将有双重需求：首先，国家需要生产足够的商品运往境外，支付其为了供应军队饷给和物资而向国外购买的期票；其二，国内通常所需的普通外国商品，也必须由国内生产足够的商品来购买。如此说来，在最具破坏性的对外战争期间，大部分制造业可能会大大繁荣，相反，在和平时期其利润可能会下降。制造业可能在国家走向毁灭的过程中繁荣一时，而一旦国家重新繁荣，制造业就可能衰败下去。英国制造业的许多不同部门在上一次战争期间，乃至战争结束后一段时间的不同景况，正是我们刚刚所得结论的一个例证。

对任何国家来说，出口土地原产品显然无法很好地支持费用浩大而旷日持久的对外战争，将一部分土地原产品输往国外，用它来购买军队所需的饷给和物资，费用太过昂贵。很少有国家生产的原产品远远超过可以维持国民生计所需的量，因此，将大量此类原产品运往国外，无异于夺取国民生活所需的必要生活资料。而工业制造品的出口就是另一回事了。制造业工人的生活资料仍然保留在国内，所输出的仅仅是他们劳动所产生的剩余部分。休谟先生屡次提到，古代英国的国王们无法不间断地为任何旷日持久的战争提供资助：那个年代的英国人没有能力在外国购买其军队所需的饷给和物资，农业原产品没有办法从国内消费中大量节省下来，少量最粗糙的制造品又和农产品一样，运输费用过于昂贵。这种情况并非源于货币短缺，而是因为那时缺乏更加精细的工业制造品。那时的英国和现在一样，买卖都是通过货币进行交易的，当时的货币流通量与买卖的数量和价值之间的比例必然与现在相同，或者比现在更大，因为那时没有纸币，而现在纸币已经在很大程度上替代了金银。在那些对商业和制造业所知甚少的国家，一旦遇到非常事件，君主很少能够从国民那里获得大的帮助，具体原因我将在下文中说明。因此，正是在这类国家，君主通常会竭力积聚财富，因为那是应对紧急事件的唯一资金来源，即使没有这种必要，在当时那种条件下，君主也会自然地倾向于为累积财富而躬行节俭。在那样一种简朴的状态下，即便君主的花费也不受喜好宫廷豪华生活的虚荣心支配，而是用于赏赐佃户、款待家臣；虽然虚荣心几乎总是导致浪费，但赏赐和款待却很少如此。因此，每一个鞑靼酋长都有财宝。据说，查理十二世著名的同盟——乌克兰哥萨克酋长马捷帕就拥有大量财宝，梅罗文加王朝的法兰西国王也个个都有财宝，如果他们将王国分封给不同的子嗣，也会分给他们相应的财宝。撒克逊君王以及征服之后的最初几个国王，似乎也一样聚集过财宝。每一个新王朝所做的第一件事，通常都是夺取前一个国王的财宝，那是保有王位的最有效手段。先进的商业国家的君主却不再有必要积累财宝，因为他们一般都可以在非常时期从臣民那里获得很大帮助，他们也不再倾向于这样做。他们自然地，或许也是必然地，追随所处时代的流行趋势，在花费方面，君主和领土内所有其他大业主一样，受到追求奢华的虚荣心的支配。宫廷中精致到极细微处的华丽奢靡与日俱增，其巨额花费不仅让财富的积累不再可行，甚至往往会侵及原本用于更为必要之用途的资金。德西利达斯对波斯宫廷的评价或许同样适合好几个欧洲君主的宫廷，他说他在那里感受到的更多是奢华而不是力量，看到的更多是奴仆而不是战士。

金银的输入绝不是国家从对外贸易中获取的主要利益，更不是对外贸易的唯一利益。无论对外贸易在哪两个地区间进行，国家都可以从中获得两种不同的利益：它将其土地和劳动力所生产产品的剩余部分，即国内不再需要的部分输出，作为交换，带回国内需要的其他东西。对外贸易使得剩余产品获得了价值，可以用来换取其他东西，从而满足国内的一部分需求，增加享受。有了对外贸易，国内市场的有限性就难以阻碍任何工艺或制造业部门的劳动分工极其完善的发展。这样就为劳动产品中超出国内消费的那一部分拓展了新的市场，从而鼓励劳动者提高生产力，最大限度地增加年产量，也进而增加了全社会的实际收入和财富。对于彼此间进行对外贸易的所有不同国家，对外贸易都在持续不断地起到极其显著而重要的作用。所有国家都从对外贸易中大大受益，不过商人所在的国家获得的利益最大，因为一般来说，商人总是更加关注供应他人之所需，并将他所在国家的剩余产品运出境外。将金银输入那些因为没有矿藏而缺乏这些贵金属的国家无疑是对外贸易业务的一个组成部分，但它只是最微不足道的一部分：如果一个国家只因为这样一个原因而开展对外贸易，恐怕一个世纪也很难有机会装满一船金银。

美洲的发现之所以让欧洲走向富裕，也并非源于金银的进口。因为美洲富藏金银矿，这两样贵金属的价格反而降低了，与15世纪相比，如今购买金银器皿所需的谷物，或者劳动，大概只有那时的1/3，也就是说，以同样的劳动和商品支出，欧洲每年可以购买的金银器皿的数量是那时的3倍。但是如果某一商品的售价仅相当于通常售价的1/3，则不但原先的买主现在购买的数量可以达到先前的3倍，而且由于价格下降，可以出价购买的买主数量也较先前多出许多，或许买主数量增加至先前的10倍多，甚至高达20倍以上。因此，欧洲现有的金银器皿数量，不仅要比美洲金银矿没有发现之时——即使在其现有的进步状态下——多出3倍，或许更是前者的20—30多倍，直到目前为止，欧洲无疑得到了真正的便利，尽管那的确只是非常微不足道的便利。金银的价格下降导致这两种金属不如先前那样适合用作货币了：为了进行同样的购买活动，我们必须携带更大量的金银，对于以往价值4便士就能购得的物品，如今我们得在口袋里装1个先令。要说这种不便可以忽略不计，上述与之相对的便利怕也不比它重要多少，两者都不会对欧洲目前的状况造成任何重大的影响。然而，美洲的发现的确对欧洲产生了极为重大的影响。它为欧洲所有商品开辟了一个全新而永不枯竭的市场，它为新的劳动分工和工艺改进创造了机会，而在古代商业的狭窄范围内，由于大部分产品缺乏市场，这是绝对不可能发生的。劳动者的生产力提高了，欧洲所有国家的劳动产品增加了，各国国民的真实收入和财富也就随之增加。欧洲的商品对于美洲来说几乎是前所未有的，同样，美洲的许多商品对于欧洲来说也是新鲜事物。因此，一系列之前从未有人预见过的交换开始了。事实证明，这既然一定会对旧大陆有利，也自然会对新大陆同样有利。当然，欧洲人颇为野蛮的不公行径使得一桩本来对所有方都有利的事件，变成了几个不幸国家的灭顶之灾。

大约同时，欧洲人发现了经由好望角前往东印度的道路，尽管其距离比美洲更加遥远，却为欧洲人或许打开了比美洲更为广阔的对外贸易市场，整个美洲只有两个国家在各个方面比蛮荒之地稍强一些，这两个国家在美洲发现不久就被消灭了，其他的都不过是蛮荒之地。而中国、印度、日本等帝国以及东印度的其他几个国家即使金银矿藏不如美洲富足，却在其他所有方面都要比墨西哥或秘鲁更加富裕，农业耕种水平更高，所有工艺和制造业也都更加先进。就算这样说无异于相信了西班牙作家们关于那些帝国往昔状况的夸大记载，我们也必须承认这些事实，而那些记载显然是不足置信的。不过，富裕文明的国家彼此之间进行交易，其价值要远远大于与未开化的野蛮人做交易，而截止到此时，欧洲与东印度各个帝国商业往来获得的利益却大大低于与美洲经商获得的利益。葡萄牙垄断东印度贸易约一个世纪之久，其他欧洲国家从东印度购入任何商品，或将任何商品输入该国，都只能间接通过葡萄牙人之手。上世纪初荷兰人开始侵入这片商业领地时，将整个东印度公司的商务全部交由一家公司独家经营。英国人、法国人、瑞典人和丹麦人都纷纷效法，此时，没有一个欧洲大国能够享受到对东印度进行自由商业贸易的利益。仅此一个原因就能够解释，为什么对东印度的贸易根本没有对美洲贸易那样有利，美洲贸易，即欧洲几乎每一个国家与其殖民地之间的贸易，对其所有臣民都是自由开放的。而那些东印度公司的专营特权和巨大财富，以及从各自的政府那里获取的惠益和保护，招来了不少嫉妒。这种嫉妒心理往往使人们觉得其贸易是完全有害的，因为它们每年需要从其进行贸易的国家输出大量白银。有关方面回答说，这种持续的白银输出的确有可能导致整个欧洲陷于贫困，但从事贸易的具体国家却不受此影响；因为通过将一部分用白银购回的商品输出到欧洲的其他国家，它实际获得的白银数量远比输出的多得多。反对者和辩驳者所持观点的依据都是我刚刚讨论过的普遍观点，因此我也没有必要就此多做论述。因为每年向东印度输出白银，欧洲的金银器皿价格很可能比以往更贵一些；而银币所能购买的劳动力和商品或许也比以往更多。在这两种影响中，前者不是什么大损失，后者也并非巨大收益，二者都微不足道，因而没有引发公众的广泛关注。与东印度的贸易为欧洲商品打开了一个新的市场，或者换一种说法，为那些商品所能购买的金银开辟了一个新市场，因而必然增加欧洲商品的年产量，从而增加欧洲的实际财富和收入总额。至于到目前为止所增加的数量甚少，则或许要归咎于那种贸易处处受到限制。

在这里，我觉得有必要详细考察一下关于财富的多少主要取决于金钱或者金银数量的大小这一通行概念，尽管这未免显得冗长繁琐。如我在上文所述，在一般人的概念中，金钱总是财富的象征，这种表达上的模棱两可使得此概念深入人心，以至于那些已经确信其荒谬无稽的人也常常会忘记自己的原则，在推理的过程中想当然将其作为一条确定无疑、不可否认的真理。英国商业界有几个数一数二的作家往往会在他们的文章开头论述道，一个国家的财富多少不仅在于所拥有的金银的数量，也在于拥有土地、房屋和各种可消费商品的数量。然而在推理过程中，他们似乎将土地、房屋和可消费商品统统抛到脑后，论证的核心往往变成了所有财富即在于金银，增加这两种贵金属的数量乃是国家工商业的最重要目标。

但是如果这两个原则都成立，即财富的多少取决于金银的数量，且缺乏这两种贵金属矿藏的国家只能通过贸易差额，或者说使出口大大多于进口来收入金银，那么政治经济学的目的必然变成了尽可能减少进口外国商品用于本国消费，并尽可能增加本土工业品的出口，因而国家致富的两大手段就变成了限制进口和鼓励出口。

对进口的限制包括两种。

首先，凡能够由本土生产的国内消费品，无论从什么国家进口，都一律加以限制。

其次，如果本国与某些国家的贸易差额对本国不利，则对那些国家几乎所有商品的进口加以限制。

限制的方式也各有不同，有时采用高关税，有时则采用绝对禁止的办法。

而鼓励出口的办法，有时是退税，有时是政府奖励，有时是与外国签订有利的通商条约，有时是在遥远的境外建立殖民地。

退税的情形一般有两种：对于已缴纳关税或国产税的国产商品，在出口时往往会返还全部或部分税款；而对于已征收进口税的外国商品，如果进口目的是为了加工后出口，有时会在出口时返还全部或部分进口税。

政府奖励要么是为了鼓励某些新兴制造业，要么是为了奖励政府认为应给予特殊照顾的某些工业。

通过建立有利的通商条约，本国的货物和商人可以在某一境外国家获得别国货物和商人所没有的特权。

而通过在遥远的境外建立殖民地，宗主国的货物和商人不仅可以获得特权，而且还可以获得垄断地位。

上述两种对进口的限制，连同四种鼓励出口的做法，乃是商业主义所倡导的各国扭转贸易逆差，使之对己有利，从而增加金银数量的六种主要手段。我将在以下各章分别对其进行论述，关于这六种手段能够给国内带来金钱的说法，我就不再关注了，而重点考察它们各自可能对国内工业年产量产生何种影响。如果这些手段能够提高或降低国内工业年产量的话，也必然能够增加或降低国家的实际财富和收入。

注释

【1】
即John Locke。——译者注

【2】
即Thomas Mun。——译者注

【3】
英国在1663到1813年间发行的金币，价值相当于1镑1先令。——译者注

【4】
古斯巴达法典的制定者。——译者注

【5】
即斯巴达。——译者注

4

对于商品进口实施的限制

通过征收高关税或绝对禁止的方式，限制可以由本国生产的商品从外国进口，在一定程度上保证了生产这些商品的国内工业对于国内市场的垄断。因此，禁止从外国进口活牲畜和腌制食品，确保了英国畜牧业者对国内肉类市场的垄断；对谷物进口课以高关税，也让英国的谷物种植者得到了相同的利益，因为在谷物丰收的年份里高额关税相当于禁止进口。禁止进口外国羊毛制品，同样对国内羊毛制品生产商有利；英国的丝绸制造商曾经完全依靠外国原材料，但最近它们也开始得到同样的好处；麻织品制造商尚未得到什么好处，不过他们正在大踏步地朝着这一方向迈进。英国的许多其他产业制造商也以同样的方式获得了针对国人的全部或几乎全部垄断权。英国绝对或在某种条件下限制进口的商品种类之多，对于不十分熟悉关税法律的人来说，已经大大超出了他们的想象。

这种对国内市场的垄断总是能够给予享受垄断的行业很大的鼓励，因此往往能够使得更大份额的劳动力和社会资源转向该行业，这是毋庸置疑的。但是它是否能够增加整个社会的财富，或者使之朝着最有利的方向发展，或许就算不得什么不证自明的真理了。

社会全部产业的总和绝不会超过社会总资本所能维持的限度；正如任何个人所能雇用的工人数量必须与他所拥有的资本保持一定比例，整个社会所有成员持续雇用的工人数量也必须与该社会的资本总量保持一定比例，并绝不能超过该比例。任何商业调控都不可违反这一常识，增加社会产业的总量，使之超出其资本所能维持的限度。商业调控只能改变其中部分产业的导向；至于这种人为的方向调整是否就要比产业根据自身条件自然发展更为有利，则纯属不确定因素。

每个人都会持续不断地竭力为自己所拥有的资本找到最合适的用途；诚然，在这样做的时候，他考虑的是自己的利益而不是整个社会的利益，但他在仔细考察自己的利益之后，自然，或者说必然会倾向于选择那些最有利于社会的用途。

首先，只要资本获利的程度与一般水平持平，或者至少不太低于一般水平，所有个人都倾向于在距离自己最近的地方使用自己的资本，这样的结果是，他会尽可能地将自己的所有资本都用于维持国内产业。

因此，在利润相等或接近相等的情况下，每一个批发商自然宁愿经营消费品国内贸易也不愿经营对外贸易，宁愿经营消费品对外贸易也不愿意经营转口贸易。与对外贸易相比，经营国内贸易时，资本总是在他的可控范围之内。他能够更好地了解所信托之人的品行和境况，万一不小心被骗，他也更熟悉国内的法律，知道如何从中获得补偿。在转口贸易中，商人的资本可以说是被分割在两个境外国家，而这两部分资本都不一定会回到国内，也就是回到他可以监管和支配的范围之内。譬如，一个阿姆斯特丹商人将俄国哥尼斯堡的玉米运往里斯本，将里斯本的水果和葡萄酒运往哥尼斯堡，一般来说，他必须有一半的资本投在哥尼斯堡，另一半投在里斯本，两部分资本似乎都没有必要回到阿姆斯特丹。这样一个商人自然应该住在哥尼斯堡或里斯本，只有在非常特殊的情况下，他才会选择居住在阿姆斯特丹。不过，因为距离自己的资本太远使商人深感不安，他们一般都会从原定运往里斯本市场的哥尼斯堡货物和原定运往哥尼斯堡的里斯本货物中，分出一部分运往阿姆斯特丹；尽管这必然会带来装载和卸载的双重费用，且需要支付一些税金和关税，但为了让一部分资本始终处于自己的监控和管理之下，他们愿意支付这部分额外费用；正因为如此，每个从事大量转口贸易的国家最后都会成为一个大型综合市场，那里交易着来自转口贸易相关各国的货物。为了避免二次装载和卸载，商人总是想方设法尽可能多地在本国市场上出售来自所有国家的货物，也就是尽其所能地将转口贸易转化为消费品的对外贸易。同样，从事消费品对外贸易的商人，在收集货物运往国外市场时，在利润相等或接近相等的情况下，也总是更愿意尽可能地将大部分货物在国内出售。为了规避出口的风险和麻烦，他总是尽其所能地将消费品的对外贸易转化为国内贸易。于是，如果我可以这样说的话，本国总是成为每个国家的居民不断流通其资本的中心，各国居民总是更愿意让资本流向国内，只是由于特殊原因资本才会远离该中心，在较远处付诸使用。不过事实不断证明，相对于消费品对外贸易中使用的同等数量的资本，国内贸易中使用的资本总是能够启动更多的国内产业，增加国内更多居民的收入和就业机会；而用于消费品对外贸易的资本，与用于转口贸易的等量资本相比，也有同样的裨益。因此，在利润相等或接近相等的前提下，个人正确使用资本，自然会给予国内产业最大的支持，并使自己国家的最大多数人口在收入和就业方面获利。

其次，任何人只要利用自己的资本支持国内产业，就必然会竭尽全力，力求使该产业的产量达到最大值。

产业的产量是指它为产业主体或劳动中所使用的原材料增加的价值。随着产业产量价值的增加或减少，雇主所得的利润也会按比例增减。然而，任何人利用自己的资本支持产业都只是为了赚取利润；因此，他必然会竭尽全力利用自己的资本支持那些能够产生最大价值的产业，或者用它换取最大数量的货币或其他商品。

但是任何社会的年收入总是与其产业的年总产量的可交换价值绝对相等，也就是说，年收入与年总产量的可交换价值完全是同一回事。由此看来，既然所有个人都会尽可能地利用自己的资本支持国内产业，并竭尽全力使该产业产生最大价值，所有个人也必然会尽可能地利用劳动为社会创造最大收入。当然，他既不是在为公众谋福利，也全然不知自己为公众贡献了多少福利。他宁可支持国内产业也不愿支持对外贸易，因而我们说他只关心自己的安全；他全力引导产业，使其产量达到最大价值，我们说他只是为自己赚取利润，在种种情形下，他都是由一只看不见的手引导着，不由自主地去达到并非出于本意希望达到的目的；当然，并非出于本意而达到目的，对社会来说不一定就有害。在为自己谋福利的过程中，他往往能够比出于本意更有效地促进整个社会的福利。我没有听说过有哪些假装以为公众谋福利为名义做生意的人真正为社会做出过什么大的贡献。当然，这种刻意作秀的做法在商人中并不常见，也用不着多费唇舌去劝阻他们这样做。

至于应该将自己的资本用在国内哪些产业中，以及哪些产业有可能获得最大价值，显然，任何个人都能够在其自身的具体条件下做出判断，且比任何政治家或立法者所能提供的建议都更显合理。如果有哪一个政治家希望知道个人应该如何使用自己的资本，那不但是全无必要地自寻烦恼，而且是在攫取一种权力，社会在任何时候都不会放心地给予任何个人或任何形式的委员会或参议会这种权力，让一个虚伪荒唐、自以为能够担此大任的人拥有这种权力则是再危险不过的了。

让国内产业中任何特定的工艺或制造业产品垄断国内市场，在某种程度上无异于指导个体国民应该如何使用他们的资本，几乎在任何情况下，这都是一种毫无用处或颇为有害的调控。如果国内产品的价格能够像外国产品一样便宜，这样的调控显然没有用处；如果不能，那么一般来说，这种调控必然是有害的。任何一个明智的一家之主，都应该坚持这样一个原则，即如果自行制作的成本高于从别处购买，就绝不选择前者。裁缝不会尝试自己做鞋，而是从鞋匠那里买鞋；同样，鞋匠也不会尝试自己做衣服，而是请裁缝帮着做；农夫既不做鞋也不做衣服，就花钱请手艺人来做。从以上种种例子可以看出，所有人都知道，将所有精力投注在自己比他人更有优势的领域，并用其部分产品去购买，或者换句话说，用其产品的部分价格去购买他们偶尔需要的东西，这种做法符合个人的最大利益。

如果某种行为对于一个家庭来讲是审慎明智的，那么对于一个大国来说，它也错不到哪里去。如果某一外国可以提供我们某一种商品，其价格要比我们自己生产更加便宜，那么更明智的做法显然是用我们自己的部分产品来购买，因为我们在生产后一种产品的产业中具有某种优势。国家的劳动总量既然一定和维持它所用的资本成正比，就不会因此而减少，正如上文提到的各类手工制造业者的劳动不会减少一样；人们只会因此而找到能够产生更大价值的使用资本的方法。因而我们说，使用资本来生产一种物品，生产的成本却高于购买的价格，则资本必然不能够产生最大价值。如果投入劳动力去生产那些显然不能产生更多价值的商品，则一定会或多或少地减损一个国家年产物的总价值。根据这一假设，从外国购买商品要比在本国制造更加便宜。这样，如果按照其自然发展方向的话，使用以同样的资本在本国产业中所生产商品的一部分，或者换句话说，用这些在本国产业中所生产商品价格的一部分，即可以购买到外国商品。所以，上述调控的结果是，将国家的劳动从较为有利的用途转为较为不利的用途，其年产量的可交换价值不但没有像立法者原先设想的那样有所增加，反而因为有了此等调控而有所减少。

诚然，有了此类调控，某一特定的制造业可能要比没有调控时更快地确立起来，且经过一段时间之后，特定商品在国内的生产成本也将不再高于国外的生产成本。然而尽管社会中某一产业可以因为获利而更加快速地进入某一特定轨道，但无论是劳动还是收入总额，都绝不会因为有了此类调控而增加。社会中劳动的增加必须与资本的增加成正比，而其资本的增加必须取决于社会收入中逐渐节省出来的那一部分。但是每一个此类调控的直接后果都是减少社会收入，而凡是减少收入的措施，自然不会迅速增加社会的资本，无论是社会的资本还是劳动都只能在自然状态下才能够很快增加。

虽然某种特定的制造业因为缺少这样的调控无法在社会上确立起来，但社会在其发展的任何一段时间内并不会因这一原因变得贫穷。在其发展的每一个时期，社会的总资本和劳动的使用或许仍然是当时最有利的，只是在不同的时期，社会发展的目标不尽相同。在每一个特定时期，社会收入可能都是其资本所能支持的最大收入，资本和收入的增长速度也是该社会当时所能够达到的最大速度。

一个国家在生产特定商品方面相对于其他国家的自然优势有时非常突出，全世界都承认无法与之竞争。通过嵌玻璃、设温床、建温壁，苏格兰也能栽种极好的葡萄，并用来生产上等的葡萄酒，只是与从其他国家购买的品质不逊的葡萄酒相比，其制作费用差不多高达30倍。如此说来，如果单单为了鼓励苏格兰制造波尔多和勃艮第葡萄酒而发布禁令，禁止进口一切外国葡萄酒，这种做法难道合理吗？但是如果人人都能看出，在需要特定数量的某种商品时，使用比从外国进口高出30倍的本国资本和劳动来生产的做法无比荒谬，那么即使所使用的资本和劳动只不过高出了1/30，甚或3％，也是一样的不合情理，只不过没有那么荒唐可笑就是了。一个国家在这方面的优势究竟是天然的还是后来拥有的，无关紧要；只要它有那些优势，而另一个国家又缺乏优势，则就后一个国家来说，从前者购买就要比自己生产更具优势。一个手工业制造者对于从事另一个行业的人而言，其优势只能是后天获得的；然而他们两人都会发现，从彼此那里购买要比制造不属于自己行业的产品更为有利。

商人和制造业者是这种国内市场垄断中最大的获利者。禁止从外国进口牲畜或腌制品，加之以对外国谷物征收较高关税——在一般的丰年这就相当于禁止——为英国畜牧业者和农场主带来的利益，远远低于英国商人和制造业者因其他此类禁令所得的利益。制造业者，特别是较精细产品的制造业者，其产品在各国之间的运输要比谷物或牛羊更加容易。因此，对外贸易的主要业务是做制造品贸易。在制造业，很小的利益就能够让外国人倾销自己工人的产品，即使在国内市场上也是如此；而对于土地的原产品来说，这样做的成本就很高，需要有很大利益才有人肯做。如果允许外国制造品自由输入，就会有好几家国内制造业者受到重创，甚至或许还有一些会倒闭，而这时该制造业使用的很大一部分资本和劳动就不得不重新寻找新的用途。但是即使国家允许土地原产品完全自由输入，也不会对国内的农业产生这样巨大的影响。

举例来说，即使对外国牲畜的进口完全开放，进口的数目也非常少，英国的畜牧业不会受到多大影响。活牲畜或许是唯一一种海运比陆地运输更加昂贵的商品了；因为牲畜能够行走，使用陆地运输的话，它们自己就能走向目标市场；而海运不但要运送它们自身，还要运送它们需要的粮食和水，费用昂贵，且无比麻烦。爱尔兰和英国之间的海程距离很短，的确使得爱尔兰牲畜的运输容易一些，最近只在一段时间内对牲畜进口实施了开放政策，然而即使永久放开进口牲畜，对于英国畜牧业者的利益也不会产生太大影响。英国靠近爱尔兰海的部分全都是畜牧养殖的乡村。进口的爱尔兰牲畜绝不会为那里的人们所用，必然是要经过那里转运到很远的地方，要经过很大一番周折才能到达适当的市场，费用不低，且麻烦不小。肥牲畜无法走这么远的路途，因而就只能进口瘦牲畜，这不会损害到那些从事牲畜养殖或育肥的乡村的利益，而只能损害到从事牲畜繁殖的地方的利益，因为对于前者而言，瘦牲畜的价格下降，事实上对他们是有利的。自从允许进口爱尔兰牲畜以来，从爱尔兰进口牲畜数量不大，瘦牲畜的价格一直卖得不错，这样看起来，似乎连英国那些繁殖牲畜的地方也不会因为进口放开而受到太大影响。据说爱尔兰的普通民众经常诉诸暴力反对出口牲畜，然而如果出口商看到继续该贸易有任何大的好处，而法律又在他们一边的话，他们完全可以轻易战胜这种民众的反对。

除此之外，从事牲畜繁殖和育肥的地方必定都是土地经过大大改良的地方，而繁殖牲畜的地方一般都是未经开垦的荒地。瘦牲畜价格高，加上未经开垦荒地的价值，这无异于一项重奖，鼓励人们不要开荒改良。因为在任何整个土地经过高度改良的地方，进口瘦牲畜都要比自己繁殖更加有利；据说现在荷兰就信奉此理。的确，苏格兰、威尔士和诺森伯兰郡的山区都是无法进行土地高度改良的地方，似乎自然条件注定了这些地方只能是英国境内繁殖牲畜的地方。完全开放进口外国牲畜的唯一结果就是，使那些繁殖牲畜的地方无法从牲畜数量增加和国内其他地方的土地改良中获益，无法无休止地提高繁殖牲畜的价格，要知道如果可以随意提高繁殖牲畜的价格，实际上就相当于给国内致力于开垦和改良的地方加收了一道税。

同样，如果说进口活牲畜对于英国畜牧业者的影响尚且有限，那么完全放开进口腌制品对于英国畜牧业者利益的影响更是微乎其微。腌制品也是体积很大的商品，而且这种商品不但品质不如新鲜畜肉，且因为其中所含的劳动较多、成本较高，价格也更高，因此，根本无法与新鲜畜肉竞争，不过倒是可以和本国的腌制品竞争。腌制品可以用于为远航的船只供应食物等用途，不过决不可能成为人们食物供应中举足轻重的一部分。自从准许腌制品自由进口以来，从爱尔兰进口的腌制品数量很少，这证实了我们畜牧业者丝毫不用担心该产品的进口。屠夫出售的生肉价格似乎根本不会因为腌制品进口而受到任何显著的影响。

即使是完全自由进口外国谷物对于英国农场主利益的影响也可以忽略不计。谷物的体积可要比屠夫卖的生肉大多了，用一个便士购买的一磅小麦在重量上相当于用四个便士购买的一磅生肉。即使在国内谷物最匮乏的年景，从外国进口的谷物数量仍然很少，这完全可以消除我国的农场主对于自由进口的恐惧感。根据见闻广博的谷物贸易研究者的论文，每年从国外进口谷物的平均数量不过只有23728夸特，不到我国年消费总量的1/571。不过由于谷物出口奖励使得丰年的出口量超过了实际耕种所允许的数量，必然导致在谷物歉收之年的进口量也超过实际耕种所需要的数量。这样一来，某一年的丰收不能够补偿另一年的歉收，而出口的平均数量必然会因为这种奖励而增加，因而进口的平均数量也必然会相应增加，超过实际耕种所需。如果不对谷物出口进行奖励，谷物的出口量会随之减少，那么按年份平均，谷物的进口量也会少于当前的水平了。谷物商人，那些在英国和境外各国之间贩运谷物的人因为业务量大大减少，可能会受到很大损失，但是国内的乡绅和农场主却不会受到什么影响。因此据我观察，最希望奖励制度持续下去的人不是乡绅和农场主，而是谷物商人。

乡绅和农场主算得上是最没有卑劣的独占心理的人，这是他们无上的光荣。一个大型制造工厂的经营者有时会因为附近20英里内新建了一所同样类型的工厂而警觉起来，在阿比维尔经营羊毛制造业的荷兰人规定，该城市周围方圆30里格
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内不得兴建另一家同类制造厂。农场主和乡绅则相反，他们一般都倾向于鼓励而不是阻挠邻人开垦和改良农场和土地。他们没有大多数制造业者拥有的所谓商业秘密，一般都更愿意与邻人交流心得体会，希望自己刚刚发现的，能够带来裨益的最新做法传播得越远越好。老伽图就说过，“这是最受人尊敬的职业，从事这种职业的人，生活最为稳定，最不为人嫉恨，他们也最没有怨气。”乡绅和农场主们零星分布在国内各地，不像商人和制造业者那样容易合并，后者因为聚集在城镇中，习惯了那种普遍的排他性企业思维，自然都会在获得各自城镇居民所没有的专营权之后，竭力设法获得所有国人中唯一的专营权。这样看来，他们似乎是禁止外国商品进口的始作俑者，为的就是确保自身对国内市场的垄断。或许是为了模仿这些人，或许因为发现这些人企图压迫自己而要获得和这些人平起平坐的权利，英国的乡绅和农场主们忘记了自己原本应有的宽大之心，反而要求获得向国民供应谷物和生肉的独有特权。他们或许根本没有花时间认真思考一下，与那些他们奉为楷模的人相比，自由贸易对他们的影响实在是微乎其微。

要颁布一项永久的法律禁止进口外国谷物和牲畜，事实上就相当于规定：国内的人口和工业在任何时候都不能超过其土地原产品所能供养的限度。

然而，在以下两种情况下，通过对国外产业征收税负来鼓励国内产业看来是有利的。

首先，某些特定产业是为国防所需。例如，英国的国防在很大程度上取决于海员和船只的多少。因此，英国的航海法案试图确保英国的海员和船只在国内航海业的垄断地位是非常正确的，具体做法有时是绝对禁止，而有时是对外国的船只征收很高的税负。以下是该法案的几条主要的规定。

一、凡与英国居留地和殖民地通商或在英国沿海经商的船只，其船主及3/4船员必须为英国籍臣民，违者没收船舶及其所载的货物。

二、各种体积极大的进口商品，只能由上述船只或所购商品出产国的船只（其船主、船长及3/4船员为该国籍公民）输入英国；但由后一类船只输入的商品，必须加倍征收关税；若由其他国家的船只输入，则处以没收船只及其所载货物的惩罚。此法案颁布之时，荷兰人是欧洲海运业的巨头，到现在仍是欧洲海运业的巨头；但该法案颁布之后，他们再也不能以海运输送者的身份，将本国货物或欧洲其他各国的货物输入英国海域了。

三、各种体积极大的进口商品，只许由出产国的船只输入，连使用英国船只运送也在被禁止之列，违者没收船只及其所载货物。这项规定很可能也是专门针对荷兰人制定的。那时的荷兰和现在一样，是所有欧洲商品进行交易的大市场，有了这个条例，英国船只就不能在荷兰国内起运欧洲其他各国的货物了。

四、各种腌制咸鱼、鲸须、鲸鳍、鲸油和鲸脂，非由英国船只捕获并加工处理者，在输入英国时，须加倍征收关税。那时欧洲以捕鱼为业并供给他国的只有荷兰人，即使现在也仍然主要是荷兰人。该法案颁布之后，荷兰人向英国供给这类海产品就须缴纳极重的关税了。

航海法案制定之时，英、荷两国虽然实际上没有交战，然而两国之间的仇恨却已达到极点。这种仇恨在制定该法律的长期议会统治时期已经开始，不久以后，终于在护国公（即克伦威尔王朝）和查理二世王朝期间的荷兰战争中来了一次大爆发。所以，说这个著名法案中的几项条例是从民族仇恨出发的，也不是完全不可能；不过这些条例本身非常明智，很像是深思熟虑的结果。当时存在于两国间的民族仇恨，其目标与经过最明智的决策之后制定的目标别无二致，那就是削弱荷兰的海军力量，那是唯一可能危害英国安全的海上力量。

航海法案不利于对外贸易，或者说遏制了对外贸易带来的财富增长。一国在对外国的通商关系中所获得的利益，与个别商人在与他人做生意时一样，都力求最大程度地贱买贵卖。而完全自由贸易鼓励一切国家购买和输入所需要的商品，在这种情况下国家最有可能贱买；也是出于同一原因，由于大量买者麇集于该国市场，商品的售价可以尽量提高，因而也最有可能贵卖。诚然，航海法案对于前来输出英国产品的外国船只并没有课税；甚至之前原本需要对所有出口和进口商品征收关税，而航海法案之后颁布的好几个法案，则规定对大部分出口商品减免这部分关税。但是如果外国人因禁令或高关税的原因而不能来我国售卖，他们也不能来我国购买；因为如果空船来我国装货，单是从其本国来到我国的船费就是一笔损失。所以减少售卖者人数，必然也会减少购买者人数；这样，与贸易完全自由之时相比，我们可能在购买外国货物时付价更高，而在售卖本国货物时出价更低。但是，由于国防比国富重要得多，所以在英国所有通商条例中，航海法案或许是最明智的一项法案。

第二种通过对外国产业征收若干税负来鼓励国内产业，总体而言又能对国内有利的情况，是在国内对该产业的产品课税的时候。在这种情况下，对外国的同类产品课以同额的赋税，似乎也合情合理。这种方法不会造成国内该产业对于国内市场的垄断，也不会使流入某一特殊用途的资本与劳动大于其自然流动的情况。课税的唯一结果，不过是阻止了本来应流入该用途的任何一部分资本与劳动流入非自然的用途，而在课税之后，本国产业与外国产业仍然能在与课税前大致相同的条件下互相竞争。在英国，国内产业的产品被课以此等税负时，通常会同时对同类外国商品的进口课以高得多的关税，免得国内商人和制造业者吵吵嚷嚷地埋怨说，这些商品要在国内贱卖了。

有人认为，对于自由贸易的这第二种限制，在某些情况下，不应仅限于输入本国而与本国课税商品相竞争的那些外国商品，应该扩大并适用于许多外国商品。他们声称，如果在国内对生活必需品课税，那么不仅对从外国输入的同类生活必需品课税是正当的，对输入国内、与国内任何产业的产品竞争的各种外国商品课税也都是正当的。他们声称，这样课税必然会抬高生活必需品的价格；而随着劳动者生活品价格的提高，劳动价格也必定跟着提高。所以，本国产业所生产的各种商品虽然没有被直接课税，但其价格都将因此种课税而提高，因为生产这些商品的劳动的价格上升了。所以，他们说，这样虽然表面看来只对生活必需品课税，实际上却相当于对国内一切产业的一切商品课税。因此他们认为，为使国内产业与国外产业处于同等地位，有必要对输入本国而与本国任何商品竞争的任何外国商品加收税负，其额度应该相当于本国商品价格提高的额度。

生活必需品税，如英国的肥皂税、盐税、皮革税、蜡烛税等，是否必然提高劳动价格，从而提高一切其他商品的价格，我将在后面考察赋税时详细阐述。但是另一方面，假设这种赋税有此后果（它的确有此后果），则一切商品价格由于劳动价格上涨而普遍上涨的情况，在以下两个方面与特定商品由于直接课有特种税负而涨价的情况有所不同。

第一，关于特种税负能够使该特定商品的价格提高到什么程度，总可以作出很准确的判断；但劳动价格的普遍提高将在何种程度上影响每一种不同商品的价格，却根本不可能准确判断。因此，要按各种国内商品价格上涨的比例，对各种外国商品课以相当的税负，就不可能将额度确定得相当准确。

第二，生活必需品税对人民生活景况的影响，无异于土壤贫瘠和气候的恶劣对人民生活的影响。粮食价格因此变得比从前昂贵，正如在贫瘠的土壤和恶劣的气候之下，生产粮食需要付出额外的劳动和费用。在土壤和气候等条件导致自然资源贫乏的情况下，指导人民如何使用其资本与劳动无疑非常荒谬；同理，在生活必需品赋税人为地导致资源匮乏时，这么做也显得滑稽可笑。很明显，在上述两种情况下对人民最有利的做法，让他们尽可能地适应当前环境，为自己的劳动寻找合适的用途，使之即使在不利的情况下，也能在国内或国外市场上占有稍稍优越的地位。人民的捐税负担已经太重了，且已经为生活必需品支付了极为高昂的价格，如果再课以新税，要他们再为其他大部分商品也支付过高的价格，无疑是雪上加霜，此乃最为荒谬的补救办法。

这类赋税高到一定程度，所造成的祸害决不低于土壤贫瘠和天时险恶所造成的祸害；然而最普遍征收这类赋税的地方，却正是那些人民最富裕，也最勤勉的国家。其他国家经不起这么大的失调。只有最强健的身体，才能在饮食不卫生时也能存活并拥有健康；国家也是一样，只有当一个国家的各种产业都具有最大的先天和后天优势时，才能在这么重的苛捐杂税下继续存在并繁荣发展。在欧洲，这一类赋税最多的国家要算荷兰，而荷兰之所以继续繁荣，并不是像人们无端想象的那样，因为有了这类税负，而是由于荷兰本国的特殊情形，这类税负无法阻止其继续繁荣。

对外国产业课以关税负担，以此来鼓励本国产业的做法，总体而言在上述两种情况下是有利的，而在下述两种情况下，则需要斟酌考虑两个问题：其一，应在何种程度上继续允许自由进口某些外国商品；其二，应在何种程度上，或以何种方式，在自由进口中断一段时间之后再次恢复。

有时需要考虑应在何种程度上继续允许自由进口某些外国商品的情况是：某个境外国家通过高关税或禁令，抑制我国某些制造业产品进口到该国。在这种情况下，复仇之心自然会诱使我们实施报复，我们应该对该国的某些或全部制造业产品同样征收高关税或完全禁止进口。事实上，各国通常都是如此实施报复的。法国人为了庇护本国的制造业，特别喜欢用限制进口的办法，对付一切能和他们竞争的外国商品。这似乎是科尔贝尔先生政策的重要组成部分，科尔贝尔先生尽管才智超群，在这一点上却似乎被商人和制造业者的诡辩蒙骗了，他们总是要求获得针对其同胞的垄断权。如今，就连法国最有才智的人都认为，先生的这种做法对国家毫无裨益。这位财政大臣于1667年颁布关税法，对大多数外国制造业品课以极高的关税；荷兰人请求降低关税而不得，便于1671年颁布法令，禁止进口法国的葡萄酒、白兰地及制造业商品。两国之所以于1672年开战，部分原因就是这一商业纠纷。1678年的奈梅亨和约结束了战争，应荷兰人之请，降低了关税，荷兰人也撤销了进口法国商品的禁令。英法两国大约是在同一个时候开始使用同样的关税和禁令来抑制对方国家的产业的，不过首先采取行动的似乎是法国。从那时以来一直存在于两国之间的敌忾之心，使得双方都不肯降低关税。1697年，英国禁止进口弗兰德制造的梭结花边。弗兰德那时是西班牙领地，其政府立即宣布禁止进口英国毛织品，以示报复。1700年，英国撤回了禁止进口弗兰德梭结花边的禁令，条件是弗兰德必须撤销禁止进口英国毛织品的禁令。

为了要撤销各方实施的高关税或禁令而纷纷采用的报复政策，如果能够达到目的，则不啻为一记良策。一般来说，能够恢复较大的外国市场，不但完全可以抵消由于某些商品价格暂时昂贵而经历的暂时困难，还能带来额外补偿。要判断这种报复能否产生效果，与其说需要立法者的知识，不如说需要有所谓政治家或政客的技巧，前者的深思熟虑应该受到普遍的一般原理的指导，而那些狡猾的“动物”，即被俗称为政治家或政客的那些人，在考虑问题时一般都得随机应变、见风使舵。在没有可能撤销这种禁令的时候，为了要补偿我国某些阶层人民所受的伤害，从而使伤害到我们自身的利益，则除了本来受伤害的那些阶层，几乎所有阶层都会受到伤害，这似乎不是一个好办法。当邻国禁止进口我国某种制造品时，我们通常不但禁止进口该国的同种制造品，而且禁止进口其生产的其他几种制造品，因为仅仅禁止那一种制造品很少能够对他们造成显著的影响。这样做无疑可能会给我国某些生产部门的工人以鼓励，替他们排除一些竞争者，使他们能在国内市场上抬高价格。不过，我们那些因邻国禁令而蒙受损失的工人是决不会从这类禁令中获益的。反之，他们以及我国几乎所有其他阶层的人民，在购买某些商品时，都不得不支付比从前更为昂贵的价格。所以，每一项此类法律的实施，事实上都给整个国家的民众增加了税负，不仅不利于那些因邻国禁令而遭受损失的我国工人，也不利于我国其他各阶层的民众。

在外国商品的自由进口中断一段时间之后，应该在何种程度上，或以何种方式恢复自由进口，需要考虑这第二个问题的原因是，由于一切能与其竞争的外国商品都被课以高关税或禁止进口，我国的某些制造业大大扩充，雇用了无数的工人。在这种情况下，出于人道主义的考虑，也许应该一步一步、小心翼翼地恢复自由贸易。如果骤然撤销高关税与禁令，价格低廉的外国同类货物将迅速涌入国内市场，导致我国千千万万的人口失业，连日常的生活资料也无从获取。由此引发的混乱无疑非常可怕。不过由于以下两个原因，由此引发的混乱或许要比一般人想象的小得多。

第一，所有在无奖励金的情况下通常也可以出口到欧洲其他各国的制造品，都很少会受到外国商品自由进口的影响。这类制造品在输往外国时，其售价必须与同品质的同类其他外国商品同样低廉，因而在国内的售价必然更低。这样一来，它们仍然能够占有国内市场。即使有一些爱赶时髦的人有时只因为是外国货便趋之若鹜，本国制造的同类商品虽价廉物美，亦为他们所不取，然而根据自然规律，这种愚行总不会那么普及，所以对人们的就业不会产生显著的影响。在我国的毛织品制造业、鞣革业、铁器业中，就有很大一部分制造品每年不依赖奖励金而输往欧洲其他各国，而雇用职工人数最多的制造业，也恰恰就是这几种制造业。从自由贸易中受到最大损害的或许是丝绸制造业，其次是麻布制造业，不过后者所受的损失比前者少得多。

第二，这样恢复贸易自由，虽然会令许多人突然失业并丧失基本生活资料，但他们不会因此而彻底失业或了无生计。上次战争结束时，海陆军人数裁减了10万多，相当于国内最大的制造业所雇用的人数；他们顿时失去了平素的职业，无疑会感到种种不便，但他们并没有因此便被剥夺所有的职业和生计。水兵的较大部分或许会有机会逐渐转移到商船上提供服务。与此同时，被遣散的陆军士兵，都被吸收到广大民众中，受雇于各种职业。10万多惯于使用武器，而且其中有许多惯于劫掠的人，生活状况发生了那么大的变化，却不曾出现大的骚动，也不曾引起显著的混乱。在我国的任何地方，流氓的数目并未因此而显著增加，而且据我所知，除了水兵转为商船海员外，任何一种职业的劳动工资也未曾减少。但是要是我们将士兵的习惯和任何一种制造业工人的习惯放在一起做一比较，即可发现：与前者相比，后者总是有可能且有资格转而从事新的行业。这是因为士兵一向以依赖粮饷为生，而制造业工人则只能靠自己的劳动为生；前者倾向于怠惰与闲荡，而后者倾向于勤勉与刻苦。由一种辛勤劳动转而从事另一种辛勤劳动，当然要比由怠惰闲荡变为勤勉刻苦容易得多。此外我们在前面已经论及，大部分制造业都有与其性质相似的旁系制造业，所以工人很容易从这些制造业的一种转到另一种。而且这类工人中的大部分，偶尔还被雇用从事农业劳动。以前在特定制造业中雇用他们的资本仍将留在国内，以其他方式雇用同样数目的人。国家的资本和从前相同，对劳动的需求也和从前相同或大致相同，不过是用在不同地方和不同职业中罢了；的确如此，海陆军士兵被遣散后即拥有了自由，可以在英国或爱尔兰的任何城镇或任何地方从事任何职业。让我们恢复国王陛下的一切臣民选择任何职业的天赋自由，像海陆军士兵所享有的那样，换言之，摧毁同业组合的专营特权、废除学徒法令（此二者实际上都是对天赋自由的侵犯），再废除居住法，使贫穷工人在此地此业中失业之后，能够在彼地彼业中就业，无须担心被人检举，也无须担心被迫迁移，这样公众与个人，由于某特定制造业工人的偶然遣散而蒙受的损害，就不会大于士兵遣散所遭受的损害。我国的制造业工人无疑对国家有很大的功绩，但和以血肉保卫国家的士兵相比，他们的功绩就显得小些，因而也不奢望得到什么更好的待遇。

我们不能指望自由贸易在英国完全恢复，正如不能指望理想国或乌托邦在英国实现一样。不仅公众的偏见，还有更难克服的许多个人对私利的欲望，这些都是完全恢复自由贸易所面对的不可抗拒的阻力。如果军队的将领都像大制造业者反对每一个有关在国内市场增加其竞争者人数的法律一样，激烈地一致反对裁减兵力，都像制造业者鼓动工人以暴力攻击和伤害此类法律的提议者那样，激烈地一致鼓动他们的士兵以暴力攻击缩减兵力政策的提议者，那么要想缩编军队就会非常危险，正如我们现在想在任何方面减缩我国制造业者既得的有害于同胞的垄断权一样危险。这种垄断权已经在很大程度上增加了某些制造业的人数，他们像一个过于庞大的常备军一样，不但可以胁迫政府，而且往往可以胁迫立法机关。支持加强此种垄断权提案的议会成员不仅可以获得理解贸易的佳誉，而且可以在那种因为人数众多和财富庞大而占据重要地位的阶层中备受欢迎与拥护。反之，要是此人胆敢反对这类提案，或者甚而有权阻止这类提案，那么，即使他被公认为是最正直的人，有最高的地位、最大的社会功绩，恐怕仍不免遭受最不名誉的侮辱与诽谤，不免受到人身攻击，而且有时会面临实际的危险，因为愤怒和失望的垄断者有时会以无理的暴行来加害他。

大制造业经营者，如果由于在国内市场上突然遇到了外国竞争对手而不得不放弃原来的行业，损失无疑是巨大的。通常用来购买原材料和支付工资的那一部分资本，要另觅用途或许不会十分困难；但固定在工厂及职业工具上的那一部分资本，其处置却难免会造成相当大的损失。因此出于对这类人利益的公平考虑，就要求这种变革不要操之过急，而要徐缓、逐渐地在发出警告很久以后实行。要是立法机构能够深思熟虑，不为出于片面利益的嘈杂抱怨声所左右，而是为大众普遍利益的卓识远见所引导，那么就要特别小心，既要防止形成任何新的此类垄断，又不能让已经形成的垄断继续扩大。这样的法规会在一定程度上给国家的体制带来实际的混乱，而后来的补救措施也难免引发新的混乱。

至于在何种程度上可以适当地对进口外国商品课以关税，不是为了阻止进口，而是为政府筹集收入，我将在以后考察税负时详细探讨。但为了阻止甚至减少进口而强加的关税，显然是在破坏自由贸易，对国家税收也是有百害而无一利。

注释

【1】
长度单位，相当于3.0法定英里（4.8千米）。——译者注

5

限制的不合理性

第一节

即使根据商业体系的原则，这种限制也不合理

商业体系所提倡的增加金银储量的第二个方法，是对通常认为其贸易差额不利于我国的那些国家的近乎所有商品的进口施加额外限制。正因为如此，西里西亚的上等细布只需缴纳一定的关税即可输入英国，供英国本土消费；但法国的细麻布和上等细布却禁止进口，只能被运往伦敦港，在那里的仓库中等待转运输出。相对于葡萄牙或任何其他国家生产的葡萄酒，我国对法国葡萄酒进口征收的关税也格外苛重。依照所谓的“1692年关税”的相关规定，一切法国商品都必须缴纳相当于其价格或价值的25％的关税；但来自其他各国的大部分货物所缴纳的关税却要轻得多，很少超过5％。诚然，法国的葡萄酒、白兰地、食盐和醋均不在此限，但这些商品却必须依照其他法律或同一法律的其他条款缴纳其他繁重的税务负担。1696年，有关方面认为25％的税负尚不足以阻止法国商品进口，于是又对白兰地以外的法国货物再课以25％的税，同时对法国葡萄酒每吨课以25英镑的新税，对法国醋每吨课以15英镑的新税。我国税则上所列举的各种商品或大多数商品所必须缴纳的那些一般补助税或“百分之五税”，法国商品无一能够省免。如果把1/3补助税和2/3补助税也计算在内的话，单一般补助税就多达五种；因此，在这次战争开始之前，法国大部分农副产品或制造品至少需要负担75％的进口税。而大部分商品根本负担不起这样重的税负，因此那些税负无异于一纸禁令。我相信，法国一定也针锋相对地对英国的商品和制造品征收同样苛重的税负，不过我并不清楚那些税负具体苛重到什么地步。这种相互施加的限制几乎断绝了两国间一切公平的贸易往来，如此一来，如今无论是法国商品运至英国，还是英国商品运至法国，主要都靠走私。我在前一章所考察的所有原则均起源于私人利害关系和垄断精神；而本章所要考察的各项原则就要归咎于民族偏见与敌意了。于是我们不难推断，这里提到的这些原则更加缺乏合理性，即使根据商业体系的诸项原则，也是极不合理的。

首先，即使英法之间自由通商，使得贸易差额确实对法国有利，我们也不能因此而断言该贸易就对英国不利；也不能因此而断言，英国全部贸易的总差额会因此而对英国更加不利。如果法国产的葡萄酒比葡萄牙产的葡萄酒价廉物美，法国产的麻布比德国产的麻布价廉物美，那么英国需要的葡萄酒与外国麻布，当然是从法国购买更加有利，而从葡萄牙和德国购买更为不利。尽管这样一来，每年从法国进口的商品价值将大大增加，但因同品质的法国商品价格要比葡萄牙和德国的商品更为低廉，全部进口商品的总价值应该有所减少，而减少的数量恰与其低廉程度相称。即便从法国进口的商品将完全用于在英国本国消费，情况也是如此。

其次，我们进口的法国商品中大部分可能会转而出口到其他国家去赚取利润，这种转出口带来的回报也许会等同于我们从法国进口的全部商品的原始费用。人们经常挂在嘴边关于东印度贸易的种种理论，或许对法国贸易也同样适用，那就是，尽管东印度的商品中大部分都是用金银购买的，但将其中一部分商品再出口之后所能够带回到本国来的金银，就比所有货物的初始费用还要多。现在，荷兰最重要的贸易部门之一，就是负责将法国商品运到欧洲其他各国。英国人饮用的法国葡萄酒，也有一部分是秘密经由荷兰及西兰岛
【1】

输入的。如果英法之间实施自由贸易，或者法国商品在进口时缴纳的税负水平与欧洲其他各国相同，并在出口时退回，那么在如今对荷兰如此有利的对法贸易中，英国就有机会分得一杯羹了。

最后，第三点，我们没有一个明确的标准，可以判定任何两国之间的贸易差额究竟对哪国有利，即哪一个国家输出的价值最大。关于这一类问题，我们判断的依据往往是为个别贸易者的私利所左右的国民偏见与敌意。然而在这种情况下，人们往往会使用两种标准，即关税簿册和汇兑情况。在我看来，这也是如今大多数人所认可的，关税簿册这种标准是非常靠不住的，因为根据该标准对大多数商品的估值都极不准确。至于汇兑的情况，恐怕也是同样不可靠。

据说，如果两地，如伦敦和巴黎，以等值票面进行汇兑，那表明伦敦欠巴黎的债务，恰被巴黎欠伦敦的债务抵消了。反之，如果在巴黎购买汇票时需要在伦敦给付贴水，据说那就表明伦敦欠巴黎的债务尚未与巴黎欠伦敦的债务完全抵消，还需从伦敦汇出一定的差额；鉴于此输出有风险、麻烦，要产生费用，代汇者要求给付贴水，汇兑人也必须给付贴水。然而据说，两个城市之间债务与债权的一般状况必然会受到彼此间通常的商务往来的支配。如果两个城市之间，甲从乙那里进口的数额不大于它向乙出口的数额，乙从甲那里进口的数额也不大于它向甲出口的数额，则两个城市的债务和债权可以相互抵消。但如果有任何一方从另一方进口的数额大于其向另一方出口的数额，则前者所承担的债务必然大于其对后者拥有的债权，那么二者间的债务和债权就无法互相抵消，前者必须向后者汇出一部分货币，其金额即相当于债务和债权之间的差额。因此，既然两地间商业往来的通常情况可以表明其债务和债权的一般状况，它也就必然能够表明两地间进出口的一般状况，因为这些都是债务和债权状况的支配因素。

不过尽管通过两地之间商业往来的通常情况就足以看出二者债务和债权的一般状况，但我们不能就此推断出，债务和债权情况有利于哪一方，贸易差额也就一定对其有利。任何两地之间债务和债权的一般状况并不一定完全取决于彼此通常的商务往来，通常它还会受到任何一方与其他许多地方进行交易情况的影响。例如，英国商人通常会用荷兰汇票从汉堡、丹泽和里加等地购买货物，这样一来，英国和荷兰之间债务和债权的一般状况就不完全取决于两国彼此交易的通常情况，还将受到英国和那些地方进行交易情况的影响。在这种情形下，即使英国对荷兰的出口可能大大超出它从荷兰进口的价值，即使所谓的贸易差额可能大大有利于英国，它仍然必须每年向荷兰汇出一笔货币。

此外，按照一向计算汇兑平价的方法，同样不能充分表明，如果汇兑的一般情况被认为有利于一个国家，那么债务与债权的一般情况也必然对它有利。换言之，真实的汇兑情况，与计算所得的汇兑情况，可能极不相同，而且事实上往往极不相同，所以，在许多情况下，关于债务和债权的一般情况，我们决不能根据汇兑的一般情况得到确实的结论。

当我们为了在英国支付一笔货币，收到一张可以在法国兑现的一笔货币的汇票时，如果前一笔货币根据英国铸币的标准所含的纯银，与后一笔货币根据法国铸币标准所含的纯银的盎司数目相同，我们就说，英国和法国之间以平价汇兑。如果你所支付的多于兑付所得，人们就认为你支付了贴水，并说汇兑对英国不利，对法国有利。如果你支付的少于兑付所得，人们就认为你得到了贴水，并说汇兑对法国不利，对英国有利。

但是，第一，我们不能总是按照各国造币厂的标准来判断各国通货的价值。各国通货的磨损程度，或者因为其他原因而低于其所制定标准的程度，有多有少。一国通用铸币与他国通用铸币的相对价值，并不取决于各自应该包含的纯银量，而是取决于各自实际所含的纯银量。在威廉王时代的银币改革之前，根据通常的算法，英国和荷兰之间的货币兑换按照其各自铸币的一般标准计算，需要英国支付25％的贴水。然而朗兹先生的调查研究表明，当时英国现行货币的价值比其标准价值不止低25％。因此，尽管按照通常算法当时的汇兑不利于英国，真正的汇兑却有利于英国；事实上，在英国支付较少量纯银所购得的汇票可以在荷兰兑换较大量的纯银，原本被认为在英国支付贴水的人最终却得到了贴水。在上一次英国金币改革之前，法国铸币的磨损程度要远远小于英国，法国铸币接近其标准的程度要比英国铸币高出两到三个百分点。因此，如果按照通常算法，英国与法国铸币之间的兑换对英国不利的程度不超过2％到3％的话，实际兑换就很可能对英国有利。自金币改革以来，兑换一直都对英国有利，对法国不利。

第二，在某些国家，铸币的费用是由政府支付的；而在另一些国家，它是由个人支付的，此时个人不但要持银块前往制币厂，政府甚至还有可能从铸币过程中获得一些税收。在英国，铸币的费用是由政府支出的，如果你持有1磅重的标准纯银前往铸币厂，可以得到62先令，其所含的同类标准纯银的重量正好是1磅。在法国，政府对铸币收取8％的税，不但支付了铸币的费用，还能够为政府带来少量收入。由于英国的铸币不收费，现行银币的价值绝不可能大大超过其实际包含的银块的价值。而在法国，由于铸币是收费的，劳动增加了铸币的价值，正如劳动使得精致的金银器皿的价值提高一样。如此说来，包含一定重量纯银的一笔法国货币要比包含同样重量纯银的英国货币的价值更高，购买时也必然需要花费更多的银块或其他商品。因此，虽说两国当前的铸币与各自标准的贴近程度没有什么差别，然而一笔英国货币无法买到含有同样重量纯银的一笔法国货币，因而也就无法买到价值相当于这笔货币的法国汇票。如果说我们为这样一笔货币支付的款项足以补偿法国铸币的费用，那么两国间的实际兑换为汇兑平价，其债务和债权或许事实上能够相互抵消，而根据计算所得的汇兑则对法国大大有利。如果所支付的款项低于这一数目，则两国间的汇兑事实上可能有利于英国，而根据算法则是有利于法国的。

第三点，也是最后一点，在某些地方，如阿姆斯特丹、汉堡、威尼斯等，外国汇票是以其所谓银行货币兑换的；而在另外一些地方，如伦敦、里斯本、安特卫普、莱戈恩等，外国汇票则是以本国的普通货币支付的。所谓银行货币的价值始终大于同等面值的普通货币。举例来说，阿姆斯特丹银行的1000荷兰盾的价值大于阿姆斯特丹通行的1000荷兰盾的价值。二者间的差额被称为银行的扣头，在阿姆斯特丹，银行的扣头一般为5％。假设两国当前使用的货币接近其各自铸币标准的程度一样，且其中一国使用普通货币来支付外国汇票，而另一国使用银行货币来支付外国汇票，那么显然，根据通行算法所得的汇兑有利于用银行货币支付的一国，而实际汇兑应该有利于以通行货币支付的一国；其道理和根据算法所得汇兑有利于用磨损较小的货币，或更接近于其各自标准的货币支付汇票的一方，而实际汇兑则有利于用磨损程度较大的货币支付的一方的道理是一样的。在上一次金币改革之前，在与阿姆斯特丹、汉堡和威尼斯等地交易时，计算所得的汇兑不利于伦敦，并且我认为，在与所有其他用所谓银行货币支付汇票的地方交易时的情况也都是如此。不过那并不表明实际汇兑也同样不利于伦敦。自从金币改革以来，即使在与那些地方交易时，实际汇兑也一直是有利于伦敦的。在伦敦与里斯本、安特卫普、莱戈恩等地交易时，或者，我认为在伦敦与除法国外的大多数其他欧洲地方交易时，根据计算所得的汇兑一般都是有利于伦敦的，且实际汇兑很可能也是有利于伦敦的。

［……］

第二节

根据其他原则，那些额外的限制也不合理

在上一节中我试图论证了即使根据商业体系的诸项原则，对于从那些贸易差额被认为不利于我国进口的商品进行额外限制也是完全不必要的。

然而，事实上整个贸易差额原则根本经不起推敲，但是另一方面，不仅这些限制，而且几乎所有其他商业监管规则全都是建立在这一原则之上。当两个地方彼此进行贸易时，贸易差额原则认为，如果差额平衡，则双方均没有损失或利润产生；但是如果贸易差额在任何程度上倾向于其中一方，则必有一方遭受损失，另一方获益，其损失和获益的程度与平衡倾斜程度一致。但是这些推想本身就是错误的。通过补贴或垄断等方式强迫进行的贸易，可能并且通常都不利于原本旨在获益的那一方，在接下来的文字中我会竭力证明这一点。而在没有外力强迫或限制的情况下自然、经常地在任何两地之间进行的贸易总是对双方都有利，不过对双方有利的程度不尽相同。

这里所谓的有利或获益并不是指金银数量的增加，而是指该国土地或劳动年产量的可交换价值的增加，或者其居民年收入的增加。

如果贸易差额平衡，且两地间的贸易完全是用各自本国生产的产品进行交换的话，则在大多数情况下，两地不但都会获益，且获益的程度也完全相同或基本相同；在这种情况下，两国各自会为对方的一部分剩余产品开辟出一块市场；甲方为生产和制造这一部分剩余产品而投入的资本，即在一定数目居民之间分配并为他们提供收入和生计的资本，会由乙方偿还；乙方投入的这部分资本则由甲方偿还。如此说来，两地各有一部分居民的收入或生计是间接从另一方获得的。同样，由于互相交换的商品被认为是同等价值的，在贸易中所使用的两种资本在大多数情况下也就一样多，或几乎一样多；在两国用于生产本国商品的资本，两国居民由此种分配而得的收入与生计，也必然相等或几乎相等。彼此互相提供的收入和生计，根据商务往来的程度，有多有少。举例来说，如果按一年计，两方面居民各自所获得的收入或生计高达10万英镑，或者100万英镑，那么两方面各自就需要为另一方的居民提供10万英镑或100万英镑的年收入。

如果两边的贸易是这样一种情况，即甲方向乙方出口的全部都是本国生产的商品，而乙方输入甲方的回程货物全都是外国商品，那么贸易差额被认为是平衡的，即双方都在用商品交换商品。在这种情况下，双方同样都会获益，但获益的程度不尽相同；纯粹出口本国商品的那个国家的居民，显然从该贸易中获得的收入最多。例如，如果英国从法国进口的商品只包括法国本国生产的商品，而英国本国的商品并不为法国人所需，因而每年向法国输入大量外国商品，例如烟草，或其他东印度商品作为补偿的话，这样的贸易尽管同样能为两国居民带来一定的收入，但为法国居民带来的收入显然要高于英国居民所得的收入。法国每年用于该贸易的全部资本都将在法国民众之间进行分配。而就英国资本而言，只有一部分，即用于生产英国商品（英国用来购买外国商品）的那部分资本，每年是在英国民众之间分配的，大部分英国资本都被用于补偿在弗吉尼亚、印度和中国使用的资本了，并将为那些遥远国度的居民提供收入和生计。在资本数目相同或几乎相同的情况下，法国用于该贸易的资本为法国民众所增加的收入就要大大高于英国用贸易资本为英国民众增加的收入。在这种情况下，法国与英国进行的是直接的消费品对外贸易，而英国与法国进行的是一种迂回的消费品对外贸易。在直接消费品对外贸易和迂回消费品对外贸易中所使用的资本的不同效果，我在前文中已经详细论述过了。

事实上，任何两个国家之间的贸易既不可能是双方都用本国生产的商品进行交换，也不大可能是一方完全用本国商品，而另一方完全用外国商品进行交换。几乎所有的国家都是用一部分本国商品和一部分外国商品进行交换的。然而，在贸易货物中包含最大比例的本国商品和最小比例的外国商品的国家，必然是主要的获益者。

如果英国不是用烟草和东印度商品，而是用金银来支付每年从法国进口的商品的话，则通常认为在这种情况下贸易差额是不平衡的，因为一国的商品不是用商品，而是用金银支付的。然而在这种情况下，正如前一种情况一样，贸易仍然会带给两国居民一些收入，只不过带给法国居民的收入稍高于英国；英国居民还是会从中获得一些收入。用于生产为购买金银所需的英国商品而投入的资本，即在一定数目居民之间分配并为其产生收入的资本，也因此而被收回，从而继续用于生产英国商品。输出这部分金银并不会减少英国的资本总量，正如输入同等价值的其他商品不会减少其资本总量一样。相反，在大多数情况下，英国的资本总量还会有所增加。商品之所以出口，就是因为国外对该商品的需求要大于国内，因此一般认为，出口所换回的商品在国内的价值要大于所出口商品的价值。如果在英国价值仅10万英镑的烟草被出口到法国之后，购回的葡萄酒的价值可以在英国达到11万英镑，那么这次交易就使得英国的资本总量增加了1万英镑。同理，如果用价值10万英镑的英国金子所购回的法国葡萄酒在英国的价值高达11万英镑，那么这次交易也同样使得英国的资本总量增加了1万英镑。如果说酒窖中存有价值11万英镑葡萄酒的商人要比仓库中存有价值10万英镑烟草的人富裕的话，那么葡萄酒商人也一定比保险箱里藏有价值10万英镑金子的商人更加富裕。葡萄酒商人所能够启动的产业数目，并因此而能够为其提供收入、生计和就业者的数目，显然要大于其他二人中的任何一个。然而国家的资本总量等同于其各行各业居民的资本总量，国家一年中所能够维持的产业数目也等同于各行各业的资本所能维持的产业数目。因此一般而言，国家的资本和国家在一年内所能维持的产业数目，将通过这次交换而增加。诚然，如果英国能够用自己生产的五金制品和绒面呢，而不是用弗吉尼亚烟草或巴西和秘鲁的金银来购买法国葡萄酒的话，这次贸易对英国将更加有利；直接的消费品对外贸易永远比迂回贸易更为有利。然而用金银进行交换的迂回的消费品对外贸易，却似乎并不会比其他同类迂回贸易更为不利。一个没有金银矿藏的国家不会因为每年出口这两种金属而造成金银严重短缺，正如一个不生产烟草的国家也不会因为烟草出口而造成烟草资源枯竭。一个有办法购买烟草的国家不会长期短缺烟草；同样，只要有办法购买到金银，任何一个国家也不会长期缺乏金银。

据说，工匠若与麦酒馆进行交易，必对工匠不利；自然，一个制造业国家与生产葡萄酒的国家进行的贸易也同属亏本贸易。我的答案是，与麦酒馆进行的交易不一定是亏本交易。从其本质上来看，它和任何其他交易的获利程度是一样的，只不过这种交易比较容易被滥用。一个酿酒师的职业，或者即使是小酒贩的职业，都必然与其他职业一样，同属必要的劳动分工。一个工匠在需要时从酿酒师那里购买，通常要比他自己酿造同样数量的麦酒更为划算，如果他是一个穷工匠，则对他来说，从小酒贩那里一点一点买，要比从酿酒师那里大量购买更加划算。如果此人贪吃好饮，则无疑会从酿酒师和酒贩那里购买大量麦酒，也会从附近其他的商人那里购买其他商品，比如会从屠夫那里购买更多的畜肉，如果此人贪慕时尚，则必然会从附近的布匹商人那里购买大量呢绒布匹。贸易自由有时的确会被滥用，且就某些贸易来说尤其如此，但无论如何，就工匠这一整体而言，这些贸易能够自由进行，显然是利大于弊。此外，个人有时会因为过量饮酒而倾家荡产，但对于一个国家而言，似乎没有这等风险。虽说每个国家都有很多人因为饮酒而入不敷出，为此量入而出或根本分文不花的人总是占更大多数。此外还应该指出，根据经验，葡萄酒如此便宜，并没有导致满街酒鬼烂醉如泥，倒反而使人们更有节制。大致说来，生产葡萄酒国家的居民是全欧洲最有节制的人，例如西班牙人、意大利人以及法国南部各省的居民。人们很少会不加节制地饮食，像温和的啤酒那样廉价的饮料，就算再怎么大肆挥霍，也无法表现出一个人出手阔绰、慷慨好客。相反，在那些因为气候过热或过冷而不生产葡萄，因而葡萄酒变得物以稀为贵的国家，酗酒倒成了一种普遍的恶行，诸如北方诸国，以及所有居住在热带附近的国家，像几内亚海岸的黑人，就是如此。当来自法国北部各省的兵团驻扎在南部某省，即从葡萄酒比较昂贵的省份来到葡萄酒非常便宜的省份时，我经常听人说，那些士兵起初会因为稀罕优质葡萄酒如此便宜而纵欲，但几个月之后，大多数人就会像当地居民一样节制了。如果我们立刻废除对外国葡萄酒征收的关税，并取消对麦芽、啤酒和淡啤酒加收的税负，英国的中下阶层民众或许也会出现普遍而短暂的酗酒现象，但很可能过不了多久，几乎所有人都会节制起来，且这种节制将一直延续下去。如今，在上流社会，即有能力消费最昂贵的酒精饮料的人士中，酗酒已经不再是普遍的恶行，因为饮用麦芽酒而烂醉如泥的绅士，实不多见。此外，在英国对葡萄酒贸易所进行的限制与其说阻止了人们前往酒馆，不如说阻止了人们令他们无法买到最物美价廉的酒精饮料。此种限制对葡萄牙的葡萄酒贸易更有利，而对法国的葡萄酒贸易不利。据说与法国人相比，葡萄牙人是英国制造业商品更好的顾客，因而与他们进行的贸易应该得到鼓励。政客们说，既然葡萄牙人照顾了我们，我们理应照顾他们。小商人的卑鄙策略，居然就这样成为一个大帝国的政治原则：的确如此，只有小商人，才会把这种策略看作是对待顾客的金科玉律。大商人不会过问这些小节，他们只关心能否在最物美价廉的地方购买到自己需要的商品。

然而，实施通过这类原则，各国最终得出的结论是，他们的利益统统在于让周围所有的邻国都变成穷国。每个国家最终都以嫉妒和毁谤之心看待所有与之进行贸易的国家的繁荣，并认为那些国家一旦得利，就必然意味着自己遭受了损失。各国之间的商业，如同个人之间的商业交易一样，原本应该是团结和友爱的纽带，最终却变成了滋生冲突和仇恨的沃土。在本世纪和上一个世纪，因为王公大臣们的任性和野心而对欧洲和平造成的伤害，远没有商人和制造业者那种无端的嫉妒之心来得更为严重。人类统治者施行的暴力和不公，自古以来就是祸害，在我看来，根据人类行事的规律法则，这种祸害是无法根除的。商人和制造业者既不是也不应该是人类的统治者，他们的贪婪和独占欲也许不能彻底改正，但要其不妨碍其他人的安宁，还是能够轻易做到的。

毫无疑问，最初发明并宣传这种原则的，正是商人们独占和垄断的精神；而最先倡导这种原则的人，却并不像后来笃信这种原则的人那般愚蠢。在任何国家，能够从卖得最便宜的人那里购买到自己需要的商品都是也必然是符合最大多数人利益的。这个道理不言自明，所以花费精力论证会显得有些滑稽；商人和制造业者出于自私、精明而故意混淆了这一基本常识，如果不因为此，我们甚至根本无须提及这一道理。在这方面，他们的利益与大多数民众的利益截然相反。就像同业组合内自由人的利益在于阻止国内居民雇用其他人而只雇用他们自己一样，这些商人和制造业者的利益，也在于自己保有国内市场的垄断。因此，英国和几乎所有的其他欧洲国家，均对所有由外国商人输入的商品课以额外的税负。于是就有了我们如今看到的，对所有可能与我们的制造品进行竞争的外国制造品征收高关税或干脆明令禁止的现象。因此也正如我们所看到的，对于贸易差额被认为不利于我国的国家，也就是那些与我国的民族仇恨最为强烈的国家，几乎所有商品的进口都施加了额外限制。

然而，尽管在战争或政治中邻国的富裕意味着我国的危险，在贸易中却显然是对我们有利的。在敌对状态下，富裕有可能使得敌人能够保有比我们更为精良的船舰和军队；而在和平的商业状态下，它必然会使得邻国与我们进行价值更大的交易，为我们提供更好的市场，使我们得以出售那些自己生产的产品或用那些产品购买的任何商品。对于勤劳生产的人来说，有富裕的邻人作为顾客自然要比贫穷的邻人更好，有一个富裕的邻国也是同样的道理。的确，如果富人本身又是一个制造业者，或许对所有同业的邻人来说不啻为一种威胁。不过其他邻人，从目前看来也是最大多数邻人却能够从中得益，因为富人的花费为大多数邻人提供了很好的市场。甚至他的产品的售价比那些贫穷的工匠更加低廉也能使大多数邻人受益。同样，一个富国的制造业者对邻国制造业者而言无疑是非常危险的竞争对手，然而竞争本身对大多数民众是有利的，此外，这样一个富裕的国家在其他方面的巨额花费，也必然为人们提供良好的市场，使之从中得益。希望发财的人绝不会退居穷乡僻壤，而必然居住在首都或者大的商业城镇附近。他们很清楚，如果财富的流通量很小，他们便很难从中受益，而如果财富的流通量极大，他们或许能够从中分得一杯羹。这种原则能够引导一两个，乃至一二十个普通人的常识，也应该能够影响一二百，乃至一二千万人的判断，应该能够使整个国家认识到，邻国的富裕可以看作是其本身获得财富的可能来源和潜在机遇。一个国家要想通过对外贸易富强起来，那么如果邻国都是富裕而勤勉的商业国家，它自然最容易达到目的。如果一个大国四周都是些游牧的未开化之人或贫穷的野蛮人，那么它无疑只能通过开垦本国的土地或发展国内商业来获取财富，想靠对外贸易则基本无望。古代埃及人和现代中国人似乎正是通过这种方式获得财富的。据说，古埃及人极不重视对外贸易；众所周知，现代中国人极其轻视对外贸易，根本不给对外贸易以正当的法律保护。由于对外商业贸易的现代原则旨在使所有的邻国陷入贫困，就算能够达到目的，产生其所企望的效果，也必然使得对外商业沦为极其微不足道、受人鄙视的地位。

正是这些原则，导致法国和英国之间的商业往来在两国都受到了很多阻碍和限制。然而，如果两个国家考虑一下自己真正的利益，而不要顾及商业上的妒忌或民族仇恨，法国商业为英国带来的利益可能远非任何其他国家可比；出于同样的原因，英国之于法国也是如此。法国是距离英国最近的邻国。英国南部沿海各地与法国北部及西北部沿海各地间的贸易，好像国内贸易一样，可以每年往返4次、5次乃至6次。两国投在这种贸易中的资本，比起投在对外贸易的大部分其他分支中的等量资本而言，可以启动4倍、5倍乃至6倍的产业活动，为4倍、5倍乃至6倍的人口提供就业和生计。就算英国和法国距离最远的那些地区之间，其贸易往来至少也能达到每年1次，即使这种少量的贸易，迄今为止英国从中所获得的利益也至少和与大部分其他欧洲国家进行对外贸易的获利一样多。如果与被我们鼓吹夸大的英国和北美殖民地之间的贸易相比——那种贸易往往每3年，甚至常常是每4—5年才能往返一次——则对法贸易的获利至少要高出3倍。此外，据估计法国居民多达2400万，而我们的北美殖民地人口绝不会超过300万；法国要比北美富饶得多；尽管由于财富不平等分配的现象更为严重，法国的穷人和乞丐人数也要比北美多得多。因此，法国所能提供的市场至少要比北美市场大8倍，且由于贸易往来的频率极高，英国从对法贸易中所得的利益要比对北美殖民地贸易所能提供的获利高出24倍之多。与英国的贸易对法国也同样有利，且根据两个国家的财富、人口、邻近程度，法国与英国的贸易也同样比法国与其殖民地之间的贸易优越得多。以上就是两种贸易之间的巨大差别：一种是两国的所谓“智者”认为应该阻止的贸易，而另一种是最受他们偏爱的贸易。

然而本该促进两国之间的开放自由贸易，使双方都从中收获甚丰的现实环境，却最终变成了对这种商业贸易的主要阻碍力量。由于彼此相邻，两国必然成为竞争对手，因此，一方的富强必然会使另一方感到恐惧；本来可以增进民族友谊的有利因素，最终却助长了激烈的民族仇恨。两国都是富饶而勤勉的国家；两国的商人和制造业者都害怕由于另一方的高超技能和勤勉劳动所带来的激烈竞争。商业上的嫉妒由强烈的民族仇恨所激起，而强烈的民族仇恨又助长了商业上的嫉妒，两者相互助长；两国的贸易者，都无比笃信其自私自利的谬说，宣称不受限制的国外贸易，必然会生出不利的贸易差额，而不利的贸易差额，又一定会导致国家的毁灭。

在欧洲各商业国家内，秉持这种学说自命不凡的学者常常预言说：贸易差额的不利必将导致国家濒于灭亡。但在这一切令他们激奋不已的焦虑论调背后，几乎所有贸易国家都试图改变贸易差额，使其有利于本国而不利于邻国，不过，这些努力似乎都是徒劳，无论从哪个方面来说，似乎没有一个欧洲国家曾因上述原因而陷入贫困。相反，每一个城镇和国家都因为对所有国家开放港口而致富，并没有像商业体系原则所预期的那样，因为自由贸易而走向毁灭。今日的欧洲，从某些方面来说，虽有几个城镇能够配得上自由贸易港口之称，而真正开放自由贸易的国家却没有一个。荷兰或许要算是最接近这一特征的国家了，却仍然离此目标甚远；众所周知，不仅荷兰的国家财富全部得自对外贸易，其国民必要生计的大部分也来自于对外贸易。

我在上文中已经解释过，还有一种差额全然不同于贸易差额，而这种差额的有利或不利，将必然决定一个国家的兴衰，这就是年产量和年消费量的差额。前文已经指出，如果年产量的可交换价值超过年消费量的可交换价值，则社会在这一年内的资本必然增加，增加的部分正好是前者超出后者的部分。在这种情况下，整个社会就其收入来说是量入而出的局面，整个一年中节省下来的收入自然增加了其资本总量，社会可继而使用这些盈余资本进一步增加年产量。相反，如果年产量的可交换价值低于年消费量的可交换价值，则整个社会的资本必然减少，减少的部分也正好是前者低于后者的部分。在这种情况下，整个社会就其收入来说，陷入了入不敷出的局面，消费必然会侵蚀资本。因而，社会的资本总量必然减少，随之而减少的，还有工业年产量的可交换价值。

产量和消费量的差额与所谓的贸易差额截然不同。即使是完全没有对外贸易、与世隔绝的国家，也可能存在这种差额。无论整个地球上的财富、人口和土地改良情况如何逐渐增加或逐渐减退，这种差额始终存在。

即使在所谓的贸易差额从整体而言不利于某一个国家时，产量和消费量之间的差额仍然可能始终有利于该国。也许半个世纪以来，一个国家的进口价值始终超出其出口价值；即使整个这段时期流入的金银可能立即流出；即使其流通的铸币逐渐磨损，只能用各种纸币替代铸币；甚至即使该国对与之交易的主要国家的债务逐渐增加，在同一时期内，这个国家真正的财富，它的土地和劳动年产量的可交换价值仍然可能以大大超过这些负面因素的比例与日俱增。

［……］

注释

【1】
位于丹麦东部，是丹麦境内最大的岛屿。——译者注

6

农业体系

我认为有必要对于政治经济学的贸易或商业体系作出详尽的解释，而对农业体系就不必长篇大论了。

据我所知，没有任何一个国家的农业体系将土地农产品作为该国政府收入和社会财富的唯一来源，这种观点目前仅仅是几个学识渊博且独辟蹊径的法国人的构想。显然，如果一种学说根本没有，甚至可能永远不会对世界上的任何国家造成任何危害，实在没有必要费心去详尽罗列该学说有何弊端。不过在此，我还是要尽可能地解释清楚这个天才学说的大致轮廓。

法王路易十四当政期间，鼎鼎有名的财政大臣科尔贝尔先生为人正直、工作勤勉、所学甚详，对审查政府账目有着丰富的经验和敏锐的洞察，简言之，他具备足够的能力，完全可以用新方案来管理政府税收的收支，并处理得井井有条。遗憾的是，这位杰出的财政大臣已经习惯了管理诸多政府部门的方法，习惯了建立必要的核查和监督机制，使这些部门各归其所。商业体系本质上的诸多束缚和严格管制，恰恰迎合了这位对工作兢兢业业的财政大臣的口味，他的头脑中充斥着商业体系带来的所有偏见。他试图将政府部门的管理模式运用到法国的工商业，不但不允许个体商人在平等、自由、公正的开明原则下以其各自的方式追求利益，还赋予某些工商业部门额外的特权，对另一些部门又特别限制。在城镇工商业和农业两者之间，他不仅和欧洲其他各国的财政大臣一样倾向于鼓励前者的发展，甚至不惜以抑制和阻止后者的发展为代价来辅助前者。为了给城镇居民提供价格低廉的生活必需品，以此来鼓励法国制造业和对外贸易，科尔贝尔先生全线禁止玉米出口，致使该国迄今最重要的工业原料无法进入国外市场。法国有着肥沃的农田和宜人的气候，自然条件十分优厚，但上述禁令连同各省自古就有的禁止玉米省际运输法案，再加上各省土地耕种者担负的名目繁多的苛捐杂税，导致法国的农业发展严重滞后。政府抑制农业发展在法国各地多少都有所体现，对其原因也展开过各种调查，原因之一似乎是科尔贝尔政府在城镇的工商业和农业之间选择优先发展前者。

常言道，矫枉往往过正。曾提出将农业作为每一个国家政府税收和社会财富的唯一来源的法国思想家们，似乎恰恰就是以此为座右铭的。如果说在科尔贝尔的方案中，城镇工商业发展被给予过高重视，那么这些哲学家设想的体系无疑又对它太不重视了。

一般认为，在任何方面可能有助于增加一国土地和劳动年产值的各阶层人民主要分为三类。第一类是土地所有者。第二类是土地耕种者、农场主和农村劳动者，这类人被尊称为生产阶级。第三类是饱受歧视，并被冠以“非生产阶级或纯消费阶级”这一侮辱性的称号的工匠、制造业者和商人。

土地所有者阶层对土地年产值的贡献在于，他们定期投入资本改良土地，修葺农舍，疏通排水设施，修补篱笆并改善其他设施。有了这些，耕种者就能够在同等资本投入的基础上获得更好的收成，从而缴付更高的地租。增加的这部分地租可以看作土地所有者支出费用或投入资本改良土地所应得的利息或利润。在农业学说中，这种费用被称为土地费用。

土地耕种者或农场主对土地年产值的贡献在于，他们支出费用耕种土地，在农业学说中，这部分费用被称为原始费用和年度费用。原始费用包括购买农具、牲畜、种子，以及农场主在第一年租种土地期间至少大半年时间或在土地有若干收成之前，维持其家人、雇工和牲畜的费用。年度费用包括购买种子、农具磨损和修葺的费用，以及农场主在一年内维持其雇工和牲畜而支出的费用，如果农场主的家人也参与劳动，被视为耕种的雇工，则也包括这部分家人的基本生活费用。对于农场主而言，土地的收成除去上缴的地租应充足有余。首先要在合理的时间内，至少在他租种期间，能够收回他所有的原始费用和产生资本的一般利润；其次要能够每年补偿他的所有年度费用和产生资本的一般利润。这两种费用是农场主在耕种期间投入的资本，如果资本不能定期收回并带来一定的利润，农场主付出的劳动和其他职业就不在同一水平上，那么从自身利益出发，他就必须尽快放弃这种劳动，寻求其他能够带来利润的工作。土地产值中用于使农场主再生产的部分应该留给耕种者专用。如果土地所有者将其挪作他用，其土地的产量必然下降，几年之后农场主将不但难以缴付上调的地租，甚至连原来的合理地租也难以承受。应该归属土地所有者的地租，不过是把先前用于提高土地总产值而支付的所有必要费用完全扣除之后所剩余的部分。正是由于土地耕种者的劳动，在扣除了所有的必要费用之后还能产生这样一部分净产值，他们在农业学说里才被冠以“生产阶级”的美称，也正是因此，其原始费用和年度费用才在该学说中被称为“生产性费用”，因为除了能够收回其本身的价值，这些费用每年还能产生一部分净产值。

所谓的土地费用，即土地所有者为改良其土地所花费的成本，在农业学说中也被冠以“生产性费用”的美称。直到上调的那部分地租偿还了所支出的所有费用，以及所投入资本的一般利润之前，这部分上调地租应该是神圣而不可侵犯的，教会和国王都不得觊觎：教会不能对其征收什一税，国王不能对其征税。否则，这笔资金的缺失将不利于土地所有者改良土地，从而降低日后教会征缴什一税和国王征税的金额。因此在一个井然有序的社会里，那些土地费用除了完全再生其本身的价值外，也会在一段时间之后产生净产值，所以在该学说中也被称为“生产性费用”。

不过，土地所有者的土地费用，以及农场主的原始费用和年度费用，是农业学说中仅有的三种生产性费用。其他任何形式的费用和其他任何阶层的人们，即使在常人看来是最具有生产能力的，根据这样的标准，也都被视为完全不生产。

工匠和制造业者尤为典型。根据常人的理解，他们的劳动大大增加了土地原产物的价值，可是在农业学说中，他们被认为是完全不生产的阶层。这种学说一般认为，他们的劳动不过是收回了雇用他们的资本，且为这部分资本创造了一般性利润。雇用资本包括由雇主事先垫付的原材料、工具和工资，是专门用于支付其劳动和维持其生活的资金，其所产生的利润则是专门用于维持雇主生活的资金。雇主既垫付了工匠和制造业者劳动所必须的原材料、工具和工资，也垫付了维持他自身生活所必需的那部分资金，一般来说，他垫付的这部分资金和他所希冀的劳动价格带来的利润呈正比。如果劳动价格还不能够偿还他维持自身生活的全部费用和投入到雇工劳动中的原材料、工具和工资费用，那么显然，它未能偿还雇主所投资的全部费用。因此，制造业资本的利润不同于地租的利润，也不是在偿还了雇主为获得利润所投下的全部费用之后所剩余的净利润。和大制造业者一样，农场主投入的资本也能够创造利润，但它还为他人创造了地租，这是大制造业者的投资所无法做到的。因此——这么说吧——用于雇用和维持工匠和制造业者生活的那部分资本不过只是让它本身的价值继续存在，而没有创造任何新价值。这就是为什么农业学说称之为完全不生产的费用。相反，用于雇用农场主或农村劳动力的费用则不仅能够继续维系其自身的价值，还能够产生新价值，即土地所有者的地租，因此它是生产性费用。

商业资本同制造业资本一样，都是不能生产的，都只能维持自身的价值。商业利润仅仅偿还了其雇主在投资期间、收回资本回报之前垫付给自身维持生活的费用，充其量只补偿了投资所必须支付的一部分费用。

工匠和制造业者的劳动的确从未增加过土地原产品年产量价值的一分一毫，可又的确大大增加了某些特定原产品的价值。不过其所消费的其他部分的价值及其所增加的那部分价值正好相等，因此在整个过程中，农产品年产总量的价值并未有丝毫增加。举例来讲，一个将褶边加工成蕾丝的手艺人，有时会将价值仅为几便士的亚麻原料的价值增加到30英镑。乍看之下，他似乎把原材料价值增加了7200多倍，事实上他一丁点儿都没有增加土地原产品年产总量的价值。加工蕾丝或许要耗去他两年的劳动。完工后所得到的30英磅不过只是偿还了他在这两年劳动期间的生活花费而已。他日复一日的劳动为那对褶边所增加的价值不过只是补偿了他那日复一日的劳动过程中的生活花费。因此在整个过程中，他丝毫没有增加土地原产品年产总量的价值：他在此期间所持续消费的农产品部分，总是能够抵消掉他所持续创造的价值。在这个费用高却又不重要的制造业中，受雇的大多数人都很贫穷，这一点恰恰证明，他们的劳动价格一般不超过他们所消耗的生活必需品的价值。而农场主和农村劳动力的情况则不同，一般来说，土地所有者的地租就是其不断产生的价值，而地租又是在扣除了完全补偿劳动者及其雇主的雇用和维持生活所需的全部费用之后剩余的部分。

工匠，制造业者和商人若要增加国家税收和社会财富，唯一的途径就是节俭，或者按照农业学说中的说法，只能靠克己，即自行剥夺原本用于维持自身生活所用的那部分资金。年复一年，他们再生产的只是那部分资金。因此，如果他们每年不节省下一部分资金或限制自己使用一部分资金，他们的劳动就根本不能增加整个社会的税收和财富。农场主和农村劳动力则相反，他们可以充分享有维持自身生活的那部分资金，同时还能增加政府的税收和社会财富。除去维持他们自身生活的花费之外，他们年复一年的劳动还创造了净产值，产值的增加必然将增加税收和社会财富。因而诸如法国和英国这样在很大程度上由土地所有者和耕种者组成的国家，劳动之余还能享乐，国家也因此而走向富裕。与之相反，荷兰和汉堡这类主要由商人、工匠和制造业者组成的国家，就只能通过节俭和克己来累积财富。由于各国所处的境况截然不同，国家的利害关系也大不相同，国民的性格也各有特点：前一类国家的国民自然而然地形成了善良慷慨，诚实直率，热情友爱的性格；后一类国民则难免狭隘卑鄙、自私自利，拒绝任何俗世的享乐。

非生产阶层，即商人、工匠和制造业者完全要靠其他两个阶层，即土地所有者和耕种者阶层来维持和雇用。后两个阶层既为前一个阶层提供了生产原料和维持其生活所必需的费用，又提供了他们在从事该劳动期间所消费的粮食和牲畜。土地所有者和耕种者最终不但要支付非生产阶层所有劳动者的工资，还要支付其雇主的所有利润。那些劳动者及其雇主在某种程度上都受制于生产阶层，只不过他们是在外做工的奴仆，而不是在主人家中做事，不过无论哪一种奴仆，都要靠同一类主人养活。因而两者的劳动都是非生产的，对于土地原产品总价值的增加没有什么影响——不仅没有增加，反倒还需从总价值中抽出一部分来支付自身费用。

尽管如此，非生产阶层不仅不能算作无用，而且对其他两个阶层颇有助益。通过商人、工匠和制造业者的辛勤劳动，土地所有者和耕种者就可以用其自身一小部分劳动的产品，来购买他们所需的他国产品及本国加工的产品；否则，无论输入别国商品还是自行加工为己所用，以其操作的笨拙和不熟练，为此付出的劳动要远远高于他们购买成品所需的费用。因为有了商人、工匠和制造业者的辛勤劳动，土地耕种者才得以心无旁骛地致力于土地的耕种，也正由于这种全力以赴的劳动，他们才能够收获足量的农产品，来支付土地所有者和他们自身为了维持和雇用非生产阶层所支付的全部费用。因此，尽管商人、工匠和制造业者本质上是不生产的，但他们的劳动以这种方式间接增加了土地产量。通过给予生产阶层充分的时间和自由来专注于自己的劳动，即土地耕种，非生产阶层的劳动提高了生产性劳动的生产力；可以这样说，往往由于与耕种毫不相干的人的劳动，耕种的效率得到大大的提高。

对土地所有者和耕种者而言，以任何方式抑制商人、工匠和制造业者的发展，向来都不符合他们的利益。非生产阶层享受的自由度越大，诸多行业间的竞争就越激烈，他们提供给土地所有者和耕种者的商品——无论是别国商品还是本国制造品——的价格就越低廉。

对非生产阶层而言，抑制另外两个阶层的发展也不符合其自身利益。用于维持其生活和雇用其劳动的，正是扣除了土地耕种者和土地所有者维持生活所必须的投资之后剩余的那部分土地农产品。同理，这部分盈余越多，维持和雇用该阶层的费用就会越高。完全公正、完全自由和完全平等地建立，是这三个阶层最大限度地同臻繁荣的最简单、最有效的秘诀。

在荷兰和汉堡等以商业为主的国家，非生产阶层主要由商人、工匠和制造业者构成，维持和雇用他们的资本也同样要由土地所有者和耕种者承担。唯一的区别是，为这些非生产阶层提供生产和生活资料的大多是其他国家的土地所有者和耕种者，是别国臣民，与荷兰等国的工商业阶级相隔千里，极不便利。

然而这些商业国对于其他国家的居民，不仅有用，而且用处颇大。其他国家居民本应拥有其各自的工商业阶层，但因各国政策的某些缺陷，工商业阶层未能形成。这些以非生产阶层为主的国家在某种程度上填补了这个极其重要的空缺，代替了这些国家的商人、工匠和制造业者。

那些农业国家——我姑且这样称呼它们——也决不会对荷兰等国的贸易或输出的商品课以高额关税，来束缚和限制这些商业国家的发展，这不符合它们自身的利益。高额关税会提高这些商品的价格，由于这些商品是用输入国的土地原产物的盈余，或换而言之，是用这些剩余产物的价格购买的，如此只会导致其本国土地原产物实际价值的贬抑。高额关税只会打击生产阶层的积极性，使之不再乐于增加土地产物的盈余，并进而导致本国土地的改良与耕种受到影响。与之相反，如若想提高剩余部分产物的价值、扩大生产、激励改良和耕种土地，最为有效的策略莫过于允许所有商业国家进行绝对的自由贸易。

这种绝对的自由贸易，从以下这一点来说也是最有效的方案：它能够及时提供那些农业国所需要的工匠、制造业者和商人，以最恰当、最便利的方式填补这个使他们深感不便的空缺。

土地剩余产物持续增加，在适当的时候，会创造出多于用于耕种和改良土地的利润值的资金，而这部分利润中剩余的部分自然又被投资，用于雇用国内的工匠和制造业者。然而一旦那些工匠和制造业者发现本国既提供生产原料又提供维持其生活的费用，那么即便他们缺乏精湛的技艺，也极有可能立即生产出与商业国的工匠和制造业者同等低廉的产品，毕竟后者的生产和生活资料要从遥远的地方运来。由于技艺不精，在一段时间内，这些手工业者的制作成本不能和他国技艺娴熟的同行一样低廉；可一旦放眼国内市场，他们的产品和那些千里迢迢来自异国他乡的产品相比，由于减免运费，价格相差无几，并且随着他们技艺的改善精进，他们产品的价格很快就会更大幅度降低。这样，那些商业国的工匠和制造业者在这些农业国的市场上就会立刻面临来自对手的竞争，继之而来的是销量大减，最终被完全挤出该国市场。由于不断改进技艺，农业国的制造业产品价格低廉，假以时日便会走出国门、进军他国市场，且最终会以同样的方式，逐渐将那些商业国家的制造业者挤出市场。

农业国土地原产物和加工产品均保持持续增长，到一定时候会生成一笔资本，其金额会高于用于农业或制造业的费用所产生的一般利润率。这部分盈余自然会转向对外贸易，用于将本国土地原产物和制造业产品超出本国消费需求的那一部分输出到其他国家。在向他国输出本国农产品时，和那些商业国家的商人相比，农业国的商人也具有一定的优势，道理和农业国的工匠和制造业者所具有的优势一样，即农业国的商人可在国内得到货物、原料及供给，而商业国家的商人若要得到这些，就得不远万里地去寻找。因此，如果农业国的商人缺乏先进的航海技术，他们和商业国商人输入到外国市场的货物价格基本持平；一旦农业国商人的航海技术发展成熟，他们的产品价格将更加低廉。如此说来，不久他们就可以在这一块对外贸易中与商业国家平起平坐，并最终将后者完全挤出市场。

因此，按照这个自由宽宏的制度，一个农业国若要促进本国的工匠、制造业者和商人的发展，最有利的办法就是给予其他国家的工匠、制造业者和商人以最大限度的贸易自由。这样可以提高本国土地剩余产物的价值，从而生成一笔资金，经一段时间的积累，这笔资金必然能够培养起本国所需的工匠、制造业者和商人。

相反，如果农业国对外贸课以高额关税或设置重重障碍，必然会从两方面危害到自身利益。其一，抬高所有外国商品和其他制造品的价格，必然会降低本国土地剩余产物的实际价值，因为该国是用这些盈余，或换言之，是用这些剩余产物的价格购买那些外国商品和制造品的；其二，通过给予本国商人、工匠和制造业者在国内市场上的某种垄断，提高商业和制造业相对于农业的利润，就会使先前应用于农业的一部分资本流入商业和制造业，或者阻碍了本应用于农业的资本流入农业。因此我们说，这项政策从两个方面挫伤了农业的发展。首先，它降低了农产品的实际价值，因而降低了农业的利润；其次，它提高了所有其他行业的利润。由此，农业相对处于劣势，贸易和制造业则拥有了原本不该有的优势。受到一己私利的驱使，每个人都会尽可能地将自己的资本和劳动从前者转投到后者。

农业国通过实施这项抑制性政策，可藉相对自由贸易以较快的速度培养出自己的工匠、制造业者和商人——不过这一点非常可疑——然而我们可以说，这是在其还未发展成熟之前，过早地将他们培养起来。过速地培育起某一个行业，就必然会抑制另一个更有价值的行业。被过速培育的这个行业只能回收起初投入的资本并产生一般利润，而被抑制的那个行业在回收该资本并产生一般利润之后还能够产生净值，即支付给地主的地租。这必然会压制生产性劳动，而过早地鼓励了完全不生产的劳动。

［……］

前面已经谈到，任何国家的规模最大和最重要的商业活动是在城乡居民之间展开的。一方面通过交换，城镇居民获得了土地原产物，从而获得了生产材料和维持生活所需的花费；另一方面，他们在交换中支付加工过的能够立即付诸使用的那部分原产物。在截然不同的两类人之间开展交易，其实最终是一定数量的原产物与一定数量的加工品之间的交换，因此后者越贵，前者就会越便宜；任何国家无论以任何方式提高加工品价格，都会导致土地原产物价格下跌，从而不利于该国农业的发展。用一定数量的土地原产物，或用一定数量的土地原产物的价格所能购买的加工品的数量越少，这部分土地原产物的可交换价值就越低，就越会打击土地所有者改良土地或农场主耕种土地的积极性。此外，任何国家无论以何种方式减少工匠和制造业者的从业人数，都会导致国内市场萎缩。而国内市场是土地原产物的诸多市场中最为重要的市场，因而该国的农业发展就会进一步受到抑制。

由此，那些认为农业胜过任何其他行业的学说，为促进农业的发展，总是对制造业和对外贸易设置障碍，最终却事与愿违，原本旨在促进农业发展，却间接地起到了抑制的作用。就这一点来说，其自相矛盾的程度或许要比商业体系的原则更为严重。商业体系对制造业和对外贸易的重视超过对农业的重视，因而从社会资本中抽取部分资本，使社会资本不再用于较有优势的行业，转而用于支持不大具备优势的行业。但事实上它最终却能够实现初衷，鼓励其意欲支持的行业发展。与之相反，重农学说最终只会抑制其所要保护的行业发展。

由此看来，无论是额外鼓励某个行业的发展，增加投入，使之远远超过本应投入的社会资本，还是限制某个行业的发展，减少投入，使之远远低于本应投入的社会资本的制度，事实上都会和原来的目标背道而驰。不仅没有加速富国强民的进程，还降低了土地年产物和劳动力的实际价值。

所有学说，无论是优先发展还是抑制发展的学说，一旦完全废除，最明白、最简单的自由制度就会自然而然地建立起来。只要不违背公正原则，任何人都可以完全自由地按照自己的方式谋求私利，并用他自己的劳动和资本与任何其他个人或阶层展开竞争。

Adam Smith

The Invisible Hand

PENGUIN BOOKS — GREAT IDEAS

1

The Division of Labour

The greatest improvement in the productive powers of labour, and the greater part of the skill, dexterity, and judgement with which it is anywhere directed, or applied, seem to have been the effects of the division of labour.

The effects of the division of labour, in the general business of society, will be more easily understood by considering in what manner it operates in some particular manufactures. It is commonly supposed to be carried furthest in some very trifling ones; not perhaps that it really is carried further in them than in others of more importance: but in those trifling manufactures which are destined to supply the small wants of but a small number of people, the whole number of workmen must necessarily be small; and those employed in every different branch of the work can often be collected into the same workhouse, and placed at once under the view of the spectator. In those great manufactures, on the contrary, which are destined to supply the great wants of the great body of the people, every different branch of the work employs so great a number of workmen that it is impossible to collect them all into the same workhouse. We can seldom see more, at one time, than those employed in one single branch. Though in such manufactures, therefore, the work may really be divided into a much greater number of parts than in those of a more trifling nature, the division is not near so obvious, and has accordingly been much less observed.

To take an example, therefore, from a very trifling manufacture; but one in which the division of labour has been very often taken notice of, the trade of the pin-maker; a workman not educated to this business (which the division of labour has rendered a distinct trade), nor acquainted with the use of the machinery employed in it (to the invention of which the same division of labour has probably given occasion), could scarce, perhaps, with his utmost industry, make one pin in a day, and certainly could not make twenty. But in the way in which this business is now carried on, not only the whole work is a peculiar trade, but it is divided into a number of branches, of which the greater part are likewise peculiar trades. One man draws out the wire, another straights it, a third cuts it, a fourth points it, a fifth grinds it at the top for receiving the head; to make the head requires three distinct operations; to put it on is a peculiar business, to whiten the pins is another; it is even a trade by itself to put them into the paper; and the important business of making a pin is, in this manner, divided into about eighteen distinct operations, which, in some manufactories, are all performed by distinct hands, though in others the same man will sometimes perform two or three of them. I have seen a small manufactory of this kind where ten men only were employed, and where some of them consequently performed two or three distinct operations. But though they were very poor, and therefore but indifferently accommodated with the necessary machinery, they could, when they exerted themselves, make among them about twelve pounds of pins in a day. There are in a pound upwards of four thousand pins of a middling size. Those ten persons, therefore, could make among them upwards of forty-eight thousand pins in a day. Each person, therefore, making a tenth part of forty-eight thousand pins, might be considered as making four thousand eight hundred pins in a day. But if they had all wrought separately and independently, and without any of them having been educated to this peculiar business, they could certainly not each of them have made twenty, perhaps not one pin in a day; that is, certainly, not the two hundred and fortieth, perhaps not the four thousand eight hundredth part of what they are at present capable of performing, in consequence of a proper division and combination of their different operations.

In every other art and manufacture, the effects of the division of labour are similar to what they are in this very trifling one; though, in many of them, the labour can neither be so much subdivided, nor reduced to so great a simplicity of operation. The division of labour, however, so far as it can be introduced, occasions, in every art, a proportionable increase of the productive powers of labour. The separation of different trades and employments from one another seems to have taken place in consequence of this advantage. This separation, too, is generally carried furthest in those countries which enjoy the highest degree of industry and improvement; what is the work of one man in a rude state of society being generally that of several in an improved one. In every improved society, the farmer is generally nothing but a farmer; the manufacturer, nothing but a manufacturer. The labour, too, which is necessary to produce any one complete manufacture is almost always divided among a great number of hands. How many different trades are employed in each branch of the linen and woollen manufactures, from the growers of the flax and the wool, to the bleachers and smoothers of the linen, or to the dyers and dressers of the cloth! The nature of agriculture, indeed, does not admit of so many subdivisions of labour, nor of so complete a separation of one business from another, as manufactures. It is impossible to separate so entirely the business of the grazier from that of the corn-farmer as the trade of the carpenter is commonly separated from that of the smith. The spinner is almost always a distinct person from the weaver; but the ploughman, the harrower, the sower of the seed, and the reaper of the corn, are often the same. The occasions for those different sorts of labour returning with the different seasons of the year, it is impossible that one man should be constantly employed in any one of them. This impossibility of making so complete and entire a separation of all the different branches of labour employed in agriculture is perhaps the reason why the improvement of the productive powers of labour in this art does not always keep pace with their improvement in manufactures. The most opulent nations, indeed, generally excel all their neighbours in agriculture as well as in manufactures; but they are commonly more distinguished by their superiority in the latter than in the former. Their lands are in general better cultivated, and having more labour and expense bestowed upon them, produce more in proportion to the extent and natural fertility of the ground. But this superiority of produce is seldom much more than in proportion to the superiority of labour and expense. In agriculture, the labour of the rich country is not always much more productive than that of the poor; or, at least, it is never so much more productive as it commonly is in manufactures. The corn of the rich country, therefore, will not always, in the same degree of goodness, come cheaper to market than that of the poor. The corn of Poland, in the same degree of goodness, is as cheap as that of France, notwithstanding the superior opulence and improvement of the latter country. The corn of France is, in the corn provinces, fully as good, and in most years nearly about the same price with the corn of England, though, in opulence and improvement, France is perhaps inferior to England. The corn-lands of England, however, are better cultivated than those of France, and the corn-lands of France are said to be much better cultivated than those of Poland. But though the poor country, notwithstanding the inferiority of its cultivation, can, in some measure, rival the rich in the cheapness and goodness of its corn, it can pretend to no such competition in its manufactures; at least if those manufactures suit the soil, climate, and situation of the rich country. The silks of France are better and cheaper than those of England, because the silk manufacture, at least under the present high duties upon the importation of raw silk, does not so well suit the climate of England as that of France. But the hardware and the coarse woollens of England are beyond all comparison superior to those of France, and much cheaper too in the same degree of goodness. In Poland there are said to be scarce any manufactures of any kind, a few of those coarser household manufactures excepted, without which no country can well subsist.

This great increase of the quantity of work which, in consequence of the division of labour, the same number of people are capable of performing, is owing to three different circumstances; first, to the increase of dexterity in every particular workman; secondly, to the saving of the time which is commonly lost in passing from one species of work to another; and lastly, to the invention of a great number of machines which facilitate and abridge labour, and enable one man to do the work of many.

First, the improvement of the dexterity of the workman necessarily increases the quantity of the work he can perform; and the division of labour, by reducing every man's business to some one simple operation, and by making this operation the sole employment of his life, necessarily increases very much the dexterity of the workman. A common smith, who, though accustomed to handle the hammer, has never been used to make nails, if upon some particular occasion he is obliged to attempt it, will scarce, I am assured, be able to make above two or three hundred nails in a day, and those too very bad ones. A smith who has been accustomed to make nails, but whose sole or principal business has not been that of a nailer, can seldom with his utmost diligence make more than eight hundred or a thousand nails in a day. I have seen several boys under twenty years of age who had never exercised any other trade but that of making nails, and who, when they exerted themselves, could make, each of them, upwards of two thousand three hundred nails in a day. The making of a nail, however, is by no means one of the simplest operations. The same person blows the bellows, stirs or mends the fire as there is occasion, heats the iron, and forges every part of the nail: in forging the head too he is obliged to change his tools. The different operations into which the making of a pin, or of a metal button, is subdivided, are all of them much more simple, and the dexterity of the person, of whose life it has been the sole business to perform them, is usually much greater. The rapidity with which some of the operations of those manufactures are performed, exceeds what the human hand could, by those who had never seen them, be supposed capable of acquiring.

Secondly, the advantage which is gained by saving the time commonly lost in passing from one sort of work to another is much greater than we should at first view be apt to imagine it. It is impossible to pass very quickly from one kind of work to another that is carried on in a different place and with quite different tools. A country weaver, who cultivates a small farm, must lose a good deal of time in passing from his loom to the field, and from the field to his loom. When the two trades can be carried on in the same workhouse, the loss of time is no doubt much less. It is even in this case, however, very considerable. A man commonly saunters a little in turning his hand from one sort of employment to another. When he first begins the new work he is seldom very keen and hearty; his mind, as they say, does not go to it, and for some time he rather trifles than applies to good purpose. The habit of sauntering and of indolent careless application, which is naturally, or rather necessarily acquired by every country workman who is obliged to change his work and his tools every half hour, and to apply his hand in twenty different ways almost every day of his life, renders him almost always slothful and lazy, and incapable of any vigorous application even on the most pressing occasions. Independent, therefore, of his deficiency in point of dexterity, this cause alone must always reduce considerably the quantity of work which he is capable of performing.

Thirdly, and lastly, everybody must be sensible how much labour is facilitated and abridged by the application of proper machinery. It is unnecessary to give any example. I shall only observe, therefore, that the invention of all those machines by which labour is so much facilitated and abridged seems to have been originally owing to the division of labour. Men are much more likely to discover easier and readier methods of attaining any object when the whole attention of their minds is directed towards that single object than when it is dissipated among a great variety of things. But in consequence of the division of labour, the whole of every man's attention comes naturally to be directed towards some one very simple object. It is naturally to be expected, therefore, that some one or other of those who are employed in each particular branch of labour should soon find out easier and readier methods of performing their own particular work, wherever the nature of it admits of such improvement. A great part of the machines made use of in those manufactures in which labour is most subdivided, were originally the inventions of common workmen, who, being each of them employed in some very simple operation, naturally turned their thoughts towards finding out easier and readier methods of performing it. Whoever has been much accustomed to visit such manufactures must frequently have been shown very pretty machines, which were the inventions of such workmen in order to facilitate and quicken their own particular part of the work. In the first fire-engines, a boy was constantly employed to open and shut alternately the communication between the boiler and the cylinder, according as the piston either ascended or descended. One of those boys, who loved to play with his companions, observed that, by tying a string from the handle of the valve which opened this communication to another part of the machine, the valve would open and shut without his assistance, and leave him at liberty to divert himself with his play-fellows. One of the greatest improvements that has been made upon this machine, since it was first invented, was in this manner the discovery of a boy who wanted to save his own labour.

All the improvements in machinery, however, have by no means been the inventions of those who had occasion to use the machines. Many improvements have been made by the ingenuity of the makers of the machines, when to make them became the business of a peculiar trade; and some by that of those who are called philosophers or men of speculation, whose trade it is not to do anything, but to observe everything; and who, upon that account, are often capable of combining together the powers of the most distant and dissimilar objects. In the progress of society, philosophy or speculation becomes, like every other employment, the principal or sole trade and occupation of a particular class of citizens. Like every other employment too, it is subdivided into a great number of different branches, each of which affords occupation to a peculiar tribe or class of philosophers; and this subdivision of employment in philosophy, as well as in every other business, improves dexterity, and saves time. Each individual becomes more expert in his own peculiar branch, more work is done upon the whole, and the quantity of science is considerably increased by it.

It is the great multiplication of the productions of all the different arts, in consequence of the division of labour, which occasions, in a well-governed society, that universal opulence which extends itself to the lowest ranks of the people. Every workman has a great quantity of his own work to dispose of beyond what he himself has occasion for; and every other workman being exactly in the same situation, he is enabled to exchange a great quantity of his own goods for a great quantity, or, what comes to the same thing, for the price of a great quantity of theirs. He supplies them abundantly with what they have occasion for, and they accommodate him as amply with what he has occasion for, and a general plenty diffuses itself through all the different ranks of the society.

Observe the accommodation of the most common artificer or day-labourer in a civilized and thriving country, and you will perceive that the number of people of whose industry a part, though but a small part, has been employed in procuring him this accommodation, exceeds all computation. The woollen coat, for example, which covers the day-labourer, as coarse and rough as it may appear, is the produce of the joint labour of a great multitude of workmen. The shepherd, the sorter of the wool, the wool-comber or carder, the dyer, the scribbler, the spinner, the weaver, the fuller, the dresser, with many others, must all join their different arts in order to complete even this homely production. How many merchants and carriers, besides, must have been employed in transporting the materials from some of those workmen to others who often live in a very distant part of the country! How many merchants and carriers, besides, must how many ship-builders, sailors, sail-makers, rope-makers, must have been employed in order to bring together the different drugs made use of by the dyer, which often come from the remotest corners of the world! What a variety of labour, too, is necessary in order to produce the tools of the meanest of those workmen! To say nothing of such complicated machines as the ship of the sailor, the mill of the fuller, or even the loom of the weaver, let us consider only what a variety of labour is requisite in order to form that very simple machine, the shears with which the shepherd clips the wool. The miner, the builder of the furnace for smelting the ore, the seller of the timber, the burner of the charcoal to be made use of in the smelting-house, the brick-maker, the brick-layer, the workmen who attend the furnace, the mill-wright, the forger, the smith, must all of them join their different arts in order to produce them. Were we to examine, in the same manner, all the different parts of his dress and household furniture, the coarse linen shirt which he wears next his skin, the shoes which cover his feet, the bed which he lies on, and all the different parts which compose it, the kitchen-grate at which he prepares his victuals, the coals which he makes use of for that purpose, dug from the bowels of the earth, and brought to him perhaps by a long sea and a long land carriage, all the other utensils of his kitchen, all the furniture of his table, the knives and forks, the earthen or pewter plates upon which he serves up and divides his victuals, the different hands employed in preparing his bread and his beer, the glass window which lets in the heat and the light, and keeps out the wind and the rain, with all the knowledge and art requisite for preparing that beautiful and happy invention, without which these northern parts of the world could scarce have afforded a very comfortable habitation, together with the tools of all the different workmen employed in producing those different conveniences; if we examine, I say, all these things, and consider what a variety of labour is employed about each of them, we shall be sensible that, without the assistance and cooperation of many thousands, the very meanest person in a civilized country could not be provided, even according to what we very falsely imagine the easy and simple manner in which he is commonly accommodated. Compared, indeed, with the more extravagant luxury of the great, his accommodation must no doubt appear extremely simple and easy; and yet it may be true, perhaps, that the accommodation of a European prince does not always so much exceed that of an industrious and frugal peasant as the accommodation of the latter exceeds that of many an African king, the absolute master of the lives and liberties of ten thousand naked savages.

2

The Principle of the Division of Labour

This division of labour, from which so many advantages are derived, is not originally the effect of any human wisdom, which foresees and intends that general opulence to which it gives occasion. It is the necessary, though very slow and gradual consequence of a certain propensity in human nature which has in view no such extensive utility; the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another.

Whether this propensity be one of those original principles in human nature of which no further account can be given; or whether, as seems more probable, it be the necessary consequences of the faculties of reason and speech, it belongs not to our present subject to inquire. It is common to all men, and to be found in no other race of animals, which seem to know neither this nor any other species of contracts. Two greyhounds, in running down the same hare, have sometimes the appearance of acting in some sort of concert. Each turns her towards his companion, or endeavours to intercept her when his companion turns her towards himself. This, however, is not the effect of any contract, but of the accidental concurrence of their passions in the same object at that particular time. Nobody ever saw a dog make a fair and deliberate exchange of one bone for another with another dog. Nobody ever saw one animal by its gestures and natural cries signify to another, this is mine, that yours; I am willing to give this for that. When an animal wants to obtain something either of a man or of another animal, it has no other means of persuasion but to gain the favour of those whose service it requires. A puppy fawns upon its dam, and a spaniel endeavours by a thousand attractions to engage the attention of its master who is at dinner, when it wants to be fed by him. Man sometimes uses the same arts with his brethren, and when he has no other means of engaging them to act according to his inclinations, endeavours by every servile and fawning attention to obtain their good will. He has not time, however, to do this upon every occasion. In civilized society he stands at all times in need of the co-operation and assistance of great multitudes, while his whole life is scarce sufficient to gain the friendship of a few persons. In almost every other race of animals each individual, when it is grown up to maturity, is entirely independent, and in its natural state has occasion for the assistance of no other living creature. But man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour, and show them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them. Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this. Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want, is the meaning of every such offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those good offices which we stand in need of. It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages. Nobody but a beggar chooses to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow-citizens. Even a beggar does not depend upon it entirely. The charity of well-disposed people, indeed, supplies him with the whole fund of his subsistence. But though this principle ultimately provides him with all the necessaries of life which he has occasion for, it neither does nor can provide him with them as he has occasion for them. The greater part of his occasional wants are supplied in the same manner as those of other people, by treaty, by barter, and by purchase. With the money which one man gives him he purchases food. The old clothes which another bestows upon him he exchanges for other old clothes which suit him better, or for lodging, or for food, or for money, with which he can buy either food, clothes, or lodging, as he has occasion.

As it is by treaty, by barter, and by purchase that we obtain from one another the greater part of those mutual good offices which we stand in need of, so it is this same trucking disposition which originally gives occasion to the division of labour. In a tribe of hunters or shepherds a particular person makes bows and arrows, for example, with more readiness and dexterity than any other. He frequently exchanges them for cattle or for venison with his companions; and he finds at last that he can in this manner get more cattle and venison than if he himself went to the field to catch them. From a regard to his own interest, therefore, the making of bows and arrows grows to be his chief business, and he becomes a sort of armourer. Another excels in making the frames and covers of their little huts or movable houses. He is accustomed to be of use in this way to his neighbours, who reward him in the same manner with cattle and with venison, till at last he finds it his interest to dedicate himself entirely to this employment, and to become a sort of house-carpenter. In the same manner a third becomes a smith or a brazier, a fourth a tanner or dresser of hides or skins, the principal part of the clothing of savages. And thus the certainty of being able to exchange all that surplus part of the produce of his own labour, which is over and above his own consumption, for such parts of the produce of other men's labour as he may have occasion for, encourages every man to apply himself to a particular occupation, and to cultivate and bring to perfection whatever talent or genius he may possess for that particular species of business.

The difference of natural talents in different men is, in reality, much less than we are aware of; and the very different genius which appears to distinguish men of different professions, when grown up to maturity, is not upon many occasions so much the cause as the effect of the division of labour. The difference between the most dissimilar characters, between a philosopher and a common street porter, for example, seems to arise not so much from nature as from habit, custom, and education. When they came into the world, and for the first six or eight years of their existence, they were perhaps very much alike, and neither their parents nor play-fellows could perceive any remarkable difference. About that age, or soon after, they come to be employed in very different occupations. The difference of talents comes then to be taken notice of, and widens by degrees, till at last the vanity of the philosopher is willing to acknowledge scarce any resemblance. But without the disposition to truck, barter, and exchange, every man must have procured to himself every necessary and conveniency of life which he wanted. All must have had the same duties to perform, and the same work to do, and there could have been no such difference of employment as could alone give occasion to any great difference of talents.

As it is this disposition which forms that difference of talents, so remarkable among men of different professions, so it is this same disposition which renders that difference useful. Many tribes of animals acknowledged to be all of the same species derive from nature a much more remarkable distinction of genius, than what, antecedent to custom and education, appears to take place among men. By nature a philosopher is not in genius and disposition half so different from a street porter, as a mastiff is from a greyhound, or a greyhound from a spaniel, or this last from a shepherd's dog. Those different tribes of animals, however, though all of the same species, are of scarce any use to one another. The strength of the mastiff is not in the least supported either by the swiftness of the greyhound, or by the sagacity of the spaniel, or by the docility of the shepherd's dog. The effects of those different geniuses and talents, for want of the power or disposition to barter and exchange, cannot be brought into a common stock, and do not in the least contribute to the better accommodation and conveniency of the species. Each animal is still obliged to support and defend itself, separately and independently, and derives no sort of advantage from that variety of talents with which nature has distinguished its fellows. Among men, on the contrary, the most dissimilar geniuses are of use to one another; the different produces of their respective talents, by the general disposition to truck, barter, and exchange, being brought, as it were, into a common stock, where every man may purchase whatever part of the produce of the other men's talents he has occasion for.

3

The Principle of the Commercial System

Political economy, considered as a branch of the science of a statesman or legislator, proposes two distinct objects: first, to provide a plentiful revenue or subsistence for the people, or more properly to enable them to provide such a revenue or subsistence for themselves; and secondly, to supply the state or commonwealth with a revenue sufficient for the public services. It proposes to enrich both the people and the sovereign.

The different progress of opulence in different ages and nations has given occasion to two different systems of political economy with regard to enriching the people. The one may be called the system of commerce, the other that of agriculture.

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That wealth consists in money, or in gold and silver, is a popular notion which naturally arises from the double function of money, as the instrument of commerce and as the measure of value. In consequence of its being the instrument of commerce, when we have money we can more readily obtain whatever else we have occasion for than by means of any other commodity. The great affair, we always find, is to get money. When that is obtained, there is no difficulty in making any subsequent purchase. In consequence of its being the measure of value, we estimate that of all other commodities by the quantity of money which they will exchange for. We say of a rich man that he is worth a great deal, and of a poor man that he is worth very little money. A frugal man, or a man eager to be rich, is said to love money; and a careless, a generous, or a profuse man, is said to be indifferent about it. To grow rich is to get money; and wealth and money, in short, are, in common language, considered as in every respect synonymous.

A rich country, in the same manner as a rich man, is supposed to be a country abounding in money; and to heap up gold and silver in any country is supposed to be the readiest way to enrich it. For some time after the discovery of America, the first inquiry of the Spaniards, when they arrived upon any unknown coast, used to be, if there was any gold or silver to be found in the neighbourhood? By the information which they received, they judged whether it was worth while to make a settlement there, or if the country was worth the conquering. Plano Carpino, a monk, sent ambassador from the King of France to one of the sons of the famous Gengis Khan, says that the Tartars used frequently to ask him if there was plenty of sheep and oxen in the kingdom of France? Their inquiry had the same object with that of the Spaniards. They wanted to know if the country was rich enough to be worth the conquering. Among the Tartars, as among all other nations of shepherds, who are generally ignorant of the use of money, cattle are the instruments of commerce and the measures of value. Wealth, therefore, according to them, consisted in cattle, as according to the Spaniards it consisted in gold and silver. Of the two, the Tartar notion, perhaps, was the nearest to the truth.

Mr Locke remarks a distinction between money and other movable goods. All other movable goods, he says, are of so consumable a nature that the wealth which consists in them cannot be much depended on, and a nation which abounds in them one year may, without any exportation, but merely by their own waste and extravagance, be in great want of them the next. Money, on the contrary, is a steady friend, which, though it may travel about from hand to hand, yet if it can be kept from going out of the country, is not very liable to be wasted and consumed. Gold and silver, therefore, are, according to him, the most solid and substantial part of the movable wealth of a nation, and to multiply those metals ought, he thinks, upon that account, to be the great object of its political economy.

Others admit that if a nation could be separated from all the world, it would be of no consequence how much, or how little money circulated in it. The consumable goods which were circulated by means of this money would only be exchanged for a greater or a smaller number of pieces; but the real wealth or poverty of the country, they allow, would depend altogether upon the abundance or scarcity of those consumable goods. But it is otherwise, they think, with countries which have connections with foreign nations, and which are obliged to carry on foreign wars, and to maintain fleets and armies in distant countries. This, they say, cannot be done, but by sending abroad money to pay them with; and a nation cannot send much money abroad unless it has a good deal at home. Every such nation, therefore, must endeavour in time of peace to accumulate gold and silver that, when occasion requires, it may have wherewithal to carry on foreign wars.

In consequence of these popular notions, all the different nations of Europe have studied, though to little purpose, every possible means of accumulating gold and silver in their respective countries. Spain and Portugal, the proprietors of the principal mines which supply Europe with those metals, have either prohibited their exportation under the severest penalties, or subjected it to a considerable duty. The like prohibition seems anciently to have made a part of the policy of most other European nations. It is even to be found, where we should least of all expect to find it, in some old Scotch acts of parliament, which forbid under heavy penalties the carrying gold or silver furth of the kingdom. The like policy anciently took place both in France and England.

When those countries became commercial, the merchants found this prohibition, upon many occasions, extremely inconvenient. They could frequently buy more advantageously with gold and silver than with any other commodity the foreign goods which they wanted, either to import into their own, or to carry to some other foreign country. They remonstrated, therefore, against this prohibition as hurtful to trade.

They represented, first, that the exportation of gold and silver in order to purchase foreign goods, did not always diminish the quantity of those metals in the kingdom. That, on the contrary, it might frequently increase that quantity; because, if the consumption of foreign goods was not thereby increased in the country, those goods might be re-exported to foreign countries, and, being there sold for a large profit, might bring back much more treasure than was originally sent out to purchase them. Mr Mun compares this operation of foreign trade to the seed-time and harvest of agriculture. 'If we only behold,' says he, 'the actions of the husbandman in the seed-time, when he casteth away much good corn into the ground, we shall account him rather a madman than a husbandman. But when we consider his labours in the harvest, which is the end of his endeavours, we shall find the worth and plentiful increase of his actions.'

They represented, secondly, that this prohibition could not hinder the exportation of gold and silver, which, on account of the smallness of their bulk in proportion to their value, could easily be smuggled abroad. That this exportation could only be prevented by a proper attention to, what they called, the balance of trade. That when the country exported to a greater value than it imported, a balance became due to it from foreign nations, which was necessarily paid to it in gold and silver, and thereby increased the quantity of those metals in the kingdom. But that when it imported to a greater value than it exported, a contrary balance became due to foreign nations, which was necessarily paid to them in the same manner, and thereby diminished that quantity. That in this case to prohibit the exportation of those metals could not prevent it, but only, by making it more dangerous, render it more expensive. That the exchange was thereby turned more against the country which owed the balance than it otherwise might have been; the merchant who purchased a bill upon the foreign country being obliged to pay the banker who sold it, not only for the natural risk, trouble, and expense of sending the money thither, but for the extraordinary risk arising from the prohibition. But that the more the exchange was against any country, the more the balance of trade became necessarily against it; the money of that country becoming necessarily of so much less value in comparison with that of the country to which the balance was due. That if the exchange between England and Holland, for example, was five per cent against England, it would require a hundred and five ounces of silver in England to purchase a bill for a hundred ounces of silver in Holland: that a hundred and five ounces of silver in England, therefore, would be worth only a hundred ounces of silver in Holland, and would purchase only a proportionable quantity of Dutch goods; but that a hundred ounces of silver in Holland, on the contrary, would be worth a hundred and five ounces in England, and would purchase a proportionable quantity of English goods: that the English goods which were sold to Holland would be sold so much cheaper; and the Dutch goods which were sold to England so much dearer by the difference of the exchange; that the one would draw so much less Dutch money to England, and the other so much more English money to Holland, as this difference amounted to: and that the balance of trade, therefore, would necessarily be so much more against England, and would require a greater balance of gold and silver to be exported to Holland.

Those arguments were partly solid and partly sophistical. They were solid so far as they asserted that the exportation of gold and silver in trade might frequently be advantageous to the country. They were solid, too, in asserting that no prohibition could prevent their exportation when private people found any advantage in exporting them. But they were sophistical in supposing that either to preserve or to augment the quantity of those metals required more the attention of government than to preserve or to augment the quantity of any other useful commodities, which the freedom of trade, without any such attention, never fails to supply in the proper quantity. They were sophistical too, perhaps, in asserting that the high price of exchange necessarily increased what they called the unfavourable balance of trade, or occasioned the exportation of a greater quantity of gold and silver. That high price, indeed, was extremely disadvantageous to the merchants who had any money to pay in foreign countries. They paid so much dearer for the bills which their bankers granted them upon those countries. But though the risk arising from the prohibition might occasion some extraordinary expense to the bankers, it would not necessarily carry any more money out of the country. This expense would generally be all laid out in the country, in smuggling the money out of it, and could seldom occasion the exportation of a single sixpence beyond the precise sum drawn for. The high price of exchange too would naturally dispose the merchants to endeavour to make their exports nearly balance their imports, in order that they might have this high exchange to pay upon as small a sum as possible. The high price of exchange, besides, must necessarily have operated as a tax, in raising the price of foreign goods, and thereby diminishing their consumption. It would tend, therefore, not to increase but to diminish what they called the unfavourable balance of trade, and consequently the exportation of gold and silver.

Such as they were, however, those arguments convinced the people to whom they were addressed. They were addressed by merchants to parliaments and to the councils of princes, to nobles and to country gentlemen, by those who were supposed to understand trade to those who were conscious to themselves that they knew nothing about the matter. That foreign trade enriched the country, experience demonstrated to the nobles and country gentlemen as well as to the merchants; but how, or in what manner, none of them well knew. The merchants knew perfectly in what manner it enriched themselves. It was their business to know it. But to know in what manner it enriched the country was no part of their business. This subject never came into their consideration but when they had occasion to apply to their country for some change in the laws relating to foreign trade. It then became necessary to say something about the beneficial effects of foreign trade, and the manner in which those effects were obstructed by the laws as they then stood. To the judges who were to decide the business it appeared a most satisfactory account of the matter, when they were told that foreign trade brought money into the country, but that the laws in question hindered it from bringing so much as it otherwise would do. Those arguments therefore produced the wished-for effect. The prohibition of exporting gold and silver was in France and England confined to the coin of those respective countries. The exportation of foreign coin and of bullion was made free. In Holland, and in some other places, this liberty was extended even to the coin of the country. The attention of government was turned away from guarding against the exportation of gold and silver to watch over the balance of trade as the only cause which could occasion any augmentation or diminution of those metals. From one fruitless care it was turned away to another care much more intricate, much more embarrassing, and just equally fruitless. The title of Mun's book, England's Treasure in Foreign Trade, became a fundamental maxim in the political economy, not of England only, but of all other commercial countries. The inland or home trade, the most important of all, the trade in which an equal capital affords the greatest revenue, and creates the greatest employment to the people of the country, was considered as subsidiary only to foreign trade. It neither brought money into the country, it was said, nor carried any out of it. The country, therefore, could never become either richer or poorer by means of it, except so far as its prosperity or decay might indirectly influence the state of foreign trade.

A country that has no mines of its own must undoubtedly draw its gold and silver from foreign countries in the same manner as one that has no vineyards of its own must draw its wines. It does not seem necessary, however, that the attention of government should be more turned towards the one than towards the other object. A country that has wherewithal to buy wine will always get the wine which it has occasion for; and a country that has wherewithal to buy gold and silver will never be in want of those metals. They are to be bought for a certain price like all other commodities, and as they are the price of all other commodities, so all other commodities are the price of those metals. We trust with perfect security that the freedom of trade, without any attention of government, will always supply us with the wine which we have occasion for: and we may trust with equal security that it will always supply us with all the gold and silver which we can afford to purchase or to employ, either in circulating our commodities, or in other uses.

The quantity of every commodity which human industry can either purchase or produce naturally regulates itself in every country according to the effectual demand, or according to the demand of those who are willing to pay the whole rent, labour, and profits which must be paid in order to prepare and bring it to market. But no commodities regulate themselves more easily or more exactly according to this effectual demand than gold and silver; because, on account of the small bulk and great value of those metals, no commodities can be more easily transported from one place to another, from the places where they are cheap to those where they are dear, from the places where they exceed to those where they fall short of this effectual demand. If there were in England, for example, an effectual demand for an additional quantity of gold, a packet-boat could bring from Lisbon, or from wherever else it was to be had, fifty tons of gold, which could be coined into more than five millions of guineas. But if there were an effectual demand for grain to the same value, to import it would require, at five guineas a ton, a million of tons of shipping, or a thousand ships of a thousand tons each. The navy of England would not be sufficient.

When the quantity of gold and silver imported into any country exceeds the effectual demand, no vigilance of government can prevent their exportation. All the sanguinary laws of Spain and Portugal are not able to keep their gold and silver at home. The continual importations from Peru and Brazil exceed the effectual demand of those countries, and sink the price of those metals there below that in the neighbouring countries. If, on the contrary, in any particular country their quantity fell short of the effectual demand, so as to raise their price above that of the neighbouring countries, the government would have no occasion to take any pains to import them. If it were even to take pains to prevent their importation, it would not be able to effectuate it. Those metals, when the Spartans had got wherewithal to purchase them, broke through all the barriers which the laws of Lycurgus opposed to their entrance into Lacedemon. All the sanguinary laws of the customs are not able to prevent the importation of the teas of the Dutch and Gottenburgh East India companies, because somewhat cheaper than those of the British company. A pound of tea, however, is about a hundred times the bulk of one of the highest prices, sixteen shillings, that is commonly paid for it in silver, and more than two thousand times the bulk of the same price in gold, and consequently just so many times more difficult to smuggle.

It is partly owing to the easy transportation of gold and silver from the places where they abound to those where they are wanted that the price of those metals does not fluctuate continually like that of the greater part of other commodities, which are hindered by their bulk from shifting their situation when the market happens to be either over- or under-stocked with them. The price of those metals, indeed, is not altogether exempted from variation, but the changes to which it is liable are generally slow, gradual, and uniform. In Europe, for example, it is supposed, without much foundation, perhaps, that during the course of the present and preceding century they have been constantly, but gradually, sinking in their value, on account of the continual importations from the Spanish West Indies. But to make any sudden change in the price of gold and silver, so as to raise or lower at once, sensibly and remarkably, the money price of all other commodities, requires such a revolution in commerce as that occasioned by the discovery of America.

If, notwithstanding all this, gold and silver should at any time fall short in a country which has wherewithal to purchase them, there are more expedients for supplying their place than that of almost any other commodity. If the materials of manufacture are wanted, industry must stop. If provisions are wanted, the people must starve. But if money is wanted, barter will supply its place, though with a good deal of inconveniency. Buying and selling upon credit, and the different dealers compensating their credits with one another, once a month or once a year, will supply it with less inconveniency. A well-regulated paper money will supply it, not only without any inconveniency, but, in some cases, with some advantages. Upon every account, therefore, the attention of government never was so unnecessarily employed as when directed to watch over the preservation or increase of the quantity of money in any country.

No complaint, however, is more common than that of a scarcity of money. Money, like wine, must always be scarce with those who have neither wherewithal to buy it nor credit to borrow it. Those who have either will seldom be in want either of the money or of the wine which they have occasion for. This complaint, however, of the scarcity of money is not always confined to improvident spendthrifts. It is sometimes general through a whole mercantile town and the country in its neighbourhood. Over-trading is the common cause of it. Sober men, whose projects have been disproportioned to their capitals, are as likely to have neither wherewithal to buy money nor credit to borrow it, as prodigals whose expense has been disproportioned to their revenue. Before their projects can be brought to bear, their stock is gone, and their credit with it. They run about everywhere to borrow money, and everybody tells them that they have none to lend. Even such general complaints of the scarcity of money do not always prove that the usual number of gold and silver pieces are not circulating in the country, but that many people want those pieces who have nothing to give for them. When the profits of trade happen to be greater than ordinary, over-trading becomes a general error both among great and small dealers. They do not always send more money abroad than usual, but they buy upon credit, both at home and abroad, an unusual quantity of goods, which they send to some distant market in hopes that the returns will come in before the demand for payment. The demand comes before the returns, and they have nothing at hand with which they can either purchase money, or give solid security for borrowing. It is not any scarcity of gold and silver, but the difficulty which such people find in borrowing, and which their creditors find in getting payment, that occasions the general complaint of the scarcity of money.

It would be too ridiculous to go about seriously to prove that wealth does not consist in money, or in gold and silver; but in what money purchases, and is valuable only for purchasing. Money, no doubt, makes always a part of the national capital; but it has already been shown that it generally makes but a small part, and always the most unprofitable part of it.

It is not because wealth consists more essentially in money than in goods that the merchant finds it generally more easy to buy goods with money than to buy money with goods; but because money is the known and established instrument of commerce, for which everything is readily given in exchange, but which is not always with equal readiness to be got in exchange for every thing. The greater part of goods, besides, are more perishable than money, and he may frequently sustain a much greater loss by keeping them. When his goods are upon hand, too, he is more liable to such demands for money as he may not be able to answer than when he has got their price in his coffers. Over and above all this, his profit arises more directly from selling than from buying, and he is upon all these accounts generally much more anxious to exchange his goods for money than his money for goods. But though a particular merchant, with abundance of goods in his warehouse, may sometimes be ruined by not being able to sell them in time, a nation or country is not liable to the same accident. The whole capital of a merchant frequently consists in perishable goods destined for purchasing money. But it is but a very small part of the annual produce of the land and labour of a country which can ever be destined for purchasing gold and silver from their neighbours. The far greater part is circulated and consumed among themselves; and even of the surplus which is sent abroad, the greater part is generally destined for the purchase of other foreign goods. Though gold and silver, therefore, could not be had in exchange for the goods destined to purchase them, the nation would not be ruined. It might, indeed, suffer some loss and inconveniency, and be forced upon some of those expedients which are necessary for supplying the place of money. The annual produce of its land and labour, however, would be the same, or very nearly the same, as usual, because the same, or very nearly the same, consumable capital would be employed in maintaining it. And though goods do not always draw money so readily as money draws goods, in the long run they draw it more necessarily than even it draws them. Goods can serve many other purposes besides purchasing money, but money can serve no other purpose besides purchasing goods. Money, therefore, necessarily runs after goods, but goods do not always or necessarily run after money. The man who buys does not always mean to sell again, but frequently to use or to consume; whereas he who sells always means to buy again. The one may frequently have done the whole, but the other can never have done more than the one-half of his business. It is not for its own sake that men desire money, but for the sake of what they can purchase with it.

Consumable commodities, it is said, are soon destroyed; whereas gold and silver are of a more durable nature, and, were it not for this continual exportation, might be accumulated for ages together, to the incredible augmentation of the real wealth of the country. Nothing, therefore, it is pretended, can be more disadvantageous to any country than the trade which consists in the exchange of such lasting for such perishable commodities. We do not, however, reckon that trade disadvantageous which consists in the exchange of the hardware of England for the wines of France; and yet hardware is a very durable commodity, and were it not for this continual exportation might, too, be accumulated for ages together, to the incredible augmentation of the pots and pans of the country. But it readily occurs that the number of such utensils is in every country necessarily limited by the use which there is for them; that it would be absurd to have more pots and pans than were necessary for cooking the victuals usually consumed there; and that if the quantity of victuals were to increase, the number of pots and pans would readily increase along with it, a part of the increased quantity of victuals being employed in purchasing them, or in maintaining an additional number of workmen whose business it was to make them. It should as readily occur that the quantity of gold and silver is in every country limited by the use which there is for those metals; that their use consists in circulating commodities as coin, and in affording a species of household furniture as plate; that the quantity of coin in every country is regulated by the value of the commodities which are to be circulated by it: increase that value, and immediately a part of it will be sent abroad to purchase, wherever it is to be had, the additional quantity of coin requisite for circulating them: that the quantity of plate is regulated by the number and wealth of those private families who choose to indulge themselves in that sort of magnificence: increase the number and wealth of such families, and a part of this increased wealth will most probably be employed in purchasing, wherever it is to be found, an additional quantity of plate: that to attempt to increase the wealth of any country, either by introducing or by detaining in it an unnecessary quantity of gold and silver, is as absurd as it would be to attempt to increase the good cheer of private families by obliging them to keep an unnecessary number of kitchen utensils. As the expense of purchasing those unnecessary utensils would diminish instead of increasing either the quantity or goodness of the family provisions, so the expense of purchasing an unnecessary quantity of gold and silver must, in every country, as necessarily diminish the wealth which feeds, clothes, and lodges, which maintains and employs the people. Gold and silver, whether in the shape of coin or of plate, are utensils, it must be remembered, as much as the furniture of the kitchen. Increase the use for them, increase the consumable commodities which are to be circulated, managed, and prepared by means of them, and you will infallibly increase the quantity; but if you attempt, by extraordinary means, to increase the quantity, you will as infallibly diminish the use and even the quantity too, which in those metals can never be greater than what the use requires. Were they ever to be accumulated beyond this quantity, their transportation is so easy, and the loss which attends their lying idle and unemployed so great, that no law could prevent their being immediately sent out of the country.

It is not always necessary to accumulate gold and silver in order to enable a country to carry on foreign wars, and to maintain fleets and armies in distant countries. Fleets and armies are maintained, not with gold and silver, but with consumable goods. The nation which, from the annual produce of its domestic industry, from the annual revenue arising out of its lands, labour, and consumable stock, has wherewithal to purchase those consumable goods in distant countries, can maintain foreign wars there.

A nation may purchase the pay and provisions of an army in a distant country three different ways: by sending abroad either, first, some part of its accumulated gold and silver; or, secondly, some part of the annual produce of its manufactures; or, last of all, some part of its annual rude produce.

The gold and silver which can properly be considered as accumulated or stored up in any country may be distinguished into three parts: first, the circulating money; secondly, the plate of private families; and, last of all, the money which may have been collected by many years parsimony, and laid up in the treasury of the prince.

It can seldom happen that much can be spared from the circulating money of the country; because in that there can seldom be much redundancy. The value of goods annually bought and sold in any country requires a certain quantity of money to circulate and distribute them to their proper consumers, and can give employment to no more. The channel of circulation necessarily draws to itself a sum sufficient to fill it, and never admits any more. Something, however, is generally withdrawn from this channel in the case of foreign war. By the great number of people who are maintained abroad, fewer are maintained at home. Fewer goods are circulated there, and less money becomes necessary to circulate them. An extraordinary quantity of paper money, of some sort or other, such as exchequer notes, navy bills, and bank bills in England, is generally issued upon such occasions, and by supplying the place of circulating gold and silver, gives an opportunity of sending a greater quantity of it abroad. All this, however, could afford but a poor resource for maintaining a foreign war of great expense and several years duration.

The melting down of the plate of private families has upon every occasion been found a still more insignificant one. The French, in the beginning of the last war, did not derive so much advantage from this expedient as to compensate the loss of the fashion.

The accumulated treasures of the prince have, in former times, afforded a much greater and more lasting resource. In the present times, if you except the King of Prussia, to accumulate treasure seems to be no part of the policy of European princes.

The funds which maintained the foreign wars of the present century, the most expensive perhaps which history records, seem to have had little dependency upon the exportation either of the circulating money, or of the plate of private families, or of the treasure of the prince. The last French war cost Great Britain upwards of ninety millions, including not only the seventy-five millions of new debt that was contracted, but the additional two shillings in the pound land-tax, and what was annually borrowed of the sinking fund. More than two-thirds of this expense were laid out in distant countries; in Germany, Portugal, America, in the ports of the Mediterranean, in the East and West Indies. The kings of England had no accumulated treasure. We never heard of any extraordinary quantity of plate being melted down. The circulating gold and silver of the country had not been supposed to exceed eighteen millions. Since the late recoinage of the gold, however, it is believed to have been a good deal under-rated. Let us suppose, therefore, according to the most exaggerated computation which I remember to have either seen or heard of, that, gold and silver together, it amounted to thirty millions. Had the war been carried on by means of our money, the whole of it must, even according to this computation, have been sent out and returned again at least twice in a period of between six and seven years. Should this be supposed, it would afford the most decisive argument to demonstrate how unnecessary it is for government to watch over the preservation of money, since upon this supposition the whole money of the country must have gone from it and returned to it again, two different times in so short a period, without anybody's knowing anything of the matter. The channel of circulation, however, never appeared more empty than usual during any part of this period. Few people wanted money who had wherewithal to pay for it. The profits of foreign trade, indeed, were greater than usual during the whole war; but especially towards the end of it. This occasioned, what it always occasions, a general over-trading in all the parts of Great Britain; and this again occasioned the usual complaint of the scarcity of money, which always follows over-trading. Many people wanted it, who had neither wherewithal to buy it, nor credit to borrow it; and because the debtors found it difficult to borrow, the creditors found it difficult to get payment. Gold and silver, however, were generally to be had for their value, by those who had that value to give for them.

The enormous expense of the late war, therefore, must have been chiefly defrayed, not by the exportation of gold and silver, but by that of British commodities of some kind or other. When the government, or those who acted under them, contracted with a merchant for a remittance to some foreign country, he would naturally endeavour to pay his foreign correspondent, upon whom he had granted a bill, by sending abroad rather commodities than gold and silver. If the commodities of Great Britain were not in demand in that country, he would endeavour to send them to some other country, in which he could purchase a bill upon that country. The transportation of commodities, when properly suited to the market, is always attended with a considerable profit; whereas that of gold and silver is scarce ever attended with any. When those metals are sent abroad in order to purchase foreign commodities, the merchant's profit arises, not from the purchase, but from the sale of the returns. But when they are sent abroad merely to pay a debt, he gets no returns, and consequently no profit. He naturally, therefore, exerts his invention to find out a way of paying his foreign debts rather by the exportation of commodities than by that of gold and silver. The great quantity of British goods exported during the course of the late war, without bringing back any returns, is accordingly remarked by the author of The Present State of the Nation.

Besides the three sorts of gold and silver above mentioned, there is in all great commercial countries a good deal of bullion alternately imported and exported for the purposes of foreign trade. This bullion, as it circulates among different commercial countries in the same manner as the national coin circulates in every particular country, may be considered as the money of the great mercantile republic. The national coin receives its movement and direction from the commodities circulated within the precincts of each particular country: the money of the mercantile republic, from those circulated between different countries. Both are employed in facilitating exchanges, the one between different individuals of the same, the other between those of different nations. Part of this money of the great mercantile republic may have been, and probably was, employed in carrying on the late war. In time of a general war, it is natural to suppose that a movement and direction should be impressed upon it, different from what it usually follows in profound peace; that it should circulate more about the seat of the war, and be more employed in purchasing there, and in the neighbouring countries, the pay and provisions of the different armies. But whatever part of this money of the mercantile republic Great Britain may have annually employed in this manner, it must have been annually purchased, either with British commodities, or with something else that had been purchased with them; which still brings us back to commodities, to the annual produce of the land and labour of the country, as the ultimate resources which enabled us to carry on the war. It is natural indeed to suppose that so great an annual expense must have been defrayed from a great annual produce. The expense of 1761, for example, amounted to more than nineteen millions. No accumulation could have supported so great an annual profusion. There is no annual produce even of gold and silver which could have supported it. The whole gold and silver annually imported into both Spain and Portugal, according to the best accounts, does not commonly much exceed six millions sterling, which, in some years, would scarce have paid four months' expense of the late war.

The commodities most proper for being transported to distant countries, in order to purchase there either the pay and provisions of an army, or some part of the money of the mercantile republic to be employed in purchasing them, seem to be the finer and more improved manufactures; such as contain a great value in a small bulk, and can, therefore, be exported to a great distance at little expense. A country whose industry produces a great annual surplus of such manufactures, which are usually exported to foreign countries, may carry on for many years a very expensive foreign war without either exporting any considerable quantity of gold and silver, or even having any such quantity to export. A considerable part of the annual surplus of its manufactures must, indeed, in this case be exported without bringing back any returns to the country, though it does to the merchant; the government purchasing of the merchant his bills upon foreign countries, in order to purchase there the pay and provisions of an army. Some part of this surplus, however, may still continue to bring back a return. The manufacturers, during the war, will have a double demand upon them, and be called upon, first, to work up goods to be sent abroad, for paying the bills drawn upon foreign countries for the pay and provisions of the army; and, secondly, to work up such as are necessary for purchasing the common returns that had usually been consumed in the country. In the midst of the most destructive foreign war, therefore, the greater part of manufactures may frequently flourish greatly; and, on the contrary, they may decline on the return of the peace. They may flourish amidst the ruin of their country, and begin to decay upon the return of its prosperity. The different state of many different branches of the British manufactures during the late war, and for some time after the peace, may serve as an illustration of what has been just now said.

No foreign war of great expense or duration could conveniently be carried on by the exportation of the rude produce of the soil. The expense of sending such a quantity of it to a foreign country as might purchase the pay and provisions of an army would be too great. Few countries produce much more rude produce than what is sufficient for the subsistence of their own inhabitants. To send abroad any great quantity of it, therefore, would be to send abroad a part of the necessary subsistence of the people. It is otherwise with the exportation of manufactures. The maintenance of the people employed in them is kept at home, and only the surplus part of their work is exported. Mr Hume frequently takes notice of the inability of the ancient kings of England to carry on, without interruption, any foreign war of long duration. The English, in those days, had nothing wherewithal to purchase the pay and provisions of their armies in foreign countries, but either the rude produce of the soil, of which no considerable part could be spared from the home consumption, or a few manufactures of the coarsest kind, of which, as well as of the rude produce, the transportation was too expensive. This inability did not arise from the want of money, but of the finer and more improved manufactures. Buying and selling was transacted by means of money in England then as well as now. The quantity of circulating money must have borne the same proportion to the number and value of purchases and sales usually transacted at that time, which it does to those transacted at present; or rather it must have borne a greater proportion, because there was then no paper, which now occupies a great part of the employment of gold and silver. Among nations to whom commerce and manufactures are little known, the sovereign, upon extraordinary occasions, can seldom draw any considerable aid from his subjects, for reasons which shall be explained hereafter. It is in such countries, therefore, that he generally endeavours to accumulate a treasure, as the only resource against such emergencies. Independent of this necessity, he is in such a situation naturally disposed to the parsimony requisite for accumulation. In that simple state, the expense even of a sovereign is not directed by the vanity which delights in the gaudy finery of a court, but is employed in bounty to his tenants, and hospitality to his retainers. But bounty and hospitality very seldom lead to extravagance; though vanity almost always does. Every Tartar chief, accordingly, has a treasure. The treasures of Mazepa, chief of the Cossacks in the Ukraine, the famous ally of Charles the
th, are said to have been very great. The French kings of the Merovingian race had all treasures. When they divided their kingdom among their different children, they divided their treasure too. The Saxon princes, and the first kings after the conquest, seem likewise to have accumulated treasures. The first exploit of every new reign was commonly to seize the treasure of the preceding king, as the most essential measure for securing the succession. The sovereigns of improved and commercial countries are not under the same necessity of accumulating treasures, because they can generally draw from their subjects extraordinary aids upon extraordinary occasions. They are likewise less disposed to do so. They naturally, perhaps necessarily, follow the mode of the times, and their expense comes to be regulated by the same extravagant vanity which directs that of all the other great proprietors in their dominions. The insignificant pageantry of their court becomes every day more brilliant, and the expense of it not only prevents accumulation, but frequently encroaches upon the funds destined for more necessary expenses. What Dercyllidas said of the court of Persia may be applied to that of several European princes, that he saw there much splendour but little strength, and many servants but few soldiers.

The importation of gold and silver is not the principal, much less the sole benefit which a nation derives from its foreign trade. Between whatever places foreign trade is carried on, they all of them derive two distinct benefits from it. It carries out that surplus part of the produce of their land and labour for which there is no demand among them, and brings back in return for it something else for which there is a demand. It gives a value to their superfluities, by exchanging them for something else, which may satisfy a part of their wants, and increase their enjoyments. By means of it the narrowness of the home market does not hinder the division of labour in any particular branch of art or manufacture from being carried to the highest perfection. By opening a more extensive market for whatever part of the produce of their labour may exceed the home consumption, it encourages them to improve its productive powers, and to augment its annual produce to the utmost, and thereby to increase the real revenue and wealth of the society. These great and important services foreign trade is continually occupied in performing to all the different countries between which it is carried on. They all derive great benefit from it, though that in which the merchant resides generally derives the greatest, as he is generally more employed in supplying the wants, and carrying out the superfluities of his own, than of any other particular country. To import the gold and silver which may be wanted into the countries which have no mines is, no doubt, a part of the business of foreign commerce. It is, however, a most insignificant part of it. A country which carried on foreign trade merely upon this account could scarce have occasion to freight a ship in a century.

It is not by the importation of gold and silver that the discovery of America has enriched Europe. By the abundance of the American mines, those metals have become cheaper. A service of plate can now be purchased for about a third part of the corn, or a third part of the labour, which it would have cost in the fifteenth century. With the same annual expense of labour and commodities, Europe can annually purchase about three times the quantity of plate which it could have purchased at that time. But when a commodity comes to be sold for a third part of what had been its usual price, not only those who purchased it before can purchase three times their former quantity, but it is brought down to the level of a much greater number of purchasers, perhaps to more than ten, perhaps to more than twenty times the former number. So that there may be in Europe at present not only more than three times, but more than twenty or thirty times the quantity of plate which would have been in it, even in its present state of improvement, had the discovery of the American mines never been made. So far Europe has, no doubt, gained a real conveniency, though surely a very trifling one. The cheapness of gold and silver renders those metals rather less fit for the purposes of money than they were before. In order to make the same purchases, we must load ourselves with a greater quantity of them, and carry about a shilling in our pocket where a groat would have done before. It is difficult to say which is most trifling, this inconveniency or the opposite conveniency. Neither the one nor the other could have made any very essential change in the state of Europe. The discovery of America, however, certainly made a most essential one. By opening a new and inexhaustible market to all the commodities of Europe, it gave occasion to new divisions of labour and improvements of art, which, in the narrow circle of the ancient commerce, could never have taken place for want of a market to take off the greater part of their produce. The productive powers of labour were improved, and its produce increased in all the different countries of Europe, and together with it the real revenue and wealth of the inhabitants. The commodities of Europe were almost all new to America, and many of those of America were new to Europe. A new set of exchanges, therefore, began to take place which had never been thought of before, and which should naturally have proved as advantageous to the new, as it certainly did to the old continent. The savage injustice of the Europeans rendered an event, which ought to have been beneficial to all, ruinous and destructive to several of those unfortunate countries.

The discovery of a passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope, which happened much about the same time, opened perhaps a still more extensive range to foreign commerce than even that of America, notwithstanding the greater distance. There were but two nations in America in any respect superior to savages, and these were destroyed almost as soon as discovered. The rest were mere savages. But the empires of China, Indostan, Japan, as well as several others in the East Indies, without having richer mines of gold or silver, were in every other respect much richer, better cultivated, and more advanced in all arts and manufactures than either Mexico or Peru, even though we should credit, what plainly deserves no credit, the exaggerated accounts of the Spanish writers concerning the ancient state of those empires. But rich and civilised nations can always exchange to a much greater value with one another than with savages and barbarians. Europe, however, has hitherto derived much less advantage from its commerce with the East Indies than from that with America. The Portuguese monopolised the East India trade to themselves for about a century, and it was only indirectly and through them that the other nations of Europe could either send out or receive any goods from that country. When the Dutch, in the beginning of the last century, began to encroach upon them, they vested their whole East India commerce in an exclusive company. The English, French, Swedes, and Danes have all followed their example, so that no great nation in Europe has ever yet had the benefit of a free commerce to the East Indies. No other reason need be assigned why it has never been so advantageous as the trade to America, which, between almost every nation of Europe and its own colonies, is free to all its subjects. The exclusive privileges of those East India companies, their great riches, the great favour and protection which these have procured them from their respective governments, have excited much envy against them. This envy has frequently represented their trade as altogether pernicious, on account of the great quantities of silver which it every year exports from the countries from which it is carried on. The parties concerned have replied that their trade, by this continual exportation of silver, might indeed tend to impoverish Europe in general, but not the particular country from which it was carried on; because, by the exportation of a part of the returns to other European countries, it annually brought home a much greater quantity of that metal than it carried out. Both the objection and the reply are founded in the popular notion which I have been just now examining. It is therefore unnecessary to say anything further about either. By the annual exportation of silver to the East Indies, plate is probably somewhat dearer in Europe than it otherwise might have been; and coined silver probably purchases a larger quantity both of labour and commodities. The former of these two effects is a very small loss, the latter a very small advantage; both too insignificant to deserve any part of the public attention. The trade to the East Indies, by opening a market to the commodities of Europe, or, what comes nearly to the same thing, to the gold and silver which is purchased with those commodities, must necessarily tend to increase the annual production of European commodities, and consequently the real wealth and revenue of Europe. That it has hitherto increased them so little is probably owing to the restraints which it everywhere labours under.

I thought it necessary, though at the hazard of being tedious, to examine at full length this popular notion that wealth consists in money, or in gold and silver. Money in common language, as I have already observed, frequently signifies wealth, and this ambiguity of expression has rendered this popular notion so familiar to us that even they who are convinced of its absurdity are very apt to forget their own principles, and in the course of their reasonings to take it for granted as a certain and undeniable truth. Some of the best English writers upon commerce set out with observing that the wealth of a country consists, not in its gold and silver only, but in its lands, houses, and consumable goods of all different kinds. In the course of their reasonings, however, the lands, houses, and consumable goods seem to slip out of their memory, and the strain of their argument frequently supposes that all wealth consists in gold and silver, and that to multiply those metals is the great object of national industry and commerce.

The two principles being established, however, that wealth consisted in gold and silver, and that those metals could be brought into a country which had no mines only by the balance of trade, or by exporting to a greater value than it imported, it necessarily became the great object of political economy to diminish as much as possible the importation of foreign goods for home consumption, and to increase as much as possible the exportation of the produce of domestic industry. Its two great engines for enriching the country, therefore, were restraints upon importation, and encouragements to exportation.

The restraints upon importation were of two kinds.

First, restraints upon the importation of such foreign goods for home consumption as could be produced at home, from whatever country they were imported.

Secondly, restraints upon the importation of goods of almost all kinds from those particular countries with which the balance of trade was supposed to be disadvantageous.

Those different restraints consisted sometimes in high duties, and sometimes in absolute prohibitions.

Exportation was encouraged sometimes by drawbacks, sometimes by bounties, sometimes by advantageous treaties of commerce with foreign states, and sometimes by the establishment of colonies in distant countries.

Drawbacks were given upon two different occasions. When the home manufactures were subject to any duty or excise, either the whole or a part of it was frequently drawn back upon their exportation; and when foreign goods liable to a duty were imported in order to be exported again, either the whole or a part of this duty was sometimes given back upon such exportation.

Bounties were given for the encouragement either of some beginning manufactures, or of such sorts of industry of other kinds as were supposed to deserve particular favour.

By advantageous treaties of commerce, particular privileges were procured in some foreign state for the goods and merchants of the country, beyond what were granted to those of other countries.

By the establishment of colonies in distant countries, not only particular privileges, but a monopoly was frequently procured for the goods and merchants of the country which established them.

The two sorts of restraints upon importation abovementioned, together with these four encouragements to exportation, constitute the six principal means by which the commercial system proposes to increase the quantity of gold and silver in any country by turning the balance of trade in its favour. I shall consider each of them in a particular chapter, and without taking much further notice of their supposed tendency to bring money into the country, I shall examine chiefly what are likely to be the effects of each of them upon the annual produce of its industry. According as they tend either to increase or diminish the value of this annual produce, they must evidently tend either to increase or diminish the real wealth and revenue of the country.

4

Restraints on the Importation of Goods

By restraining, either by high duties or by absolute prohibitions, the importation of such goods from foreign countries as can be produced at home, the monopoly of the home market is more or less secured to the domestic industry employed in producing them. Thus the prohibition of importing either live cattle or salt provisions from foreign countries secures to the graziers of Great Britain the monopoly of the home market for butcher's meat. The high duties upon the importation of corn, which in times of moderate plenty amount to a prohibition, give a like advantage to the growers of that commodity. The prohibition of the importation of foreign woollens is equally favourable to the woollen manufacturers. The silk manufacture, though altogether employed upon foreign materials, has lately obtained the same advantage. The linen manufacture has not yet obtained it, but is making great strides towards it. Many other sorts of manufacturers have, in the same manner, obtained in Great Britain, either altogether or very nearly, a monopoly against their countrymen. The variety of goods of which the importation into Great Britain is prohibited, either absolutely, or under certain circumstances, greatly exceeds what can easily be suspected by those who are not well acquainted with the laws of the customs.

That this monopoly of the home market frequently gives great encouragement to that particular species of industry which enjoys it, and frequently turns towards that employment a greater share of both the labour and stock of the society than would otherwise have gone to it, cannot be doubted. But whether it tends either to increase the general industry of the society, or to give it the most advantageous direction, is not, perhaps, altogether so evident.

The general industry of the society never can exceed what the capital of the society can employ. As the number of workmen that can be kept in employment by any particular person must bear a certain proportion to his capital, so the number of those that can be continually employed by all the members of a great society must bear a certain proportion to the whole capital of that society, and never can exceed that proportion. No regulation of commerce can increase the quantity of industry in any society beyond what its capital can maintain. It can only divert a part of it into a direction into which it might not otherwise have gone; and it is by no means certain that this artificial direction is likely to be more advantageous to the society than that into which it would have gone of its own accord.

Every individual is continually exerting himself to find out the most advantageous employment for whatever capital he can command. It is his own advantage, indeed, and not that of the society, which he has in view. But the study of his own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily, leads him to prefer that employment which is most advantageous to the society.

First, every individual endeavours to employ his capital as near home as he can, and consequently as much as he can in the support of domestic industry; provided always that he can thereby obtain the ordinary, or not a great deal less than the ordinary profits of stock.

Thus, upon equal or nearly equal profits, every wholesale merchant naturally prefers the home trade to the foreign trade of consumption, and the foreign trade of consumption to the carrying trade. In the home trade his capital is never so long out of his sight as it frequently is in the foreign trade of consumption. He can know better the character and situation of the persons whom he trusts, and if he should happen to be deceived, he knows better the laws of the country from which he must seek redress. In the carrying trade, the capital of the merchant is, as it were, divided between two foreign countries, and no part of it is ever necessarily brought home, or placed under his own immediate view and command. The capital which an Amsterdam merchant employs in carrying corn from Konnigsberg to Lisbon, and fruit and wine from Lisbon to Konnigsberg, must generally be the one-half of it at Konnigsberg and the other half at Lisbon. No part of it need ever come to Amsterdam. The natural residence of such a merchant should either be at Konnigsberg or Lisbon, and it can only be some very particular circumstances which can make him prefer the residence of Amsterdam. The uneasiness, however, which he feels at being separated so far from his capital generally determines him to bring part both of the Konnigsberg goods which he destines for the market of Lisbon, and of the Lisbon goods which he destines for that of Konnigsberg, to Amsterdam: and though this necessarily subjects him to a double charge of loading and unloading, as well as to the payment of some duties and customs, yet for the sake of having some part of his capital always under his own view and command, he willingly submits to this extraordinary charge; and it is in this manner that every country which has any considerable share of the carrying trade becomes always the emporium, or general market, for the goods of all the different countries whose trade it carries on. The merchant, in order to save a second loading and unloading, endeavours always to sell in the home market as much of the goods of all those different countries as he can, and thus, so far as he can, to convert his carrying trade into a foreign trade of consumption. A merchant, in the same manner, who is engaged in the foreign trade of consumption, when he collects goods for foreign markets, will always be glad, upon equal or nearly equal profits, to sell as great a part of them at home as he can. He saves himself the risk and trouble of exportation, when, so far as he can, he thus converts his foreign trade of consumption into a home trade. Home is in this manner the centre, if I may say so, round which the capitals of the inhabitants of every country are continually circulating, and towards which they are always tending, though by particular causes they may sometimes be driven off and repelled from it towards more distant employments. But a capital employed in the home trade, it has already been shown, necessarily puts into motion a greater quantity of domestic industry, and gives revenue and employment to a greater number of the inhabitants of the country, than an equal capital employed in the foreign trade of consumption: and one employed in the foreign trade of consumption has the same advantage over an equal capital employed in the carrying trade. Upon equal, or only nearly equal profits, therefore, every individual naturally inclines to employ his capital in the manner in which it is likely to afford the greatest support to domestic industry, and to give revenue and employment to the greatest number of people of his own country.

Secondly, every individual who employs his capital in the support of domestic industry, necessarily endeavours so to direct that industry that its produce may be of the greatest possible value.

The produce of industry is what it adds to the subject or materials upon which it is employed. In proportion as the value of this produce is great or small, so will likewise be the profits of the employer. But it is only for the sake of profit that any man employs a capital in the support of industry; and he will always, therefore, endeavour to employ it in the support of that industry of which the produce is likely to be of the greatest value, or to exchange for the greatest quantity either of money or of other goods.

But the annual revenue of every society is always precisely equal to the exchangeable value of the whole annual produce of its industry, or rather is precisely the same thing with that exchangeable value. As every individual, therefore, endeavours as much as he can both to employ his capital in the support of domestic industry, and so to direct that industry that its produce may be of the greatest value; every individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the public good. It is an affectation, indeed, not very common among merchants, and very few words need be employed in dissuading them from it.

What is the species of domestic industry which his capital can employ, and of which the produce is likely to be of the greatest value, every individual, it is evident, can, in his local situation, judge much better than any statesman or law-giver can do for him. The statesman who should attempt to direct private people in what manner they ought to employ their capitals would not only load himself with a most unnecessary attention, but assume an authority which could safely be trusted, not only to no single person, but to no council or senate whatever, and which would nowhere be so dangerous as in the hands of a man who had folly and presumption enough to fancy himself fit to exercise it.

To give the monopoly of the home market to the produce of domestic industry, in any particular art or manufacture, is in some measure to direct private people in what manner they ought to employ their capitals, and must, in almost all cases, be either a useless or a hurtful regulation. If the produce of domestic can be brought there as cheap as that of foreign industry, the regulation is evidently useless. If it cannot, it must generally be hurtful. It is the maxim of every prudent master of a family never to attempt to make at home what it will cost him more to make than to buy. The tailor does not attempt to make his own shoes, but buys them off the shoemaker. The shoemaker does not attempt to make his own clothes, but employs a tailor. The farmer attempts to make neither the one nor the other, but employs those different artificers. All of them find it for their interest to employ their whole industry in a way in which they have some advantage over their neighbours, and to purchase with a part of its produce, or what is the same thing, with the price of a part of it, whatever else they have occasion for.

What is prudence in the conduct of every private family can scarce be folly in that of a great kingdom. If a foreign country can supply us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy it off them with some part of the produce of our own industry employed in a way in which we have some advantage. The general industry of the country, being always in proportion to the capital which employs it, will not thereby be diminished, no more than that of the above-mentioned artificers; but only left to find out the way in which it can be employed with the greatest advantage. It is certainly not employed to the greatest advantage when it is thus directed towards an object which it can buy cheaper than it can make. The value of its annual produce is certainly more or less diminished when it is thus turned away from producing commodities evidently of more value than the commodity which it is directed to produce. According to the supposition, that commodity could be purchased from foreign countries cheaper than it can be made at home. It could, therefore, have been purchased with a part only of the commodities, or, what is the same thing, with a part only of the price of the commodities, which the industry employed by an equal capital would have produced at home, had it been left to follow its natural course. The industry of the country, therefore, is thus turned away from a more to a less advantageous employment, and the exchangeable value of its annual produce, instead of being increased, according to the intention of the lawgiver, must necessarily be diminished by every such regulation.

By means of such regulations, indeed, a particular manufacture may sometimes be acquired sooner than it could have been otherwise, and after a certain time may be made at home as cheap or cheaper than in the foreign country. But though the industry of the society may be thus carried with advantage into a particular channel sooner than it could have been otherwise, it will by no means follow that the sum total, either of its industry, or of its revenue, can ever be augmented by any such regulation. The industry of the society can augment only in proportion as its capital augments, and its capital can augment only in proportion to what can be gradually saved out of its revenue. But the immediate effect of every such regulation is to diminish its revenue, and what diminishes its revenue is certainly not very likely to augment its capital faster than it would have augmented of its own accord had both capital and industry been left to find out their natural employments.

Though for want of such regulations the society should never acquire the proposed manufacture, it would not, upon that account, necessarily be the poorer in any one period of its duration. In every period of its duration its whole capital and industry might still have been employed, though upon different objects, in the manner that was most advantageous at the time. In every period its revenue might have been the greatest which its capital could afford, and both capital and revenue might have been augmented with the greatest possible rapidity.

The natural advantages which one country has over another in producing particular commodities are sometimes so great that it is acknowledged by all the world to be in vain to struggle with them. By means of glasses, hotbeds, and hot walls, very good grapes can be raised in Scotland, and very good wine too can be made of them at about thirty times the expense for which at least equally good can be brought from foreign countries. Would it be a reasonable law to prohibit the importation of all foreign wines merely to encourage the making of claret and burgundy in Scotland? But if there would be a manifest absurdity in turning towards any employment thirty times more of the capital and industry of the country than would be necessary to purchase from foreign countries an equal quantity of the commodities wanted, there must be an absurdity, though not altogether so glaring, yet exactly of the same kind, in turning towards any such employment a thirtieth, or even a three-hundredth part more of either. Whether the advantages which one country has over another be natural or acquired is in this respect of no consequence. As long as the one country has those advantages, and the other wants them, it will always be more advantageous for the latter rather to buy off the former than to make. It is an acquired advantage only, which one artificer has over his neighbour, who exercises another trade; and yet they both find it more advantageous to buy off one another than to make what does not belong to their particular trades.

Merchants and manufacturers are the people who derive the greatest advantage from this monopoly of the home market. The prohibition of the importation of foreign cattle, and of salt provisions, together with the high duties upon foreign corn, which in times of moderate plenty amount to a prohibition, are not near so advantageous to the graziers and farmers of Great Britain as other regulations of the same kind are to its merchants and manufacturers. Manufactures, those of the finer kind especially, are more easily transported from one country to another than corn or cattle. It is in the fetching and carrying manufactures, accordingly, that foreign trade is chiefly employed. In manufactures, a very small advantage will enable foreigners to undersell our own workmen, even in the home market. It will require a very great one to enable them to do so in the rude produce of the soil. If the free importation of foreign manufactures were permitted, several of the home manufactures would probably suffer, and some of them, perhaps, go to ruin altogether, and a considerable part of the stock and industry at present employed in them would be forced to find out some other employment. But the freest importation of the rude produce of the soil could have no such effect upon the agriculture of the country.

If the importation of foreign cattle, for example, were made ever so free, so few could be imported that the grazing trade of Great Britain could be little affected by it. Live cattle are, perhaps, the only commodity of which the transportation is more expensive by sea than by land. By land they carry themselves to market. By sea, not only the cattle, but their food and their water too, must be carried at no small expense and inconveniency. The short sea between Ireland and Great Britain, indeed, renders the importation of Irish cattle more easy. But though the free importation of them, which was lately permitted only for a limited time, were rendered perpetual, it could have no considerable effect upon the interest of the graziers of Great Britain. Those parts of Great Britain which border upon the Irish Sea are all grazing countries. Irish cattle could never be imported for their use, but must be driven through those very extensive countries, at no small expense and inconveniency, before they could arrive at their proper market. Fat cattle could not be driven so far. Lean cattle, therefore, only could be imported, and such importation could interfere, not with the interest of the feeding or fattening countries, to which, by reducing the price of lean cattle, it would rather be advantageous, but with that of the breeding countries only. The small number of Irish cattle imported since their importation was permitted, together with the good price at which lean cattle still continue to sell, seem to demonstrate that even the breeding countries of Great Britain are never likely to be much affected by the free importation of Irish cattle. The common people of Ireland, indeed, are said to have sometimes opposed with violence the exportation of their cattle. But if the exporters had found any great advantage in continuing the trade, they could easily, when the law was on their side, have conquered this mobbish opposition.

Feeding and fattening countries, besides, must always be highly improved, whereas breeding countries are generally uncultivated. The high price of lean cattle, by augmenting the value of uncultivated land, is like a bounty against improvement. To any country which was highly improved throughout, it would be more advantageous to import its lean cattle than to breed them. The province of Holland, accordingly, is said to follow this maxim at present. The mountains of Scotland, Wales, and Northumberland, indeed, are countries not capable of much improvement, and seem destined by nature to be the breeding countries of Great Britain. The freest importation of foreign cattle could have no other effect than to hinder those breeding countries from taking advantage of the increasing population and improvement of the rest of the kingdom, from raising their price to an exorbitant height, and from laying a real tax upon all the more improved and cultivated parts of the country.

The freest importation of salt provisions, in the same manner, could have as little effect upon the interest of the graziers of Great Britain as that of live cattle. Salt provisions are not only a very bulky commodity, but when compared with fresh meat, they are a commodity both of worse quality, and as they cost more labour and expense, of higher price. They could never, therefore, come into competition with the fresh meat, though they might with the salt provisions of the country. They might be used for victualling ships for distant voyages and such like uses, but could never make any considerable part of the food of the people. The small quantity of salt provisions imported from Ireland since their importation was rendered free is an experimental proof that our graziers have nothing to apprehend from it. It does not appear that the price of butcher's meat has ever been sensibly affected by it.

Even the free importation of foreign corn could very little affect the interest of the farmers of Great Britain. Corn is a much more bulky commodity than butcher's meat. A pound of wheat at a penny is as dear as a pound of butcher's meat at fourpence. The small quantity of foreign corn imported even in times of the greatest scarcity may satisfy our farmers that they can have nothing to fear from the freest importation. The average quantity imported, one year with another, amounts only, according to the very well informed author of the tracts upon the corn trade, to twenty-three thousand seven hundred and twenty-eight quarters of all sorts of grain, and does not exceed the five hundred and seventy-first part of the annual consumption. But as the bounty upon corn occasions a greater exportation in years of plenty, so it must of consequence occasion a greater importation in years of scarcity than in the actual state of tillage would otherwise take place. By means of it the plenty of one year does not compensate the scarcity of another, and as the average quantity exported is necessarily augmented by it, so must likewise, in the actual state of tillage, the average quantity imported. If there were no bounty, as less corn would be exported, so it is probable that, one year with another, less would be imported than at present. The corn merchants, the fetchers and carriers of corn between Great Britain and foreign countries would have much less employment, and might suffer considerably; but the country gentlemen and farmers could suffer very little. It is in the corn merchants accordingly, rather than in the country gentlemen and farmers, that I have observed the greatest anxiety for the renewal and continuation of the bounty.

Country gentlemen and farmers are, to their great honour, of all people, the least subject to the wretched spirit of monopoly. The undertaker of a great manufactory is sometimes alarmed if another work of the same kind is established within twenty miles of him. The Dutch undertaker of the woollen manufacture at Abbeville stipulated that no work of the same kind should be established within thirty leagues of that city. Farmers and country gentlemen, on the contrary, are generally disposed rather to promote than to obstruct the cultivation and improvement of their neighbours' farms and estates. They have no secrets such as those of the greater part of manufacturers, but are generally rather fond of communicating to their neighbours and of extending as far as possible any new practice which they have found to be advantageous. Pius Questus, says old Cato, stabilissimusque, minimeque invidiosus; minimeque male cogitantes sunt, qui in eo studio occupati sunt. Country gentlemen and farmers, dispersed in different parts of the country, cannot so easily combine as merchants and manufacturers, who, being collected into towns, and accustomed to that exclusive corporation spirit which prevails in them, naturally endeavour to obtain against all their countrymen the same exclusive privilege which they generally possess against the inhabitants of their respective towns. They accordingly seem to have been the original inventors of those restraints upon the importation of foreign goods which secure to them the monopoly of the home market. It was probably in imitation of them, and to put themselves upon a level with those who, they found, were disposed to oppress them, that the country gentlemen and farmers of Great Britain so far forgot the generosity which is natural to their station as to demand the exclusive privilege of supplying their countrymen with corn and butcher's meat. They did not perhaps take time to consider how much less their interest could be affected by the freedom of trade than that of the people whose example they followed.

To prohibit by a perpetual law the importation of foreign corn and cattle is in reality to enact that the population and industry of the country shall at no time exceed what the rude produce of its own soil can maintain.

There seem, however, to be two cases in which it will generally be advantageous to lay some burden upon foreign for the encouragement of domestic industry.

The first is, when some particular sort of industry is necessary for the defence of the country. The defence of Great Britain, for example, depends very much upon the number of its sailors and shipping. The act of navigation, therefore, very properly endeavours to give the sailors and shipping of Great Britain the monopoly of the trade of their own country, in some cases by absolute prohibitions and in others by heavy burdens upon the shipping of foreign countries. The following are the principal dispositions of this act.

First, all ships, of which the owners and three-fourths of the mariners are not British subjects, are prohibited, upon pain of forfeiting ship and cargo, from trading to the British settlements and plantations, or from being employed in the coasting trade of Great Britain.

Secondly, a great variety of the most bulky articles of importation can be brought into Great Britain only, either in such ships as are above described, or in ships of the country where those goods are purchased, and of which the owners, masters, and three-fourths of the mariners are of that particular country; and when imported even in ships of this latter kind, they are subject to double aliens' duty. If imported in ships of any other country, the penalty is forfeiture of ship and goods. When this act was made, the Dutch were, what they still are, the great carriers of Europe, and by this regulation they were entirely excluded from being the carriers to Great Britain, or from importing to us the goods of any other European country.

Thirdly, a great variety of the most bulky articles of importation are prohibited from being imported, even in British ships, from any country but that in which they are produced, under pain of forfeiting ship and cargo. This regulation, too, was probably intended against the Dutch. Holland was then, as now, the great emporium for all European goods, and by this regulation British ships were hindered from loading in Holland the goods of any other European country.

Fourthly, salt fish of all kinds, whale-fins, whale-bone, oil, and blubber, not caught by and cured on board British vessels, when imported into Great Britain, are subjected to double aliens' duty. The Dutch, as they are still the principal, were then the only fishers in Europe that attempted to supply foreign nations with fish. By this regulation, a very heavy burden was laid upon their supplying Great Britain.

When the act of navigation was made, though England and Holland were not actually at war, the most violent animosity subsisted between the two nations. It had begun during the government of the Long Parliament, which first framed this act, and it broke out soon after in the Dutch wars during that of the Protector and of Charles the Second. It is not impossible, therefore, that some of the regulations of this famous act may have proceeded from national animosity. They are as wise, however, as if they had all been dictated by the most deliberate wisdom. National animosity at that particular time aimed at the very same object which the most deliberate wisdom would have recommended, the diminution of the naval power of Holland, the only naval power which could endanger the security of England.

The act of navigation is not favourable to foreign commerce, or to the growth of that opulence which can arise from it. The interest of a nation in its commercial relations to foreign nations is, like that of a merchant with regard to the different people with whom he deals, to buy as cheap and to sell as dear as possible. But it will be most likely to buy cheap, when by the most perfect freedom of trade it encourages all nations to bring to it the goods which it has occasion to purchase; and, for the same reason, it will be most likely to sell dear, when its markets are thus filled with the greatest number of buyers. The act of navigation, it is true, lays no burden upon foreign ships that come to export the produce of British industry. Even the ancient aliens' duty, which used to be paid upon all goods exported as well as imported, has, by several subsequent acts, been taken off from the greater part of the articles of exportation. But if foreigners, either by prohibitions or high duties, are hindered from coming to sell, they cannot always afford to come to buy; because coming without a cargo, they must lose the freight from their own country to Great Britain. By diminishing the number of sellers, therefore, we necessarily diminish that of buyers, and are thus likely not only to buy foreign goods dearer, but to sell our own cheaper, than if there was a more perfect freedom of trade. As defence, however, is of much more importance than opulence, the act of navigation is, perhaps, the wisest of all the commercial regulations of England.

The second case, in which it will generally be advantageous to lay some burden upon foreign for the encouragement of domestic industry is, when some tax is imposed at home upon the produce of the latter. In this case, it seems reasonable that an equal tax should be imposed upon the like produce of the former. This would not give the monopoly of the home market to domestic industry, nor turn towards a particular employment a greater share of the stock and labour of the country than what would naturally go to it. It would only hinder any part of what would naturally go to it from being turned away by the tax into a less natural direction, and would leave the competition between foreign and domestic industry, after the tax, as nearly as possible upon the same footing as before it. In Great Britain, when any such tax is laid upon the produce of domestic industry, it is usual at the same time, in order to stop the clamorous complaints of our merchants and manufacturers that they will be undersold at home, to lay a much heavier duty upon the importation of all foreign goods of the same kind.

This second limitation of the freedom of trade according to some people should, upon some occasions, be extended much farther than to the precise foreign commodities which could come into competition with those which had been taxed at home. When the necessaries of life have been taxed in any country, it becomes proper, they pretend, to tax not only the like necessaries of life imported from other countries, but all sorts of foreign goods which can come into competition with anything that is the produce of domestic industry. Subsistence, they say, becomes necessarily dearer in consequence of such taxes; and the price of labour must always rise with the price of the labourers' subsistence. Every commodity, therefore, which is the produce of domestic industry, though not immediately taxed itself, becomes dearer in consequence of such taxes, because the labour which produces it becomes so. Such taxes, therefore, are really equivalent, they say, to a tax upon every particular commodity produced at home. In order to put domestic upon the same footing with foreign industry, therefore, it becomes necessary, they think, to lay some duty upon every foreign commodity equal to this enhancement of the price of the home commodities with which it can come into competition.

Whether taxes upon the necessaries of life, such as those in Great Britain upon soap, salt, leather, candles, etc, necessarily raise the price of labour, and consequently that of all other commodities, I shall consider hereafter when I come to treat of taxes. Supposing, however, in the meantime, that they have this effect, and they have it undoubtedly, this general enhancement of the price of all commodities, in consequence of that of labour, is a case which differs in the two following respects from that of a particular commodity of which the price was enhanced by a particular tax immediately imposed upon it.

First, it might always be known with great exactness how far the price of such a commodity could be enhanced by such a tax: but how far the general enhancement of the price of labour might affect that of every different commodity about which labour was employed could never be known with any tolerable exactness. It would be impossible, therefore, to proportion with any tolerable exactness the tax upon every foreign to this enhancement of the price of every home commodity.

Secondly, taxes upon the necessaries of life have nearly the same effect upon the circumstances of the people as a poor soil and a bad climate. Provisions are thereby rendered dearer in the same manner as if it required extraordinary labour and expense to raise them. As in the natural scarcity arising from soil and climate it would be absurd to direct the people in what manner they ought to employ their capitals and industry, so is it likewise in the artificial scarcity arising from such taxes. To be left to accommodate, as well as they could, their industry to their situation, and to find out those employments in which, notwithstanding their unfavourable circumstances, they might have some advantage either in the home or in the foreign market, is what in both cases would evidently be most for their advantage. To lay a new tax upon them, because they are already overburdened with taxes, and because they already pay too dear for the necessaries of life, to make them likewise pay too dear for the greater part of other commodities, is certainly a most absurd way of making amends.

Such taxes, when they have grown up to a certain height, are a curse equal to the barrenness of the earth and the inclemency of the heavens; and yet it is in the richest and most industrious countries that they have been most generally imposed. No other countries could support so great a disorder. As the strongest bodies only can live and enjoy health under an unwholesome regimen, so the nations only that in every sort of industry have the greatest natural and acquired advantages can subsist and prosper under such taxes. Holland is the country in Europe in which they abound most, and which from peculiar circumstances continues to prosper, not by means of them, as has been most absurdly supposed, but in spite of them.

As there are two cases in which it will generally be advantageous to lay some burden upon foreign for the encouragement of domestic industry, so there are two others in which it may sometimes be a matter of deliberation; in the one, how far it is proper to continue the free importation of certain foreign goods; and in the other, how far, or in what manner, it may be proper to restore that free importation after it has been for some time interrupted.

The case in which it may sometimes be a matter of deliberation how far it is proper to continue the free importation of certain foreign goods is, when some foreign nation restrains by high duties or prohibitions the importation of some of our manufactures into their country. Revenge in this case naturally dictates retaliation, and that we should impose the like duties and prohibitions upon the importation of some or all of their manufactures into ours. Nations, accordingly, seldom fail to retaliate in this manner. The French have been particularly forward to favour their own manufactures by restraining the importation of such foreign goods as could come into competition with them. In this consisted a great part of the policy of Mr Colbert, who, notwithstanding his great abilities, seems in this case to have been imposed upon by the sophistry of merchants and manufacturers, who are always demanding a monopoly against their countrymen. It is at present the opinion of the most intelligent men in France that his operations of this kind have not been beneficial to his country. That minister, by the tariff of 1667, imposed very high duties upon a great number of foreign manufactures. Upon his refusing to moderate them in favour of the Dutch, they in 1671 prohibited the importation of the wines, brandies, and manufactures of France. The war of 1672 seems to have been in part occasioned by this commercial dispute. The peace of Nimeguen put an end to it in 1678 by moderating some of those duties in favour of the Dutch, who in consequence took off their prohibition. It was about the same time that the French and English began mutually to oppress each other's industry by the like duties and prohibitions, of which the French, however, seem to have set the first example. The spirit of hostility which has subsisted between the two nations ever since has hitherto hindered them from being moderated on either side. In 1697 the English prohibited the importation of bonelace, the manufacture of Flanders. The government of that country, at that time under the dominion of Spain, prohibited in return the importation of English woollens. In 1700, the prohibition of importing bonelace into England was taken off upon condition that the importation of English woollens into Flanders should be put on the same footing as before.

There may be good policy in retaliations of this kind, when there is a probability that they will procure the repeal of the high duties or prohibitions complained of. The recovery of a great foreign market will generally more than compensate the transitory inconveniency of paying dearer during a short time for some sorts of goods. To judge whether such retaliations are likely to produce such an effect does not, perhaps, belong so much to the science of a legislator, whose deliberations ought to be governed by general principles which are always the same, as to the skill of that insidious and crafty animal, vulgarly called a statesman or politician, whose councils are directed by the momentary fluctuations of affairs. When there is no probability that any such repeal can be procured, it seems a bad method of compensating the injury done to certain classes of our people to do another injury ourselves, not only to those classes, but to almost all the other classes of them. When our neighbours prohibit some manufacture of ours, we generally prohibit, not only the same, for that alone would seldom affect them considerably, but some other manufacture of theirs. This may no doubt give encouragement to some particular class of workmen among ourselves, and by excluding some of their rivals, may enable them to raise their price in the home market. Those workmen, however, who suffered by our neighbours' prohibition will not be benefited by ours. On the contrary, they and almost all the other classes of our citizens will thereby be obliged to pay dearer than before for certain goods. Every such law, therefore, imposes a real tax upon the whole country, not in favour of that particular class of workmen who were injured by our neighbours' prohibition, but of some other class.

The case in which it may sometimes be a matter of deliberation, how far, or in what manner, it is proper to restore the free importation of foreign goods, after it has been for some time interrupted, is, when particular manufactures, by means of high duties or prohibitions upon all foreign goods which can come into competition with them, have been so far extended as to employ a great multitude of hands. Humanity may in this case require that the freedom of trade should be restored only by slow gradations, and with a good deal of reserve and circumspection. Were those high duties and prohibitions taken away all at once, cheaper foreign goods of the same kind might be poured so fast into the home market as to deprive all at once many thousands of our people of their ordinary employment and means of subsistence. The disorder which this would occasion might no doubt be very considerable. It would in all probability, however, be much less than is commonly imagined, for the two following reasons:—

First, all those manufactures, of which any part is commonly exported to other European countries without a bounty, could be very little affected by the freest importation of foreign goods. Such manufactures must be sold as cheap abroad as any other foreign goods of the same quality and kind, and consequently must be sold cheaper at home. They would still, therefore, keep possession of the home market, and though a capricious man of fashion might sometimes prefer foreign wares, merely because they were foreign, to cheaper and better goods of the same kind that were made at home, this folly could, from the nature of things, extend to so few that it could make no sensible impression upon the general employment of the people. But a great part of all the different branches of our woollen manufacture, of our tanned leather, and of our hardware, are annually exported to other European countries without any bounty, and these are the manufactures which employ the greatest number of hands. The silk, perhaps, is the manufacture which would suffer the most by this freedom of trade, and after it the linen, though the latter much less than the former.

Secondly, though a great number of people should, by thus restoring the freedom of trade, be thrown all at once out of their ordinary employment and common method of subsistence, it would by no means follow that they would thereby be deprived either of employment or subsistence. By the reduction of the army and navy at the end of the late war, more than a hundred thousand soldiers and seamen, a number equal to what is employed in the greatest manufactures, were all at once thrown out of their ordinary employment; but, though they no doubt suffered some inconveniency, they were not thereby deprived of all employment and subsistence. The greater part of the seamen, it is probable, gradually betook themselves to the merchant service as they could find occasion, and in the meantime both they and the soldiers were absorbed in the great mass of the people, and employed in a great variety of occupations. Not only no great convulsion, but no sensible disorder arose from so great a change in the situation of more than a hundred thousand men, all accustomed to the use of arms, and many of them to rapine and plunder. The number of vagrants was scarce anywhere sensibly increased by it, even the wages of labour were not reduced by it in any occupation, so far as I have been able to learn, except in that of seamen in the merchant service. But if we compare together the habits of a soldier and of any sort of manufacturer, we shall find that those of the latter do not tend so much to disqualify him from being employed in a new trade, as those of the former from being employed in any. The manufacturer has always been accustomed to look for his subsistence from his labour only: the soldier to expect it from his pay. Application and industry have been familiar to the one; idleness and dissipation to the other. But it is surely much easier to change the direction of industry from one sort of labour to another than to turn idleness and dissipation to any. To the greater part of manufactures besides, it has already been observed, there are other collateral manufactures of so similar a nature that a workman can easily transfer his industry from one of them to another. The greater part of such workmen too are occasionally employed in country labour. The stock which employed them in a particular manufacture before will still remain in the country to employ an equal number of people in some other way. The capital of the country remaining the same, the demand for labour will likewise be the same, or very nearly the same, though it may be exerted in different places and for different occupations. Soldiers and seamen, indeed, when discharged from the king's service, are at liberty to exercise any trade, within any town or place of Great Britain or Ireland. Let the same natural liberty of exercising what species of industry they please, be restored to all his Majesty's subjects, in the same manner as to soldiers and seamen; that is, break down the exclusive privileges of corporations, and repeal the statute of apprenticeship, both which are real encroachments upon natural liberty, and add to these the repeal of the law of settlements, so that a poor workman, when thrown out of employment either in one trade or in one place, may seek for it in another trade or in another place without the fear either of a prosecution or of a removal, and neither the public nor the individuals will suffer much more from the occasional disbanding some particular classes of manufacturers than from that of soldiers. Our manufacturers have no doubt great merit with their country, but they cannot have more than those who defend it with their blood, nor deserve to be treated with more delicacy.

To expect, indeed, that the freedom of trade should ever be entirely restored in Great Britain is as absurd as to expect that an Oceana or Utopia should ever be established in it. Not only the prejudices of the public, but what is much more unconquerable, the private interests of many individuals, irresistibly oppose it. Were the officers of the army to oppose with the same zeal and unanimity any reduction in the numbers of forces with which master manufacturers set themselves against every law that is likely to increase the number of their rivals in the home market; were the former to animate their soldiers in the same manner as the latter enflame their workmen to attack with violence and outrage the proposers of any such regulation, to attempt to reduce the army would be as dangerous as it has now become to attempt to diminish in any respect the monopoly which our manufacturers have obtained against us. This monopoly has so much increased the number of some particular tribes of them that, like an overgrown standing army, they have become formidable to the government, and upon many occasions intimidate the legislature. The member of parliament who supports every proposal for strengthening this monopoly is sure to acquire not only the reputation of understanding trade, but great popularity and influence with an order of men whose numbers and wealth render them of great importance. If he opposes them, on the contrary, and still more if he has authority enough to be able to thwart them, neither the most acknowledged probity, nor the highest rank, nor the greatest public services can protect him from the most infamous abuse and detraction, from personal insults, nor sometimes from real danger, arising from the insolent outrage of furious and disappointed monopolists.

The undertaker of a great manufacture, who, by the home markets being suddenly laid open to the competition of foreigners, should be obliged to abandon his trade, would no doubt suffer very considerably. That part of his capital which had usually been employed in purchasing materials and in paying his workmen might, without much difficulty, perhaps, find another employment. But that part of it which was fixed in work-houses, and in the instruments of trade, could scarce be disposed of without considerable loss. The equitable regard, therefore, to his interest requires that changes of this kind should never be introduced suddenly, but slowly, gradually, and after a very long warning. The legislature, were it possible that its deliberations could be always directed, not by the clamorous importunity of partial interests, but by an extensive view of the general good, ought upon this very account, perhaps, to be particularly careful neither to establish any new monopolies of this kind, nor to extend further those which are already established. Every such regulation introduces some degree of real disorder into the constitution of the state, which it will be difficult afterwards to cure without occasioning another disorder.

How far it may be proper to impose taxes upon the importation of foreign goods, in order not to prevent their importation but to raise a revenue for government, I shall consider hereafter when I come to treat of taxes. Taxes imposed with a view to prevent, or even to diminish importation, are evidently as destructive of the revenue of the customs as of the freedom of trade.

5

The Unreasonableness of Restraints

Part Ⅰ

Of the Unreasonableness of those Restraints even upon the Principles of the Commercial System

To lay extraordinary restraints upon the importation of goods of almost all kinds from those particular countries with which the balance of trade is supposed to be disadvantageous, is the second expedient by which the commercial system proposes to increase the quantity of gold and silver. Thus in Great Britain, Silesia lawns may be imported for home consumption upon paying certain duties. But French cambrics and lawns are prohibited to be imported, except into the port of London, there to be warehoused for exportation. Higher duties are imposed upon the wines of France than upon those of Portugal, or indeed of any other country. By what is called the impost 1692, a duty of five-and-twenty per cent of the rate or value was laid upon all French goods; while the goods of other nations were, the greater part of them, subjected to much lighter duties, seldom exceeding five per cent. The wine, brandy, salt and vinegar of France were indeed excepted; these commodities being subjected to other heavy duties, either by other laws, or by particular clauses of the same law. In 1696, a second duty of twenty-five per cent, the first not having been thought a sufficient discouragement, was imposed upon all French goods, except brandy; together with a new duty of five-and-twenty pounds upon the ton of French wine, and another of fifteen pounds upon the ton of French vinegar. French goods have never been omitted in any of those general subsidies, or duties of five per cent, which have been imposed upon all, or the greater part of the goods enumerated in the book of rates. If we count the one-third and two-third subsidies as making a complete subsidy between them, there have been five of these general subsidies; so that before the commencement of the present war seventy-five per cent may be considered as the lowest duty to which the greater part of the goods of the growth, produce, or manufacture of France were liable. But upon the greater part of goods, those duties are equivalent to a prohibition. The French in their turn have, I believe, treated our goods and manufactures just as hardly; though I am not so well acquainted with the particular hardships which they have imposed upon them. Those mutual restraints have put an end to almost all fair commerce between the two nations, and smugglers are now the principal importers, either of British goods into France, or of French goods into Great Britain. The principles which I have been examining in the foregoing chapter took their origin from private interest and the spirit of monopoly; those which I am going to examine in this, from national prejudice and animosity. They are, accordingly, as might well be expected, still more unreasonable. They are so, even upon the principles of the commercial system.

First, though it were certain that in the case of a free trade between France and England, for example, the balance would be in favour of France, it would by no means follow that such a trade would be disadvantageous to England, or that the general balance of its whole trade would thereby be turned more against it. If the wines of France are better and cheaper than those of Portugal, or its linens than those of Germany, it would be more advantageous for Great Britain to purchase both the wine and the foreign linen which it had occasion for of France than of Portugal and Germany. Though the value of the annual importations from France would thereby be greatly augmented, the value of the whole annual importations would be diminished, in proportion as the French goods of the same quality were cheaper than those of the other two countries. This would be the case, even upon the supposition that the whole French goods imported were to be consumed in Great Britain.

But, secondly, a great part of them might be reexported to other countries, where, being sold with profit, they might bring back a return equal in value, perhaps, to the prime cost of the whole French goods imported. What has frequently been said of the East India trade might possibly be true of the French; that though the greater part of East India goods were bought with gold and silver, the re-exportation of a part of them to other countries brought back more gold and silver to that which carried on the trade than the prime cost of the whole amounted to. One of the most important branches of the Dutch trade, at present, consists in the carriage of French goods to other European countries. Some part even of the French wine drank in Great Britain is clandestinely imported from Holland and Zealand. If there was either a free trade between France and England, or if French goods could be imported upon paying only the same duties as those of other European nations, to be drawn back upon exportation, England might have some share of a trade which is found so advantageous to Holland.

Thirdly, and lastly, there is no certain criterion by which we can determine on which side what is called the balance between any two countries lies, or which of them exports to the greatest value. National prejudice and animosity, prompted always by the private interest of particular traders, are the principles which generally direct our judgment upon all questions concerning it. There are two criterions, however, which have frequently been appealed to upon such occasions, the custom-house books and the course of exchange. The custom-house books, I think, it is now generally acknowledged, are a very uncertain criterion, on account of the inaccuracy of the valuation at which the greater part of goods are rated in them. The course of exchange is, perhaps, almost equally so.

When the exchange between two places, such as London and Paris, is at par, it is said to be a sign that the debts due from London to Paris are compensated by those due from Paris to London. On the contrary, when a premium is paid at London for a bill upon Paris, it is said to be a sign that the debts due from London to Paris are not compensated by those due from Paris to London, but that a balance in money must be sent out from the latter place; for the risk, trouble, and expense of exporting which, the premium is both demanded and given. But the ordinary state of debt and credit between those two cities must necessarily be regulated, it is said, by the ordinary course of their dealings with one another. When neither of them imports from the other to a greater amount than it exports to that other, the debts and credits of each may compensate one another. But when one of them imports from the other to a greater value than it exports to that other, the former necessarily becomes indebted to the latter in a greater sum than the latter becomes indebted to it; the debts and credits of each do not compensate one another, and money must be sent out from that place of which the debts overbalance the credits. The ordinary course of exchange, therefore, being an indication of the ordinary state of debt and credit between two places, must likewise be an indication of the ordinary course of their exports and imports, as these necessarily regulate that state.

But though the ordinary course of exchange should be allowed to be a sufficient indication of the ordinary state of debt and credit between any two places, it would not from thence follow that the balance of trade was in favour of that place which had the ordinary state of debt and credit in its favour. The ordinary state of debt and credit between any two places is not always entirely regulated by the ordinary course of their dealings with one another; but is often influenced by that of the dealings of either with many other places. If it is usual, for example, for the merchants of England to pay for the goods which they buy of Hamburg, Dantzic, Riga, etc, by bills upon Holland, the ordinary state of debt and credit between England and Holland will not be regulated entirely by the ordinary course of the dealings of those two countries with one another, but will be influenced by that of the dealings of England with those other places. England may be obliged to send out every year money to Holland, though its annual exports to that country may exceed very much the annual value of its imports from thence; and though what is called the balance of trade may be very much in favour of England.

In the way, besides, in which the par of exchange has hitherto been computed, the ordinary course of exchange can afford no sufficient indication that the ordinary state of debt and credit is in favour of that country which seems to have, or which is supposed to have, the ordinary course of exchange in its favour: or, in other words, the real exchange may be, and, in fact, often is so very different from the computed one, that from the course of the latter no certain conclusion can, upon many occasions, be drawn concerning that of the former.

When for a sum of money paid in England, containing, according to the standard of the English mint, a certain number of ounces of pure silver, you receive a bill for a sum of money to be paid in France, containing, according to the standard of the French mint, an equal number of ounces of pure silver, exchange is said to be at par between England and France. When you pay more, you are supposed to give a premium, and exchange is said to be against England and in favour of France. When you pay less, you are supposed to get a premium, and exchange is said to be against France and in favour of England.

But, first, we cannot always judge of the value of the current money of different countries by the standard of their respective mints. In some it is more, in others it is less worn, clipt, and otherwise degenerated from that standard. But the value of the current coin of every country, compared with that of any other country, is in proportion not to the quantity of pure silver which it ought to contain, but to that which it actually does contain. Before the reformation of the silver coin in King William's time, exchange between England and Holland, computed in the usual manner according to the standard of their respective mints, was five-and-twenty per cent against England. But the value of the current coin of England, as we learn from Mr Lowndes, was at that time rather more than five-and-twenty per cent below its standard value. The real exchange, therefore, may even at that time have been in favour of England, notwithstanding the computed exchange was so much against it; a smaller number of ounces of pure silver actually paid in England may have purchased a bill for a greater number of ounces of pure silver to be paid in Holland, and the man who was supposed to give may in reality have got the premium. The French coin was, before the late reformation of the English gold coin, much less worn than the English, and was perhaps two or three per cent nearer its standard. If the computed exchange with France, therefore, was not more than two or three per cent against England, the real exchange might have been in its favour. Since the reformation of the gold coin, the exchange has been constantly in favour of England, and against France.

Secondly, in some countries, the expense of coinage is defrayed by the government; in others, it is defrayed by the private people who carry their bullion to the mint, and the government even derives some revenue from the coinage. In England, it is defrayed by the government, and if you carry a pound weight of standard silver to the mint, you get back sixty-two shillings, containing a pound weight of the like standard silver. In France, a duty of eight per cent is deducted for the coinage, which not only defrays the expense of it, but affords a small revenue to the government. In England, as the coinage costs nothing, the current coin can never be much more valuable than the quantity of bullion which it actually contains. In France, the workmanship, as you pay for it, adds to the value in the same manner as to that of wrought plate. A sum of French money, therefore, containing a certain weight of pure silver, is more valuable than a sum of English money containing an equal weight of pure silver, and must require more bullion, or other commodities, to purchase it. Though the current coin of the two countries, therefore, were equally near the standards of their respective mints, a sum of English money could not well purchase a sum of French money containing an equal number of ounces of pure silver, nor consequently a bill upon France for such a sum. If for such a bill no more additional money was paid than what was sufficient to compensate the expense of the French coinage, the real exchange might be at par between the two countries, their debts and credits might mutually compensate one another, while the computed exchange was considerably in favour of France. If less than this was paid, the real exchange might be in favour of England, while the computed was in favour of France.

Thirdly, and lastly, in some places, as at Amsterdam, Hamburg, Venice, etc, foreign bills of exchange are paid in what they call bank money; while in others, as at London, Lisbon, Antwerp, Leghorn, etc., they are paid in the common currency of the country. What is called bank money is always of more value than the same nominal sum of common currency. A thousand guilders in the bank of Amsterdam, for example, are of more value than a thousand guilders of Amsterdam currency. The difference between them is called the agio of the bank, which, at Amsterdam, is generally about five per cent. Supposing the current money of the two countries equally near to the standard of their respective mints, and that the one pays foreign bills in this common currency, while the other pays them in bank money, it is evident that the computed exchange may be in favour of that which pays in bank money, though the real exchange should be in favour of that which pays in current money; for the same reason that the computed exchange may be in favour of that which pays in better money, or in money nearer to its own standard, though the real exchange should be in favour of that which pays in worse. The computed exchange, before the late reformation of the gold coin, was generally against London with Amsterdam, Hamburg, Venice, and, I believe, with all other places which pay in what is called bank money. It will be no means follow, however, that the real exchange was against it. Since the reformation of the gold coin, it has been in favour of London even with those places. The computed exchange has generally been in favour of London with Lisbon, Antwerp, Leghorn, and, if you except France, I believe, with most other parts of Europe that pay in common currency; and it is not improbable that the real exchange was so too.

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Part Ⅱ

Of the Unreasonableness of those Extraordinary Restraints upon other Principles

In the foregoing Part of this Chapter I have endeavoured to show, even upon the principles of the commercial system, how unnecessary it is to lay extraordinary restraints upon the importation of goods from those countries with which the balance of trade is supposed to be disadvantageous.

Nothing, however, can be more absurd than this whole doctrine of the balance of trade, upon which, not only these restraints, but almost all the other regulations of commerce are founded. When two places trade with one another, this doctrine supposes that, if the balance be even, neither of them either loses or gains; but if it leans in any degree to one side, that one of them loses and the other gains in proportion to its declension from the exact equilibrium. Both suppositions are false. A trade which is forced by means of bounties and monopolies may be and commonly is disadvantageous to the country in whose favour it is meant to be established, as I shall endeavour to show hereafter. But that trade which, without force or constraint, is naturally and regularly carried on between any two places is always advantageous, though not always equally so, to both.

By advantage or gain, I understand not the increase of the quantity of gold and silver, but that of the exchangeable value of the annual produce of the land and labour of the country, or the increase of the annual revenue of its inhabitants.

If the balance be even, and if the trade between the two places consist altogether in the exchange of their native commodities, they will, upon most occasions, not only both gain, but they will gain equally, or very near equally; each will in this case afford a market for a part of the surplus produce of the other; each will replace a capital which had been employed in raising and preparing for the market this part of the surplus produce of the other, and which had been distributed among, and given revenue and maintenance to a certain number of its inhabitants. Some part of the inhabitants of each, therefore, will indirectly derive their revenue and maintenance from the other. As the commodities exchanged, too, are supposed to be of equal value, so the two capitals employed in the trade will, upon most occasions, be equal, or very nearly equal; and both being employed in raising the native commodities of the two countries, the revenue and maintenance which their distribution will afford to the inhabitants of each will be equal, or very nearly equal. This revenue and maintenance, thus mutually afforded, will be greater or smaller in proportion to the extent of their dealings. If these should annually amount to an hundred thousand pounds, for example, or to a million on each side, each of them would afford an annual revenue in the one case of an hundred thousand pounds, in the other of a million, to the inhabitants of the other.

If their trade should be of such a nature that one of them exported to the other nothing but native commodities, while the returns of that other consisted altogether in foreign goods; the balance, in this case, would still be supposed even, commodities being paid for with commodities. They would, in this case too, both gain, but they would not gain equally; and the inhabitants of the country which exported nothing but native commodities would derive the greatest revenue from the trade. If England, for example, should import from France nothing but the native commodities of that country, and, not having such commodities of its own as were in demand there, should annually repay them by sending thither a large quantity of foreign goods, tobacco, we shall suppose, and East India goods; this trade, though it would give some revenue to the inhabitants of both countries, would give more to those of France than to those of England. The whole French capital annually employed in it would annually be distributed among the people of France. But that part of the English capital only which was employed in producing the English commodities with which those foreign goods were purchased would be annually distributed among the people of England. The greater part of it would replace the capitals which had been employed in Virginia, Indostan, and China, and which had given revenue and maintenance to the inhabitants of those distant countries. If the capitals were equal, or nearly equal, therefore this employment of the French capital would augment much more the revenue of the people of France than that of the English capital would the revenue of the people of England. France would in this case carry on a direct foreign trade of consumption with England; whereas England would carry on a round-about trade of the same kind with France. The different effects of a capital employed in the direct and of one employed in the round-about foreign trade of consumption have already been fully explained.

There is not, probably, between any two countries a trade which consists altogether in the exchange either of native commodities on both sides, or of native commodities on one side and of foreign goods on the other. Almost all countries exchange with one another partly native and partly foreign goods. That country, however, in whose cargoes there is the greatest proportion of native, and the least of foreign goods, will always be the principal gainer.

If it was not with tobacco and East India goods, but with gold and silver, that England paid for the commodities annually imported from France, the balance, in this case, would be supposed uneven, commodities not being paid for with commodities, but with gold and silver. The trade, however, would, in this case, as in the foregoing, give some revenue to the inhabitants of both countries, but more to those of France than to those of England. It would give some revenue to those of England. The capital which had been employed in producing the English goods that purchased this gold and silver, the capital which had been distributed among, and given revenue to, certain inhabitants of England, would thereby be replaced and enabled to continue that employment. The whole capital of England would no more be diminished by this exportation of gold and silver than by the exportation of an equal value of any other goods. On the contrary, it would in most cases be augmented. No goods are sent abroad but those for which the demand is supposed to be greater abroad than at home, and of which the returns consequently, it is expected, will be of more value at home than the commodities exported. If the tobacco which, in England, is worth only a hundred thousand pounds, when sent to France will purchase wine which is, in England, worth a hundred and ten thousand, this exchange will equally augment the capital of England by ten thousand pounds. If a hundred thousand pounds of English gold, in the same manner, purchase French wine which, in England, is worth a hundred and ten thousand, this exchange will equally augment the capital of England by ten thousand pounds. As a merchant who has a hundred and ten thousand pounds worth of wine in his cellar is a richer man than he who has only a hundred thousand pounds worth of tobacco in his warehouse, so is he likewise a richer man than he who has only a hundred thousand pounds worth of gold in his coffers. He can put into motion a greater quantity of industry, and give revenue, maintenance, and employment to a greater number of people than either of the other two. But the capital of the country is equal to the capitals of all its different inhabitants, and the quantity of industry which can be annually maintained in it is equal to what all those different capitals can maintain. Both the capital of the country, therefore, and the quantity of industry which can be annually maintained in it, must generally be augmented by this exchange. It would, indeed, be more advantageous for England that it could purchase the wines of France with its own hardware and broadcloth than with either the tobacco of Virginia or the gold and silver of Brazil and Peru. A direct foreign trade of consumption is always more advantageous than a round-about one. But a round-about foreign trade of consumption, which is carried on with gold and silver, does not seem to be less advantageous than any other equally round-about one. Neither is a country which has no mines more likely to be exhausted of gold and silver by this annual exportation of those metals than one which does not grow tobacco by the like annual exportation of that plant. As a country which has wherewithal to buy tobacco will never be long in want of it, so neither will one be long in want of gold and silver which has wherewithal to purchase those metals.

It is a losing trade, it is said, which a workman carries on with the alehouse; and the trade which a manufacturing nation would naturally carry on with a wine country may be considered as a trade of the same nature. I answer, that the trade with the alehouse is not necessarily a losing trade. In its own nature it is just as advantageous as any other, though perhaps somewhat more liable to be abused. The employment of a brewer, and even that of a retailer of fermented liquors, are as necessary divisions of labour as any other. It will generally be more advantageous for a workman to buy of the brewer the quantity he has occasion for than to brew it himself, and if he is a poor workman, it will generally be more advantageous for him to buy it by little and little of the retailer than a large quantity of the brewer. He may no doubt buy too much of either, as he may of any other dealers in his neighbourhood, of the butcher, if he is a glutton, or of the draper, if he affects to be a beau among his companions. It is advantageous to the great body of workmen, notwithstanding, that all these trades should be free, though this freedom may be abused in all of them, and is more likely to be so, perhaps, in some than in others. Though individuals, besides, may sometimes ruin their fortunes by an excessive consumption of fermented liquors, there seems to be no risk that a nation should do so. Though in every country there are many people who spend upon such liquors more than they can afford, there are always many more who spend less. It deserves to be remarked too, that, if we consult experience, the cheapness of wine seems to be a cause, not of drunkenness, but of sobriety. The inhabitants of the wine countries are in general the soberest people in Europe; witness the Spaniards, the Italians, and the inhabitants of the southern provinces of France. People are seldom guilty of excess in what is their daily fare. Nobody affects the character of liberality and good fellowship by being profuse of a liquor which is as cheap as small beer. On the contrary, in the countries which, either from excessive heat or cold, produce no grapes, and where wine consequently is dear and a rarity, drunkenness is a common vice, as among the northern nations, and all those who live between the tropics, the negroes, for example, on the coast of Guinea. When a French regiment comes from some of the northern provinces of France, where wine is somewhat dear, to be quartered in the southern, where it is very cheap, the soldiers, I have frequently heard it observed, are at first debauched by the cheapness and novelty of good wine; but after a few months' residence, the greater part of them become as sober as the rest of the inhabitants. Were the duties upon foreign wines, and the excises upon malt, beer, and ale to be taken away all at once, it might, in the same manner, occasion in Great Britain a pretty general and temporary drunkenness among the middling and inferior ranks of people, which would probably be soon followed by a permanent and almost universal sobriety. At present drunkenness is by no means the vice of people of fashion, or of those who can easily afford the most expensive liquors. A gentleman drunk with ale has scarce ever been seen among us. The restraints upon the wine trade in Great Britain, besides, do not so much seem calculated to hinder the people from going, if I may say so, to the alehouse, as from going where they can buy the best and cheapest liquor. They favour the wine trade of Portugal, and discourage that of France. The Portuguese, it is said, indeed, are better customers for our manufactures than the French, and should therefore be encouraged in preference to them. As they give us their custom, it is pretended, we should give them ours. The sneaking arts of underling tradesmen are thus erected into political maxims for the conduct of a great empire: for it is the most underling tradesmen only who make it a rule to employ chiefly their own customers. A great trader purchases his goods always where they are cheapest and best, without regard to any little interest of this kind.

By such maxims as these, however, nations have been taught that their interest consisted in beggaring all their neighbours. Each nation has been made to look with an invidious eye upon the prosperity of all the nations with which it trades, and to consider their gain as its own loss. Commerce, which ought naturally to be, among nations, as among individuals, a bond of union and friendship, has become the most fertile source of discord and animosity. The capricious ambition of kings and ministers has not, during the present and the preceding century, been more fatal to the repose of Europe than the impertinent jealousy of merchants and manufacturers. The violence and injustice of the rulers of mankind is an ancient evil, for which, I am afraid, the nature of human affairs can scarce admit of a remedy. But the mean rapacity, the monopolising spirit of merchants and manufacturers, who neither are, nor ought to be, the rulers of mankind, though it cannot perhaps be corrected may very easily be prevented from disturbing the tranquillity of any body but themselves.

That it was the spirit of monopoly which originally both invented and propagated this doctrine cannot be doubted; and they who first taught it were by no means such fools as they who believed it. In every country it always is and must be the interest of the great body of the people to buy whatever they want of those who sell it cheapest. The proposition is so very manifest that it seems ridiculous to take any pains to prove it; nor could it ever have been called in question had not the interested sophistry of merchants and manufacturers confounded the common sense of mankind. Their interest is, in this respect, directly opposite to that of the great body of the people. As it is the interest of the freemen of a corporation to hinder the rest of the inhabitants from employing any workmen but themselves, so it is the interest of the merchants and manufacturers of every country to secure to themselves the monopoly of the home market. Hence in Great Britain, and in most other European countries, the extraordinary duties upon almost all goods imported by alien merchants. Hence the high duties and prohibitions upon all those foreign manufactures which can come into competition with our own. Hence, too, the extraordinary restraints upon the importation of almost all sorts of goods from those countries with which the balance of trade is supposed to be disadvantageous; that is, from those against whom national animosity happens to be most violently inflamed.

The wealth of a neighbouring nation, however, though dangerous in war and politics, is certainly advantageous in trade. In a state of hostility it may enable our enemies to maintain fleets and armies superior to our own; but in a state of peace and commerce it must likewise enable them to exchange with us to a greater value, and to afford a better market, either for the immediate produce of our own industry, or for whatever is purchased with that produce. As a rich man is likely to be a better customer to the industrious people in his neighbourhood than a poor, so is likewise a rich nation. A rich man, indeed, who is himself a manufacturer, is a very dangerous neighbour to all those who deal in the same way. All the rest of the neighbourhood, however, by far the greatest number, profit by the good market which his expense affords them. They even profit by his underselling the poorer workmen who deal in the same way with him. The manufacturers of a rich nation, in the same manner, may no doubt be very dangerous rivals to those of their neighbours. This very competition, however, is advantageous to the great body of the people, who profit greatly besides by the good market which the great expense of such a nation affords them in every other way. Private people who want to make a fortune never think of retiring to the remote and poor provinces of the country, but resort either to the capital, or to some of the great commercial towns. They know that where little wealth circulates there is little to be got, but that where a great deal is in motion, some share of it may fall to them. The same maxims which would in this manner direct the common sense of one, or ten, or twenty individuals, should regulate the judgment of one, or ten, or twenty millions, and should make a whole nation regard the riches of its neighbours as a probable cause and occasion for itself to acquire riches. A nation that would enrich itself by foreign trade is certainly most likely to do so when its neighbours are all rich, industrious, and commercial nations. A great nation surrounded on all sides by wandering savages and poor barbarians might, no doubt, acquire riches by the cultivation of its own lands, and by its own interior commerce, but not by foreign trade. It seems to have been in this manner that the ancient Egyptians and the modern Chinese acquired their great wealth. The ancient Egyptians, it is said, neglected foreign commerce, and the modern Chinese, it is known, hold it in the utmost contempt, and scarce deign to afford it the decent protection of the laws. The modern maxims of foreign commerce, by aiming at the impoverishment of all our neighbours, so far as they are capable of producing their intended effect, tend to render that very commerce insignificant and contemptible.

It is in consequence of these maxims that the commerce between France and England has in both countries been subjected to so many discouragements and restraints. If those two countries, however, were to consider their real interest, without either mercantile jealousy or national animosity, the commerce of France might be more advantageous to Great Britain than that of any other country, and for the same reason that of Great Britain to France. France is the nearest neighbour to Great Britain. In the trade between the southern coast of England and the northern and north-western coasts of France, the returns might be expected, in the same manner as in the inland trade, four, five, or six times in the year. The capital, therefore, employed in this trade could in each of the two countries keep in motion four, five, or six times the quantity of industry, and afford employment and subsistence to four, five, or six times the number of people, which an equal capital could do in the greater part of the other branches of foreign trade. Between the parts of France and Great Britain most remote from one another, the returns might be expected, at least, once in the year, and even this trade would so far be at least equally advantageous as the greater part of the other branches of our foreign European trade. It would be, at least, three times more advantageous than the boasted trade with our North American colonies, in which the returns were seldom made in less than three years, frequently not in less than four or five years. France besides, is supposed to contain twenty-four millions of inhabitants. Our North American colonies were never supposed to contain more than three millions; and France is a much richer country than North America; though, on account of the more unequal distribution of riches, there is much more poverty and beggary in the one country than in the other. France, therefore, could afford a market at least eight times more extensive, and, on account of the superior frequency of the returns, four-and-twenty times more advantageous than that which our North American colonies ever afforded. The trade of Great Britain would be just as advantageous to France, and, in proportion to the wealth, population, and proximity of the respective countries, would have the same superiority over that which France carries on with her own colonies. Such is the very great difference between that trade, which the wisdom of both nations has thought proper to discourage, and that which it has favoured the most.

But the very same circumstances which would have rendered an open and free commerce between the two countries so advantageous to both, have occasioned the principal obstructions to that commerce. Being neighbours, they are necessarily enemies, and the wealth and power of each becomes, upon that account, more formidable to the other; and what would increase the advantages of national friendship serves only to inflame the violence of national animosity. They are both rich and industrious nations; and the merchants and manufacturers of each dread the competition of the skill and activity of those of the other. Mercantile jealousy is excited, and both inflames, and is itself inflamed, by the violence of national animosity; and the traders of both countries have announced, with all the passionate confidence of interested falsehood, the certain ruin of each, in consequence of that unfavourable balance of trade, which, they pretend, would be the infallible effect of an unrestrained commerce with the other.

There is no commercial country in Europe of which the approaching ruin has not frequently been foretold by the pretended doctors of this system from an unfavourable balance of trade. After all the anxiety, however, which they have excited about this, after all the vain attempts of almost all trading nations to turn that balance in their own favour and against their neighbours, it does not appear that any one nation in Europe has been in any respect impoverished by this cause. Every town and country, on the contrary, in proportion as they have opened their ports to all nations, instead of being ruined by this free trade, as the principles of the commercial system would lead us to expect, have been enriched by it. Though there are in Europe, indeed, a few towns which in some respects deserve the name of free ports, there is no country which does so. Holland, perhaps, approaches the nearest to this character of any, though still very remote from it; and Holland, it is acknowledged, not only derives its whole wealth, but a great part of its necessary subsistence, from foreign trade.

There is another balance, indeed, which has already been explained, very different from the balance of trade, and which, according as it happens to be either favourable or unfavourable, necessarily occasions the prosperity or decay of every nation. This is the balance of the annual produce and consumption. If the exchangeable value of the annual produce, it has already been observed, exceeds that of the annual consumption, the capital of the society must annually increase in proportion to this excess. The society in this case lives within its revenue, and what is annually saved out of its revenue is naturally added to its capital, and employed so as to increase still further the annual produce. If the exchangeable value of the annual produce, on the contrary, fall short of the annual consumption, the capital of the society must annually decay in proportion to this deficiency. The expense of the society in this case exceeds its revenue, and necessarily encroaches upon its capital. Its capital, therefore, must necessarily decay, and together with it the exchangeable value of the annual produce of its industry.

This balance of produce and consumption is entirely different from what is called the balance of trade. It might take place in a nation which had no foreign trade, but which was entirely separated from all the world. It may take place in the whole globe of the earth, of which the wealth, population, and improvement may be either gradually increasing or gradually decaying.

The balance of produce and consumption may be constantly in favour of a nation, though what is called the balance of trade be generally against it. A nation may import to a greater value than it exports for half a century, perhaps, together; the gold and silver which comes into it during all this time may be all immediately sent out of it; its circulating coin may gradually decay, different sorts of paper money being substituted in its place, and even the debts, too, which it contracts in the principal nations with whom it deals, may be gradually increasing; and yet its real wealth, the exchangeable value of the annual produce of its lands and labour, may, during the same period, have been increasing in a much greater proportion.

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6

The Agricultural Systems

The agricultural systems of political economy will not require so long an explanation as that which I have thought it necessary to bestow upon the mercantile or commercial system.

That system which represents the produce of land as the sole source of the revenue and wealth of every country has, so far as I know, never been adopted by any nation, and it at present exists only in the speculations of a few men of great learning and ingenuity in France. It would not, surely, be worth while to examine at great length the errors of a system which never has done, and probably never will do, any harm in any part of the world. I shall endeavour to explain, however, as distinctly as I can, the great outlines of this very ingenious system.

Mr Colbert, the famous minister of Louis XIV, was a man of probity, of great industry and knowledge of detail, of great experience and acuteness in the examination of public accounts, and of abilities, in short, every way fitted for introducing method and good order into the collection and expenditure of the public revenue. That minister had unfortunately embraced all the prejudices of the mercantile system, in its nature and essence a system of restraint and regulation, and such as could scarce fail to be agreeable to a laborious and plodding man of business, who had been accustomed to regulate the different departments of public offices, and to establish the necessary checks and controls for confining each to its proper sphere. The industry and commerce of a great country he endeavoured to regulate upon the same model as the departments of a public office; and instead of allowing every man to pursue his own interest in his own way, upon the liberal plan of equality, liberty, and justice, he bestowed upon certain branches of industry extraordinary privileges, while he laid others under as extraordinary restraints. He was not only disposed, like other European ministers, to encourage more the industry of the towns than that of the country; but, in order to support the industry of the towns, he was willing even to depress and keep down that of the country. In order to render provisions cheap to the inhabitants of the towns, and thereby to encourage manufactures and foreign commerce, he prohibited altogether the exportation of corn, and thus excluded the inhabitants of the country from every foreign market for by far the most important part of the produce of their industry. This prohibition, joined to the restraints imposed by the ancient provincial laws of France upon the transportation of corn from one province to another, and to the arbitrary and degrading taxes which are levied upon the cultivators in almost all the provinces, discouraged and kept down the agriculture of that country very much below the state to which it would naturally have risen in so very fertile a soil and so very happy a climate. This state of discouragement and depression was felt more or less in every different part of the country, and many different inquiries were set on foot concerning the causes of it. One of those causes appeared to be the preference given, by the institutions of Mr Colbert, to the industry of the towns above that of the country.

If the rod be bent too much one way, says the proverb, in order to make it straight you must bend it as much the other. The French philosophers, who have proposed the system which represents agriculture as the sole source of the revenue and wealth of every country, seem to have adopted this proverbial maxim; and as in the plan of Mr Colbert the industry of the towns was certainly over-valued in comparison with that of the country; so in their system it seems to be as certainly undervalued.

The different orders of people who have ever been supposed to contribute in any respect towards the annual produce of the land and labour of the country, they divide into three classes. The first is the class of the proprietors of land. The second is the class of the cultivators, of farmers and country labourers, whom they honour with the peculiar appellation of the productive class. The third is the class of artificers, manufacturers, and merchants, whom they endeavour to degrade by the humiliating appellation of the barren or unproductive class.

The class of proprietors contributes to the annual produce by the expense which they may occasionally lay out upon the improvement of the land, upon the buildings, drains, enclosures, and other ameliorations, which they may either make or maintain upon it, and by means of which the cultivators are enabled, with the same capital, to raise a greater produce, and consequently to pay a greater rent. This advanced rent may be considered as the interest or profit due to the proprietor upon the expense or capital which he thus employs in the improvement of his land. Such expenses are in this system called ground expenses (dépenses foncières).

The cultivators or farmers contribute to the annual produce by what are in this system called the original and annual expenses (dépenses primitives et dépenses annuelles) which they lay out upon the cultivation of the land. The original expenses consist in the instruments of husbandry, in the stock of cattle, in the seed, and in the maintenance of the farmer's family, servants, and cattle during at least a great part of the first year of his occupancy, or till he can receive some return from the land. The annual expenses consist in the seed, in the wear and tear of the instruments of husbandry, and in the annual maintenance of the farmer's servants and cattle, and of his family too, so far as any part of them can be considered as servants employed in cultivation. That part of the produce of the land which remains to him after paying the rent ought to be sufficient, first, to replace to him within a reasonable time, at least during the term of his occupancy, the whole of his original expenses, together with the ordinary profits of stock; and, secondly, to replace to him annually the whole of his annual expenses, together likewise with the ordinary profits of stock. Those two sorts of expenses are two capitals which the farmer employs in cultivation; and unless they are regularly restored to him together with a reasonable profit, he cannot carry on his employment upon a level with other employments; but, from a regard to his own interest, must desert it as soon as possible and seek some other. That part of the produce of the land which is thus necessary for enabling the farmer to continue his business ought to be considered as a fund sacred to cultivation, which, if the landlord violates, he necessarily reduces the produce of his own land, and in a few years not only disables the farmer from paying this racked rent, but from paying the reasonable rent which he might otherwise have got for his land. The rent which properly belongs to the landlord is no more than the net produce which remains after paying in the completest manner all the necessary expenses which must be previously laid out in order to raise the gross or the whole produce. It is because the labour of the cultivators, over and above paying completely all those necessary expenses, affords a net produce of this kind that this class of people are in this system peculiarly distinguished by the honourable appellation of the productive class. Their original and annual expenses are for the same reason called, in this system, productive expenses, because, over and above replacing their own value, they occasion the annual reproduction of this net produce.

The ground expenses, as they are called, or what the landlord lays out upon the improvement of his land, are in this system, too, honoured with the appellation of productive expenses. Till the whole of those expenses, together with the ordinary profits of stock, have been completely repaid to him by the advanced rent which he gets from his land, that advanced rent ought to be regarded as sacred and inviolable, both by the church and by the king; ought to be subject neither to tithe nor to taxation. If it is otherwise, by discouraging the improvement of land the church discourages the future increase of her own tithes, and the king the future increase of his own taxes. As in a well-ordered state of things, therefore, those ground expenses, over and above reproducing in the completest manner their own value, occasion likewise after a certain time a reproduction of a net produce, they are in this system considered as productive expenses.

The ground expenses of the landlord, however, together with the original and the annual expenses of the farmer, are the only three sorts of expenses which in this system are considered as productive. All other expenses and all other orders of people, even those who in the common apprehensions of men are regarded as the most productive, are in this account of things represented as altogether barren and unproductive.

Artificers and manufacturers in particular, whose industry, in the common apprehensions of men, increases so much the value of the rude produce of land, are in this system represented as a class of people altogether barren and unproductive. Their labour, it is said, replaces only the stock which employs them, together with its ordinary profits. That stock consists in the materials, tools, and wages advanced to them by their employer; and is the fund destined for their employment and maintenance. Its profits are the fund destined for the maintenance of their employer. Their employer, as he advances to them the stock of materials, tools, and wages necessary for their employment, so he advances to himself what is necessary for his own maintenance, and this maintenance he generally proportions to the profit which he expects to make by the price of their work. Unless its price repays to him the maintenance which he advances to himself, as well as the materials, tools, and wages which he advances to his workmen, it evidently does not repay to him the whole expense which he lays out upon it. The profits of manufacturing stock therefore are not, like the rent of land, a net produce which remains after completely repaying the whole expense which must be laid out in order to obtain them. The stock of the farmer yields him a profit as well as that of the master manufacturer; and it yields a rent likewise to another person, which that of the master manufacturer does not. The expense, therefore, laid out in employing and maintaining artificers and manufacturers does no more than continue, if one may say so, the existence of its own value, and does not produce any new value. It is therefore altogether a barren and unproductive expense. The expense, on the contrary, laid out in employing farmers and country labourers, over and above continuing the existence of its own value, produces a new value, the rent of the landlord. It is therefore a productive expense.

Mercantile stock is equally barren and unproductive with manufacturing stock. It only continues the existence of its own value, without producing any new value. Its profits are only the repayment of the maintenance which its employer advances to himself during the time that he employs it, or till he receives the returns of it. They are only the repayment of a part of the expense which must be laid out in employing it.

The labour of artificers and manufacturers never adds anything to the value of the whole annual amount of the rude produce of the land. It adds, indeed, greatly to the value of some particular parts of it. But the consumption which in the meantime it occasions of other parts is precisely equal to the value which it adds to those parts; so that the value of the whole amount is not, at any one moment of time, in the least augmented by it. The person who works the lace of a pair of fine ruffles, for example, will sometimes raise the value of perhaps a pennyworth of flax to thirty pounds sterling. But though at first sight he appears thereby to multiply the value of a part of the rude produce about seven thousand and two hundred times, he in reality adds nothing to the value of the whole annual amount of the rude produce. The working of that lace costs him perhaps two years' labour. The thirty pounds which he gets for it when it is finished is no more than the repayment of the subsistence which he advances to himself during the two years that he is employed about it. The value which, by every day's, month's, or year's labour, he adds to the flax does no more than replace the value of his own consumption during that day, month, or year. At no moment of time, therefore, does he add anything to the value of the whole annual amount of the rude produce of the land: the portion of that produce which he is continually consuming being always equal to the value which he is continually producing. The extreme poverty of the greater part of the persons employed in this expensive though trifling manufacture may satisfy us that the price of their work does not in ordinary cases exceed the value of their subsistence. It is otherwise with the work of farmers and country labourers. The rent of the landlord is a value which, in ordinary cases, it is continually producing, over and above replacing, in the most complete manner, the whole consumption, the whole expense laid out upon the employment and maintenance both of the workmen and of their employer.

Artificers, manufacturers, and merchants can augment the revenue and wealth of their society by parsimony only; or, as it is expressed in this system, by privation, that is, by depriving themselves of a part of the funds destined for their own subsistence. They annually reproduce nothing but those funds. Unless, therefore, they annually save some part of them, unless they annually deprive themselves of the enjoyment of some part of them, the revenue and wealth of their society can never be in the smallest degree augmented by means of their industry. Farmers and country labourers, on the contrary, may enjoy completely the whole funds destined for their own subsistence, and yet augment at the same time the revenue and wealth of their society. Over and above what is destined for their own subsistence, their industry annually affords a net produce, of which the augmentation necessarily augments the revenue and wealth of their society. Nations therefore which, like France or England, consist in a great measure of proprietors and cultivators can be enriched by industry and enjoyment. Nations on the contrary, which, like Holland and Hamburg, are composed chiefly of merchants, artificers, and manufacturers can grow rich only through parsimony and privation. As the interest of nations so differently circumstanced is very different, so is likewise the common character of the people: in those of the former kind, liberality, frankness, and good fellowship naturally make a part of that common character: in the latter, narrowness, meanness, and a selfish disposition, averse to all social pleasure and enjoyment.

The unproductive class, that of merchants, artificers, and manufacturers, is maintained and employed altogether at the expense of the two other classes, of that of proprietors, and of that of cultivators. They furnish it both with the materials of its work and with the fund of its subsistence, with the corn and cattle which it consumes while it is employed about that work. The proprietors and cultivators finally pay both the wages of all the workmen of the unproductive class, and of the profits of all their employers. Those workmen and their employers are properly the servants of the proprietors and cultivators. They are only servants who work without doors, as menial servants work within. Both the one and the other, however, are equally maintained at the expense of the same masters. The labour of both is equally unproductive. It adds nothing to the value of the sum total of the rude produce of the land. Instead of increasing the value of that sum total, it is a charge and expense which must be paid out of it.

The unproductive class, however, is not only useful, but greatly useful to the other two classes. By means of the industry of merchants, artificers, and manufacturers, the proprietors and cultivators can purchase both the foreign goods and the manufactured produce of their own country which they have occasion for with the produce of a much smaller quantity of their own labour than what they would be obliged to employ if they were to attempt, in an awkward and unskilful manner, either to import the one or to make the other for their own use. By means of the unproductive class, the cultivators are delivered from many cares which would otherwise distract their attention from the cultivation of land. The superiority of produce, which, in consequence of this undivided attention, they are enabled to raise, is fully sufficient to pay the whole expense which the maintenance and employment of the unproductive class costs either the proprietors or themselves. The industry of merchants, artificers, and manufacturers, though in its own nature altogether unproductive, yet contributes in this manner indirectly to increase the produce of the land. It increases the productive powers of productive labour by leaving it at liberty to confine itself to its proper employment, the cultivation of land; and the plough goes frequently the easier and the better by means of the labour of the man whose business is most remote from the plough.

It can never be the interest of the proprietors and cultivators to restrain or to discourage in any respect the industry of merchants, artificers, and manufacturers. The greater the liberty which this unproductive class enjoys, the greater will be the competition in all the different trades which compose it, and the cheaper will the other two classes be supplied, both with foreign goods and with the manufactured produce of their own country.

It can never be the interest of the unproductive class to oppress the other two classes. It is the surplus produce of the land, or what remains after deducting the maintenance, first, of the cultivators, and afterwards of the proprietors, that maintains and employs the unproductive class. The greater this surplus the greater must likewise be the maintenance and employment of that class. The establishment of perfect justice, of perfect liberty, and of perfect equality is the very simple secret which most effectually secures the highest degree of prosperity to all the three classes.

The merchants, artificers, and manufacturers of those mercantile states which, like Holland and Hamburg, consist chiefly of this unproductive class, are in the same manner maintained and employed altogether at the expense of the proprietors and cultivators of land. The only difference is, that those proprietors and cultivators are, the greater part of them, placed at a most inconvenient distance from the merchants, artificers, and manufacturers whom they supply with the materials of their work and the fund of their subsistence, are the inhabitants of other countries and the subjects of other governments.

Such mercantile states, however, are not only useful, but greatly useful to the inhabitants of those other countries. They fill up, in some measure, a very important void, and supply the place of the merchants, artificers, and manufacturers whom the inhabitants of those countries ought to find at home, but whom, from some defect in their policy, they do not find at home.

It can never be the interest of those landed nations, if I may call them so, to discourage or distress the industry of such mercantile states by imposing high duties upon their trade or upon the commodities which they furnish. Such duties, by rendering those commodities dearer, could serve only to sink the real value of the surplus produce of their own land, with which, or, what comes to the same thing, with the price of which those commodities are purchased. Such duties could serve only to discourage the increase of that surplus produce, and consequently the improvement and cultivation of their own land. The most effectual expedient, on the contrary, for raising the value of that surplus produce, for encouraging its increase, and consequently the improvement and cultivation of their own land, would be to allow the most perfect freedom to the trade of all such mercantile nations.

This perfect freedom of trade would even be the most effectual expedient for supplying them, in due time, with all the artificers, manufacturers, and merchants whom they wanted at home, and for filling up in the properest and most advantageous manner that very important void which they felt there.

The continual increase of the surplus produce of their land would, in due time, create a greater capital than what could be employed with the ordinary rate of profit in the improvement and cultivation of land; and the surplus part of it would naturally turn itself to the employment of artificers and manufacturers at home. But those artificers and manufacturers, finding at home both the materials of their work and the fund of their subsistence, might immediately even with much less art and skill be able to work as cheap as the like artificers and manufacturers of such mercantile states who had both to bring from a great distance. Even though, from want of art and skill, they might not for some time be able to work as cheap, yet, finding a market at home, they might be able to sell their work there as cheap as that of the artificers and manufacturers of such mercantile states, which could not be brought to that market but from so great a distance; and as their art and skill improved, they would soon be able to sell it cheaper. The artificers and manufacturers of such mercantile states, therefore, would immediately be rivalled in the market of those landed nations, and soon after undersold and jostled out of it altogether. The cheapness of the manufactures of those landed nations, in consequence of the gradual improvements of art and skill, would, in due time, extend their sale beyond the home market, and carry them to many foreign markets, from which they would in the same manner gradually jostle out many of the manufactures of such mercantile nations.

This continual increase both of the rude and manufactured produce of those landed nations would in due time create a greater capital than could, with the ordinary rate of profit, be employed either in agriculture or in manufactures. The surplus of this capital would naturally turn itself to foreign trade, and be employed in exporting to foreign countries such parts of the rude and manufactured produce of its own country as exceeded the demand of the home market. In the exportation of the produce of their own country, the merchants of a landed nation would have an advantage of the same kind over those of mercantile nations which its artificers and manufacturers had over the artificers and manufacturers of such nations; the advantage of finding at home that cargo and those stores and provisions which the others were obliged to seek for at a distance. With inferior art and skill in navigation, therefore, they would be able to sell that cargo as cheap in foreign markets as the merchants of such mercantile nations; and with equal art and skill they would be able to sell it cheaper. They would soon, therefore, rival those mercantile nations in this branch of foreign trade, and in due time would jostle them out of it altogether.

According to this liberal and generous system, therefore, the most advantageous method in which a landed nation can raise up artificers, manufacturers, and merchants of its own is to grant the most perfect freedom of trade to the artificers, manufacturers, and merchants of all other nations. It thereby raises the value of the surplus produce of its own land, of which the continual increase gradually establishes a fund, which in due time necessarily raises up all the artificers, manufacturers, and merchants whom it has occasion for.

When a landed nation, on the contrary, oppresses either by high duties or by prohibitions the trade of foreign nations, it necessarily hurts its own interest in two different ways. First, by raising the price of all foreign goods and of all sorts of manufactures, it necessarily sinks the real value of the surplus produce of its own land, with which, or, what comes to the same thing, with the price of which it purchases those foreign goods and manufactures. Secondly, by giving a sort of monopoly of the home market to its own merchants, artificers, and manufacturers, it raises the rate of mercantile and manufacturing profit in proportion to that of agricultural profit, and consequently either draws from agriculture a part of the capital which had before been employed in it, or hinders from going to it a part of what would otherwise have gone to it. This policy, therefore, discourages agriculture in two different ways; first, by sinking the real value of its produce, and thereby lowering the rate of its profit; and, secondly, by raising the rate of profit in all other employments. Agriculture is rendered less advantageous, and trade and manufactures more advantageous than they otherwise would be; and every man is tempted by his own interest to turn, as much as he can, both his capital and his industry from the former to the latter employments.

Though, by this oppressive policy, a landed nation should be able to raise up artificers, manufacturers, and merchants of its own somewhat sooner than it could do by the freedom of trade — a matter, however, which is not a little doubtful — yet it would raise them up, if one may say so, prematurely, and before it was perfectly ripe for them. By raising up too hastily one species of industry, it would depress another more valuable species of industry. By raising up too hastily a species of industry which only replaces the stock which employs it, together with the ordinary profit, it would depress a species of industry which, over and above replacing that stock with its profit, affords likewise a net produce, a free rent to the landlord. It would depress productive labour, by encouraging too hastily that labour which is altogether barren and unproductive.

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The greatest and most important branch of the commerce of every nation, it has already been observed, is that which is carried on between the inhabitants of the town and those of the country. The inhabitants of the town draw from the country the rude produce which constitutes both the materials of their work and the fund of their subsistence; and they pay for this rude produce by sending back to the country a certain portion of it manufactured and prepared for immediate use. The trade which is carried on between these two different sets of people consists ultimately in a certain quantity of rude produce exchanged for a certain quantity of manufactured produce. The dearer the latter, therefore, the cheaper the former; and whatever tends in any country to raise the price of manufactured produce tends to lower that of the rude produce of the land, and thereby to discourage agriculture. The smaller the quantity of manufactured produce which any given quantity of rude produce, or, what comes to the same thing, which the price of any given quantity of rude produce is capable of purchasing, the smaller the exchangeable value of that given quantity of rude produce, the smaller the encouragement which either the landlord has to increase its quantity by improving or the farmer by cultivating the land. Whatever, besides, tends to diminish in any country the number of artificers and manufacturers, tends to diminish the home market, the most important of all markets for the rude produce of the land, and thereby still further to discourage agriculture.

Those systems, therefore, which, preferring agriculture to all other employments, in order to promote it, impose restraints upon manufactures and foreign trade, act contrary to the very end which they propose, and indirectly discourage that very species of industry which they mean to promote. They are so far, perhaps, more inconsistent than even the mercantile system. That system, by encouraging manufactures and foreign trade more than agriculture, turns a certain portion of the capital of the society from supporting a more advantageous, to support a less advantageous species of industry. But still it really and in the end encourages that species of industry which it means to promote. Those agricultural systems, on the contrary, really and in the end discourage their own favourite species of industry.

It is thus that every system which endeavours, either by extraordinary encouragements to draw towards a particular species of industry a greater share of the capital of the society than what would naturally go to it, or, by extraordinary restraints, force from a particular species of industry some share of the capital which would otherwise be employed in it, is in reality subversive of the great purpose which it means to promote. It retards, instead of accelerating, the progress of the society towards real wealth and greatness; and diminishes, instead of increasing, the real value of the annual produce of its land and labour.

All systems either of preference or of restraint, therefore, being thus completely taken away, the obvious and simple system of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord. Every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest his own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with those of any other man, or order of men.

中文目录

1　论劳动分工

2　劳动分工的原理

3　商业体系的原理

4　对于商品进口实施的限制

5　限制的不合理性

6　农业体系

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英文目录

Contents

1　The Division of Labour

2　The Principle of the Division of Labour

3　The Principle of the Commercial System

4　Restraints on the Importation of Goods

5　The Unreasonableness of Restraints

6　The Agricultural Systems

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